



Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-100
Wednesday
22 May 1996

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-100

CONTENTS

22 May 1996

NOTICE: This volume contains a representative selection of material previously disseminated in softcopy format.

ALBANIA

Albania: Berisha Promises To Support Fier District Farmers [ATA]	1
Albania: Berisha Addresses Voter Rallies in South [ATA]	1
Albania: Report on Party Election Rallies in Districts [ATA]	1
Albania: Party Leaders Hold Electoral Meetings in Districts [ATA]	2
Albania: Socialists Plan To Prevent Election 'Trickery' [KOHA JONE 21 May]	2
Albania: Election Commission Terms PS Charges 'Groundless' [ATA]	3
Albania: Poll Shows Majority Thinks TV Favors Red Front [ATA]	4
Albania: Zhulali Discusses Integration With Greek Counterpart [ATA]	4

BULGARIA

Bulgaria: SDS Says Bill Imposes BSP Control of Media [DEMOKRATSIYA 18 May]	5
Bulgaria: BSP To Name Presidential Candidate on 23 Jun [STANDART NEWS 19 May]	5
Bulgaria: Opposition Presidential Candidates Attend Rallies [KONTINENT 20 May]	5
Bulgaria: BSP Plans Campaign Strategy, Views Media Coverage [STANDART NEWS 22 May]	6
Bulgaria: Gechev Departs for Moscow To Hold Cooperation Talks [Sofia Radio]	6
Bulgaria: Article Questions Videnov Commitment to Market Reform [DEMOKRATSIYA 22 May]	6

CZECH REPUBLIC

Czech Republic: Free Trade Zone Agreement With Israel Signed [HOSPODARSKE NOVINY 21 May]	8
Czech Republic: UK's Portillo Pushes Purchase of Gripen [MLADA FRONTA DNES 21 May]	8
Czech Republic: Poll on Party Support on Election Eve [PRAVO 21 May]	8
Czech Republic: Analysis of Final Polls Before Elections [MLADA FRONTA DNES 21 May]	9

SLOVAKIA

Slovakia: Poll Shows Drop in Support for NATO Membership [SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 21 May]	11
Slovakia: Schenk's Vatican Visit Seen as 'Unusual' [NARDONA OBRODA 20 May]	11
Slovakia: Official Views Ethnic Minority Rights Conference [SME 13 May]	12
Slovakia: Visiting Americans' Advice Criticized [SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 18 May]	12
Slovakia: Coalition Disputes Said To Be More 'Acute' [SME 15 May]	13
Slovakia: Scandals Erupt on Domestic Political Scene [SME, etc.]	13
Slovakia: DU Calls Leader of New Liberal Party 'Swindler' [PRAVDA 20 May]	16
Slovakia: President's Son Protests Suspension of Case [Bratislava Radio]	16
Slovakia: Parties View Shelving of Kidnapping Inquiry [SME 21 May]	16
Slovakia: Remias's Parents Convinced of Son's 'Murder' [SME 20 May]	17

HUNGARY

Hungary: Defense Minister Keleti Refuses To Resign [Budapest Radio]	19
Hungary: Surveys Examine Army Attitude Toward NATO Membership [NEPSZAVA 20 May]	19
Hungary: SZDSZ Chairman Peto Views Legislative Issues [NEPSZAVA 20 May]	20

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

B-H: Klickovic on Possible Referendum, Dayton Implementation [SRNA]	23
---	----

B-H: Unendorsed Treaties Signed by Kasagic To Be Disregarded [SRNA]	23
B-H: Biographical Data on Serb Republic PM Klicovic [GLAS SRPSKI 20 May]	23
B-H: Bildt, Walker Meet Serb Leaders; Karadzic Problem Remains [AFP]	24
B-H: Bildt To Ask Milosevic 'To Help Arrest' Karadzic, Mladic [AFP]	24
B-H: Serb Socialist Leader Views Kasagic Removal, Economy [Belgrade TV]	24
B-H: Commentary Assesses Karadzic's 'Halfway' Withdrawal [VEČERNJE NOVOSTI 20 May]	25
B-H: Serb Missing Persons Official Requests Bildt's Help [Pale TV]	26
B-H: ICTY To Hold Public Hearings on Karadzic, Mladic [AFP]	26
B-H: UNHCR Reports on Refugee Situation in 10 Municipalities [TANJUG]	26
B-H: Izetbegovic Discusses Elections With OSCE Officials [Sarajevo Radio]	27
B-H: Pejanovic Stresses 'Basic Conditions' To Hold Elections [Sarajevo Radio]	28
B-H: Government Repeats Demand for Mostar Refugees To Vote [AFP]	28
B-H: Commentary Urges Mostar Elections Postponement [Sarajevo Radio]	28
B-H: Presidency Appoints Cazim Sadikovic as Brcko Arbiter [Sarajevo Radio]	29
B-H: Joint Military Commission Discusses Peace Agreement [Sarajevo Radio]	29
B-H: Gen Delic: Federal Army Commander Should Be Bosniak [Hanau NOVA BOSNA 21 May]	29
B-H: Zubak: UNHCR To Blame for Stolac Impasse [Mostar Radio]	30
B-H: Government Views Results of Federation Forum Meeting [Sarajevo Radio]	30
B-H: Air Force Commander Describes Development of Air Force [VEČERNJE NOVINE 17 May]	30
B-H: Scandinavian IFOR Troops Not To Withdraw 20 Dec [AFP]	31
B-H: Federal Partners, Bosnians in Turkey Deceiving U.S. [VJESNIK 20 May]	31
B-H: 'Mutual Distrust' in Relations With Croatia Seen [OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) 13 May]	32
B-H: Report on Former Mujahedin Camp [SLOBODNA BOSNA 22 Mar]	33

CROATIA

Croatia: UN Envoy on Pilot Program for Refugee Repatriation [TANJUG]	36
Croatia: UNTAES Commander Satisfied With Demilitarization [Belgrade Radio]	36
Croatia: E. Slavonia Serbs Criticize Croatian Amnesty Law [SRNA]	36
Croatia: Social Liberal Party Leader Gotovac Interviewed [NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA 17 May]	37
Croatia: Tactics of Anti-Tudjman Opposition Criticized [Zagreb TV]	38

FYROM

FYROM: Foreign Minister on NATO, International Relations [DNEVNIK 18 May]	39
FYROM: Citizens Experience Difficulties Obtaining Visas [MIC]	42
FYROM: Visa Procedure With Greece Simplified [MIC]	43

POLAND

Poland: Allied Forces Commander on Prospects of NATO Entry [PAP]	44
Poland: 'Large-Scale Actions' To Promote NATO Membership [RZECZPOSPOLITA 22 May]	44
Poland: Deputy Defense Minister on NATO Negotiations [POLSKA ZBROJNA 16 May]	45
Poland: Krzaklewski: Belarus Minister Lied About Minsk Events [PAP]	46
Poland: Solidarity Pickets Belarus Embassy in Warsaw [PAP]	47
Poland: Ukrainian Minister on Prospects for Free Trade [GAZETA WYBORCZA 22 May]	47
Poland: Minister Presents Nominee for Intelligence Service [Warsaw Radio]	48
Poland: Committee on Interior Ministry Reorganization Plans [Warsaw TV]	48
Poland: Draft Privatization Law 'Violates the Law' [RZECZPOSPOLITA 21 May]	49
Poland: Presidential Delegate Wants Draft Constitution Amended [NOWA EUROPA 22 May]	49
Poland: PSL Chairman's Internal Party Policy Assessed [GAZETA WYBORCZA 18-19 May]	49
Poland: Advantages of Israeli Missile Over U.S. Hellfire [SZTANDAR 20 May]	50

ROMANIA

Romania: Presence of NATO Troops for PFP Drills Approved [Bucharest Radio]	52
--	----

Romania: Funar Suggests PDSR-PUNR Meetings To End Dispute [Bucharest Radio]	52
Romania: PDSR Rejects PUNR Proposal for County-Level Talks [Bucharest Radio]	52
Romania: Minister Says 'Secret Services' Involved in Elections [EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 20 May] ..	53

SLOVENIA

Slovenia: No Signals From Solana on Possible NATO Membership [Ljubljana Radio]	54
Slovenia: Duma Delegation Opposed to Nation in NATO [DNEVNIK 17 May]	54
Slovenia: EU Sees No Obstacles to Associate Agreement [Ljubljana Radio]	55

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

FRY: Defense Council Supports Dayton Accord Implementation [TANJUG]	56
FRY: Serbian, Russian Nationalist Party Discuss Ties [TANJUG]	56
FRY: Mladic Attends Burial of Serb Gen Djukic [SRNA]	56
FRY: Mladic, Perisic Attend Djukic Memorial Service [Bad Vilbel VESTI 22 May]	56

Serbia

Serbia: Belgrade, Zagreb Negotiate Oil Deal [AFP]	57
Serbia: Milosevic Receives 'Acting' Serb Republic President [TANJUG]	57
Serbia: Trade Union Threatens More Demonstrations in Nis [FONET 21 May]	57
Serbia: Opposition Leader Believes Karadzic Should Go [TANJUG]	57

Kosovo

Kosovo: Rugova on U.S. Role in Resolving Kosovo Issue [KOSOVA DAILY REPORT]	58
---	----

Albania: Berisha Promises To Support Fier District Farmers

AU2105131896 Tirana ATA in English
1002 GMT 21 May 96

[Report by A. Keko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Fier, May 20 (ATA)—In the course of his meetings with inhabitants of the Myzeqe zone, President Berisha had several meetings on Monday [20 May] afternoon with inhabitants of Kuman, Roskovec, Zharrez, and Patos in the Fier district.

Berisha expressed gratitude to the Myzeqe inhabitants for their great support in realising its programme for the country's progress.

The president reconfirmed the goals of the Democratic Party [PD] programme to support agricultural production.

He told the Myzeqe farmers that the democratic state would support private farmers with selected seeds, saplings and chemical fertilizers to go ahead with the agricultural development. He also told them that investment would be provided for the infrastructure, water system, health and education.

The PD is sure to win in the May 26 elections because it has a serious and ambitious programme.

Berisha had its last meeting with inhabitants of Ballsh. Also in this meeting, Berisha unfolded the PD alternative, which is the alternative of victory in the May 26 elections, the alternative of a better future for Albanians and Albania.

Albania: Berisha Addresses Voter Rallies in South

AU2205105196 Tirana ATA in English
0851 GMT 22 May 96

[Report by P. Shuteriqi, I. Manka]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, May 21 (ATA)—Albanian President Sali Berisha met with the inhabitants of Corovode and the villages of Kakruke, Storre, Zogaj, in southern Albania.

Berisha introduced Kudret Cela, lawyer, honest intellectual devoted to democratic alternative as the Democratic Party [PD] candidate for deputy.

An appeal of 250 intellectuals of Skrapar addressed to the co-citizens to support the PD as the only progressive alternative force guaranteeing welfare and progress of the country was read at the meeting.

Berisha held a meeting in Polican, near Corovode. He also met the inhabitants of Kucove in southern middle

Albania and was present at the inauguration of the new digital telephone exchange with 1,000 numbers.

Albanian President visited on Tuesday the new Albanian Municipality, Ura Vajgurore. He said to the participants that "he really is for a genuine social democratic alternative, like the civilized Europe but the Albanian Socialist leadership does not accept it. They want that Albania returns to the East while we have been and will remain in the West."

He invited them to vote for the PD candidate.

More than 10,000 people joined a gathering on Tuesday [21 May] afternoon in the "Tomorri" Stadium to welcome the President of the Republic Sali Berisha.

Speaking about the prospective of the city of Berat, Berisha said that the PD will work to set up an air connection with this marvelous city and great centre of the Albanian culture, to build automobile roads to connect the city with the sea in the shortest way possible.

Berisha presented Vice Prime Minister Dylber Vrioni, Interior Minister Agron Musaraj, the PD chairman in Berat Kozeta Menkulasi, Kristaq Piti, and Mirko Haxhistasa, teachers as the PD candidates for deputy in Berat.

Albania: Report on Party Election Rallies in Districts

AU2105133696

[FBIS Report] Tirana ATA in English at 0905 and 0929 GMT on 21 May transmits reports on election rallies held by party leaders in several districts in Albania.

An 0905 GMT report by Shkelqim Hajno from Sarande notes that the Socialist Party [PS] Steering Committee "held a rally with the city's electorate" at the sports hall on 19 May.

Citing PS chairman Pellumbi, the report notes that Pellumbi "expressed conviction for the PS sure victory in the May 26 elections and said that this party has worked out an alternative which has as its main objective the man and his troubles." Pellumbi said that over the past four years, "the PS has shown to be a force knowing to give democracy messages."

On the other hand, ATA mentions "surveys carried out by various international institutions" which predict "PS can ensure in the May 26 elections the support of no more than 20 per cent of the electors."

Pellumbi also "expressed dissatisfaction towards the Democratic Party governing, saying that the PS has been

under constant persecution. He considered Fatos Nano's imprisonment a result of political retaliation."

At 0929 GMT ATA transmits a report by P. Zekthi on two election rallies held by Democratic Party, PD, Chairman Tritan Shehu with Elbasan inhabitants on 19 May.

The report cites Shehu as having stated that "our ideal, which will give us victory on May 26, is the individual's well-being. During the last four years we encountered with many difficulties inherited by communism, but despite errors we will march ahead." Shehu expressed "full conviction" that "Elbasan, like the whole of Albania, will vote for the PD alternative."

The report further notes: "The candidates for deputies of this constituency, Minister of Mineral and Energy Resources Abdyl Khaja, Minister of Labour, Emigration, Social Assistance and Formerly Politically Persecuted Engjell Dakli, and S. Jorgaqi, expressed their belief that the Elbasan people will know for which to vote this time, too. They have seen in the PD the only force to bring to this region the necessary development."

The report says that "the chairman of the German delegations in the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, Klaus Buehler, greeted the participants and expressed the commitment to establish links between Germany and the Elbasan city for the reconstruction of a multi-branch industry under the existing resources."

Albania: Party Leaders Hold Electoral Meetings in Districts

AU2205093796

[FBIS Report] Tirana ATA in English at 1329 and 1641 GMT on 21 May transmits reports on the electoral activity of the political parties on the eve of elections.

According to the 1329 GMT report, the "Speaker of Parliament Pjeter Arbnori, candidate in the Constituency 5, met with inhabitants of Lac and Vau i Dejes."

Deputy Prime Minister Dashamir Shehi, a candidate for deputy, held a meeting with inhabitants of two districts in Vlore, promising that "the telephone network will be extended to the whole of Albania in 2000." Shehi also "explained the Democratic Party (PD) economic platform for the next four years."

The report notes that the Democratic Alliance leaders held a meeting in Vlore on 20 May and "ensured the participants of the victory of their party in the May 26 elections." The report also notes that "the National Legality Party presented the candidates for deputies in the sixth constituencies at the Palace of Culture A. Moisiu in Durres."

The 1641 GMT report notes that PD Chairman Tritan Shehu held a meeting in Sarande. Focusing on "PD efforts to integrate Albania into the Euro-Atlantic structures," Shehu "mentioned the last messages Albania has received from different European countries; those of Kohl and Chirac, of Italy and Greece, of the U.S. and CE, which asked to continue the same road to the West and not to the East where socialists want to send Albania." At the meeting, Shehu also "introduced three candidates for deputy."

Albania: Socialists Plan To Prevent Election 'Trickery'

AU2105174196 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian
21 May 96 p 3

[Report by Emin Barci: "The Socialists: This Is How We Will Defend Our Votes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Not a single vote will be lost to us," announced the Socialist Party (PS) headquarters in Tirana yesterday. The PS Presidium gathered together all the PS district chairmen to discuss the electoral procedure and the measures the Socialists must take to avoid possible manipulation by the Democratic Party (PD). The chairmen of the 37 districts presented at headquarters all the problems they have encountered so far in their constituencies. They told the party leaders about the trickery and manipulation that the PD is ready to use on 26 May. They all handed in to the PS Information Office the electoral rolls in every district and every constituency. These lists will be processed by computer within two days, and all names registered twice, and all those not registered at all, will be identified. After identifying the manipulators by name, the Socialists will ask the constituency commissions to eliminate "surplus" names.

There are also measures that will be taken even if the PD-controlled commissions do not remove the surplus names on the electoral rolls, but the PS headquarters was not willing to say what they are. The district chairmen once again learned about all the features of the ballot paper and how the results will be calculated. The PS's Electoral Office told the district chiefs everything about the procedure from the opening of the polling station and the ballot boxes, securing the private booths, and registering voters, down to drawing up the final protocols. It has been learned that the district chairmen will gather all their members at the polling stations and explain to them all the possible tricks the government is expected to use to rig the votes.

As for the most recent provocation of the PD, according to which the PD alone will sign the protocols, the Socialist leaders explained to the representatives of the

grass roots that the government's game is up, and all the members of the commission will sign the results of the voting. The manner in which the results of the voting will be carried from the polling station and brought immediately to Tirana has also been decided. Every polling station will have at its disposal a car that will bring the protocol from the polling station to the constituency commission, and thence to PS headquarters in Tirana. In the most sensitive constituencies, the protocols will be escorted by foreign observers until they reach their destination. According to one of the Socialist leaders, the results of the votes throughout more than 90 percent of the Republic will be ready before midnight [2200 GMT] on 26 May. "No vote will go for nothing, because there will be no sleep for anybody that night," said PS Deputy Chairman Ilir Meta.

Albania: Election Commission Terms PS Charges 'Groundless'

AU2105125796 Tirana ATA in English
1131 GMT 21 May 96

[Report by R. Floqi]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, April 20 (ATA)—The case of the form containing the election outcome which is considered as a violation by the Socialist Party [PS] and carried by the daily KOHA JONE on Friday [17 May] was a political bluff to tense the situation.

The member of the Legality Party, Murat Bala, told the Socialist members of the Central Election Commission [KQZ] to reflect on the manipulations during their press conference.

"The meeting of the Commission said that the problems presented by Ylli Bufi and Bashkim Caka, both Socialists, are not true," sources at the KQZ said to ATA.

On Saturday [18 May], the above PS representatives held a press conference to express their "concern" over the kind of forms to be used for the election outcome and the fact that who will sign them. They said that "after many unfair and arbitrary actions and attitudes, the majority of the election commission tried to change the report of the election outcome through secret decisions."

"In yesterday's meeting, the Central Election Commission rejected the Socialist statements calling them untrue and groundless. Through these statements they aimed at tensioning the electoral campaign," Nestor Thereska, vice chairman of the commission said.

Sources at the commission informed yesterday that Caka said to Gudar Beqiraj, the KQZ member, that "we know that the case of the report was a bluff."

In fact the final model of the report of local election commission was defined only last evening in compliance with the law. It was decided that the form will be signed by the chairman and secretary leaving space to other commission's members if they like.

"The report is legal if it is signed by the chairman and secretary. An empty space is left, without limiting the number, to other members of the commission whose number reaches 15. This was unanimously accepted by the Central Election Commission last evening, Vladimir Kristo, KQZ member and lawyer, said. [no closing quotation mark as received]

In yesterday's press conference, Bufi and Caka presented two unsealed copies of a certain report model saying that this was given by the secretary and that it was approved on May 5.

Bufi said that "the secretary has informed them that the report has been changed upon order depriving the other members of the polling station commission to sign and giving the right only to commission's chairman and secretary."

Asked about the report, the secretary said to ATA that he has not handed over any certain form to anyone. Moreover, the sources at the commission said that this problem like other different projects, was discussed first in commission and the chosen variant was sealed and signed.

"The false article of the daily KOHA JONE and the illegal press conference of Bufi and Caka are two actions which run counter to the laws," the KQZ said.

According to Article 48 on Election Law, "Members of the Election Commission and observers are neither allowed to have badges or symbols of the party or the group they represent and nor to carry out or participate in propaganda activities during the elections."

Their statements that "this paves the way to manipulation of the election outcome, and others" are, according to the commission, a party propaganda in favour of the PS.

The KQZ urged the daily KOHA JONE to deny the false story under Article 59 on the Electoral Law. Article 59 said that newspapers or any other means of information which publish false and insulting material are obliged to carry a debate gratis in the coming edition or broadcast in the same place and size with the previous material which caused debates, otherwise they will be punished with large amounts of fines under the Article 48 if the case is a penal offence.

The efforts of the Socialists, the KQZ said, aim at amplifying a tense situation. This can also explain yester-

day's threat against the Secretary of the Central Election Commission Kreshnik Spahiu and other pressures against some other commission members.

"Earlier yesterday when I was on my way to the commission a man around 35 whose name, I learned later, was Osman Ibrahim forced the way to my car saying: 'I am from Hoxha's family. We will behead you after the election,'" Spahiu said.

Later he was put into custody by police and is now under interrogation.

Some sources said that unidentified persons have spread slogans among youngsters saying that "the borders will be closed immediately after the elections, and others."

Albania: Poll Shows Majority Thinks TV Favors Red Front

AU2105130396 Tirana ATA in English
1018 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, May 21 (ATA)—The "Arben Broci" Foundation says in a press release on Monday [20 May] that after a detailed survey of the electoral campaign, it observes tendencies of political groups, especially of the red front, to artificially aggravate the elections campaign.

One of this tendencies, the statement says, is the pressure on the TV and the independent mass media in general.

"Our survey on this topic, carried out since the beginning of the campaign on May 17, 1996, shows that 1,000 people or 59.3 per cent have responded that the TV has given more space to the red front than to the union for democracy. Whereas 28.4 per cent think that the opposition has been favoured," the statement says.

Albania: Zhulali Discusses Integration With Greek Counterpart

AU2205092696 Tirana ATA in English
1617 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, May 21 (ATA)—Albanian Defence Minister Safet Zhulali at the head

of a delegation paid a visit to Greece from May 19 21 upon the invitation of the Greek minister of defence.

After voicing President Berisha's greeting for the Greek President Stefanopoulos, Zhulali said that, the signing of two agreements some days ago was a concrete expression of the Friendship Treaty signed in March in Tirana. The ever growing relations between the two countries will be on the benefit of both countries and stability in the region.

He said that President Berisha will visit Greece according to the invitation of the Greek president immediately after the elections in Albania.

Stefanopoulos in his address greeted all democratic developments in Albania and the deepening of bilateral relations between the two countries, and in this context the importance of further widening of military relations.

After a tete-a-tete talk between the two defence ministers the delegations meeting was held.

Zhulali said that Albania is seriously working in the Partnership for Peace agreement and considers this initiative as the best way to introduce Albania into the alliance and we ask Greece support for our integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.

The Greek Defence Minister Arsenis underlining the fact that the Balkan gradually should be integrated into the EU and backed Albanian request to be a member of the Alliance.

Two collaborators of both defence ministers signed the Cooperation Programme for 1996 and agreed to sign soon other agreements in the field of defence.

Both ministers held a press conference after the talks.

Zhulali today returned to Albania.

Bulgaria: SDS Says Bill Imposes BSP Control of Media

AU2005132196 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian
18 May 96 p 1

[Article by Milena Boyadzhieva: "BSP Will Control Radio and Television by Law"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sofia—The Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] deputies are suspending their participation in the debates and voting on the radio, television, and BTA bill. The national media are becoming dependent on the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP]. SDS Deputy Chairman Nadezhda Mikhaylova declared after the parliamentary majority approved the membership quotas in the future National Radio and Television Council. The council will have 11 members, two of whom will be nominated by the prime minister, two by the president, four by the largest parliamentary group, and three by the opposition. Simple arithmetic shows that the parliamentary majority will have six representatives, that is, it will dominate the council. Opposition deputies declared that this article of the laws imposes party control on the national media. At the start of the session, they asked for the debate on the bill to be adjourned, because the bill is completely at variance with the recommendations of experts from the United States and the Council of Europe.

Bulgaria: BSP To Name Presidential Candidate on 23 Jun

AU2005133796 Sofia STANDART NEWS
in Bulgarian 19 May 96 p 1

[STANDART NEWS staff report: "BSP To Nominate Presidential Candidate on 23 June"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to a source at BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] headquarters, at a secret session the Executive Bureau of the BSP Supreme Council decided that the Socialists would announce the name of their presidential candidate on 23 June.

The Socialist's leading body held an all-night session on 17 and 18 May to discuss their participation in the presidential elections. After a report presented by the trio of Doncho Konakchiev, Krasimir Premyanov, and Nikolay Dobrev, who had surveyed potential presidential candidates, the BSP leadership reportedly decided to nominate its candidate after the results of the presidential elections in Russia had become known.

SDS members commented that "Videnov can allow himself not to nominate a purely party candidate only if Zyuganov enters the Kremlin on 16 June."

Bulgaria: Opposition Presidential Candidates Attend Rallies

AU2005133596 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian
20 May 96 p 2

[Report by "KONTINENT reporters team"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Gabrovo, Isperrikh, Sofia—The opposition's presidential candidates Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev and Petur Stoyanov exchanged hardly a word to one another at the rally that the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS] organized on 18 May in the locality called Demir Baba Teke, near the town of Isperrikh, in memory of victims of the so-called Revival Process [campaign to force ethnic Turks to change their names].

The two candidates, accompanied by Anastasiya Mozer, had to wait around until DPS leader Ahmed Dogan showed up at the commemoration of the events of May 1989. Dogan arrived an hour late, because he had stayed up until 0400 the night before in the nightclub of the Shumen Hotel, in the company of Kasim Dal and SDS deputy leader Aleksandur Bozhkov. While the audience were waiting for Dogan to arrive, they were entertained by folklore groups. Zhelev and Stoyanov delivered formal speeches, following which the multitude fell upon the votive offering of 123 lambs, slaughtered in memory of the victims of the "Revival Process." Dr. Zhelev was also expected at the commemoration held the day before in the village of Pristoe, Shumen district, but failed to appear in the stadium, where Dogan addressed a crowd of 5,000 people.

"I do not need the primaries," President Zhelev said in a special interview on the Panorama Program of Bulgarian National Television. However, he admitted that the vote on 1 June is "the final attempt to unite the democratic community." "The members of the opposition are still not mature enough to conduct a calm dialogue among themselves," the president said, adding that half of the SDS electorate has always supported him. This provoked an angry reaction from SDS Deputy Muravey Radev, who declared that Dr. Zhelev was mistaken if he expected half of the SDS electorate to vote for him in the primaries. According to Radev, this would not happen.

The SDS will accept the results of the primaries and will support whichever candidate wins them, Ivan Kostov said in Yambol yesterday. In Kostov's view, no politician or party can assume the right to assess the legitimacy of the primary elections. This was the SDS leader's comment on Zhelev's recent statement that he will not accept the result of the primaries if they are manipulated or falsified. Visiting Sliven, Kostov declared that a poll taken by the opinion agency MBMD

indicated that one-third of the supporters of the People's Union will vote for Petur Stoyanov.

Bulgaria: BSP Plans Campaign Strategy, Views Media Coverage

AU2205100596 *Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian* 22 May 96 p 4

[Article by Neda Popova: "BSP Forms Group To Ward Off Attacks From the Right and Looks at Private Media"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] will set up a temporary group to ward off attacks from the right with a view to ensuring success in the presidential elections. This was announced yesterday at a session of the BSP Information and Propaganda Commission, chaired by Klara Marinova, at the party headquarters. The membership and tasks of the group will be determined later.

Pavel Pisarev, former director of Bulgarian National Television, urged that the BSP should obtain air time on private electronic media. In his view, the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] was in full control of the electronic media in Sofia. He described Darik Radio and FM Plus as the opposition's media.

Sociologist Andrey Bundzhulov from the OSD [Alliance for Social Democracy] singled out as the most immediate tasks the propagation of the BSP's ideas on mass privatization and the structural reform, the problem of crime, and the party's responsibility to win the presidential elections.

National Assembly Deputy Yuriy Borisov attacked Klara Marinova for allowing journalists to attend the strategic meeting, asking her if she could guarantee him similar access to the SDS meetings on tactical planning. Marinova retorted that this is a matter for the journalists who report on the opposition.

"We are losing the right-wing section of the party's electorate, which will mean defeat in the presidential elections," OSD member Andrey Raychev warned. In his words, there will be a disastrous outcome within the BSP following the elections unless the BSP now mounts a tolerant campaign, free of excessive attacks. Mincho Minchev of the Marxist Platform accused Petur Stoyanov of duplicitous behavior. According to him, the SDS presidential candidate shows different faces to the electorate, when he launches bitter attacks on the BSP, and in the electronic media, when he pretends to be tolerant. "We cannot hold a dialogue with the SDS," Minchev declared.

Valentin Vatshev complained to STANDART NEWS that "the conclusion from the way the extreme wings

of the BSP are behaving is that they will not vote for the Left's presidential candidate." Raychev said earlier that "the OSD holds about one-tenth of the BSP's firm electorate."

Bulgaria: Gechev Departs for Moscow To Hold Cooperation Talks

AU2205114696 *Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian* 0900 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Today Rumen Gechev, deputy prime minister and minister for economic development, departed for Moscow to attend the closing proceedings of the "Days of Bulgaria" in Russia. His delegation includes Bulgarian cultural figures, musicians, and actors, who will take part in the closing events in Moscow.

At Sofia Airport, Minister Gechev announced that his program also included talks on bilateral cooperation with Russian Government leaders and meetings at the Russian Economics Ministry.

Bulgaria: Article Questions Videnov Commitment to Market Reform

AU2205113396 *Sofia DEMOKRATIYA in Bulgarian* 22 May 96 p 9

[Article by Ivan Ibrishimov: "Market Communism Is Absurd"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Videnov takes special pride in the fact that only he and his government had the nerve to launch the structural reform by closing 64 state companies operating at a loss, thus putting 23,000 workers on the street. There is something symbolic in this act: The party, the successor and continuation of the communist tradition, itself destroys what it took decades to build so it can save its own skin. With the same aim, using its familiar techniques, it struggles simultaneously to convince the international financial institutions that it is grappling seriously with the reform and to persuade workers and unions that the devil is not so black, because there is a social program, and we do have Rumen Gechev and Mincho Koralski.

All this might have followed the familiar old scenario and even produced some real benefits for Bulgaria. However, remaining true to themselves, our rulers continue to remove from and add companies to the list, showing that their actions are really just shadowboxing for the benefit of Anne McGuirk [IMF mission leader] rather than a sign of serious intentions and real change. The other interpretation is that this is another case of professional impotence and a lost sense of responsibility. However, there is also a third possibility; namely, that the companies to be closed will be selected on

the basis of the economic interests of the various party clans, of who is who, and what belongs to whom.

In any event, we can be certain that the catastrophic processes in the economy will provoke similar events within the depths of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] itself. Andrey Lukanov's argument that the reform has been delayed not by one, but by six years, which its why the consequences are to terrible, does not hold water either. People with good memories know that the reform was started in 1992 by the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] administration and was one of the main reasons for this government's loss of power. The BSP has been in power for five of the six years that have elapsed since 10 November 1989, and only now, when it has once again driven Bulgaria to the brink of disaster, has it been forced to react, not to mention the fact that during the last three and a half years the party has enjoyed total power.

Now Zhan Videnov is seeking the support of the whole of society. It will be difficult for him to count on this support; this is not because the SDS and the unions fail to realize that the unpopular measures and steps

that he is undertaking might in principle be correct, but because one cannot implement market reform and capitalism with one hand and sow communism with the other. A social market economy may exist, but market communism is absurd. It is impossible to seek understanding and consensus on one set of issues while acting like a dictator with regard to other issues. This is something that we have witnessed every day in parliament. What guarantee is there that, in the event of the reform failing, dictate may not escape from the parliamentary debating chamber into the street, and that the responsibility will be wielded like a hammer to smash the heads of ordinary people?

The Bulgarian people have lived through a lot. Byzantines, Turks, and Communists have oppressed them. The people have invented proverbs and stories to ensure their survival. One of them is the story of the little boy who called wolf. The analogy is perfect, because the new economic environment that Videnov talks about will turn out to be the same kind of mutant as the Communists who have transformed themselves into businessmen.

Czech Republic: Free Trade Zone Agreement With Israel Signed

AU2105183296 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 21 May 96 p 3

[Report by "(jbn)": "Trade With Israel Will Soon Be Simpler Than It Now Is With Some European States"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Trade and Industry Minister Vladimir Dlouhy and his Israeli counterpart, Mikha Harish, yesterday signed an agreement in Prague on establishing a free trade zone between the Czech Republic and Israel.

For our side, it is the first agreement of this kind outside of Europe. "We would like to acquaint businessmen with the advantages of the agreement in the first month after its signing," declared M. Harish.

The agreement concluded is far more liberal than some of the similar agreements with the countries bordering on our republic, pointed out V. Dlouhy. By 1 January 1997, duty should be reduced completely for the absolute majority (about 90 percent) of the goods traded today. In the case of industrial products, which, at the moment, are not traded between our countries, it is envisaged that about 80 percent of the duties will be reduced.

For two years, of course, a transitional period with certain exceptions (for example, heating oils or some textile raw materials) will be in force. The liberalization of trade in so-called sensitive goods—such as footwear, furniture, textiles, transformers, conductors, pneumatic tires, and other products—should be resolved completely by the end of the century. Talks have also begun on gradually relaxing the market in agricultural commodities.

Czech Republic: UK's Portillo Pushes Purchase of Gripen

AU2105140096 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 21 May 96 p 2

[Report by "(gag, gro)": "The British Recommend That the Army Purchase Swedish Fighters"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Michael Portillo, British secretary of state for defense, used yesterday's meeting with his Czech counterpart, Vilem Holan, to put in a word on behalf of the purchase of the state-of-the-art British-Swedish JAS-39 Gripen fighter aircraft, which the Swedish Saab company has developed and is producing.

This is the first time a politician from a Western country, whose offer the Czech Army is considering, has spoken publicly in favor of a specific aircraft. The other options

contained in the Czech-U.S. plan for modernizing the Air Force include the purchase of the state-of-the-art U.S. F/A-18, F-16C, or F-16D aircraft or the five-year lease of seven older unmodernized F-16A fighters. Then the Army would purchase 18 already modernized F-16A or F-16B fighters for 5-6 billion korunas. This option also reckons with the purchase of a further 18 fighters after the year 2007.

At the same time, the Americans are capable of delivering the first modernized F-16 fighters as early as 1998—that is, at the time that AERO Vodochody will start to produce the subsonic L-159 ground-attack aircraft for the Army.

On the other hand, according to the experts, Saab will not be capable of delivering the JAS-39 Gripen fighters until the year 2000 at the earliest. Its entire production is destined for the Swedish Army until this date. Despite this, military experts describe the Swedish offer as unusually interesting. "This is an extraordinarily high-quality aircraft, whose price may be very favorable," claims a Defense Ministry specialist.

Nevertheless, experts point out that the advantageous offer from the Swedes, who are cooperating with the British Aerospace company, may be preceded by attempts to promote the British HAWK-200 ground-attack aircraft, whose purpose is similar to that of the Vodochody L-159, but whose cost is about 50-percent more. "If this were to happen, it could, under certain circumstances, endanger the completed project for the Czech ground-attack aircraft," the experts think.

British diplomatic sources maintain, however, that Michael Portillo's statement is not surprising. His interest in selling goods—in this case, aircraft—is, according to them, logical from a commercial point of view. "This really involves nothing more than an assurance that there is an interest here. There is nothing specific behind his statement," they said.

Czech Republic: Poll on Party Support on Election Eve

AU2205120096 Prague PRAVO in Czech 21 May 96 p 2

[Report by "(ryc)": "The Governing Parties Would Not Have a Constitutional Majority"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the survey conducted by the Institute for Public Opinion Research (IVVM) in May, the governing coalition would have 106 seats in the future 200-member Chamber of Deputies—that is, not enough for a constitutional majority (120 are necessary for changes in the Constitution). The Civic Democratic Party [ODS] would

win 66 mandates, the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party [KDU-CSL] would win 22, and the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA] would win 18. The opposition factions would hold 94 seats: the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD], 54; the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia [KSCM], 22; and the Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia [SPR-RSC], 18.

The support for the following parties is not shown in the table: The Bohemian-Moravian Union of the Center and the Movement for a Self-Governing Moravia and Silesia-Moravian National Party, each have 0.5 percent; the Party of the Democratic Left has 0.3 percent; the Independents have 1.2 percent; and the Moravian National Party-Movement for Moravian and Silesian Unification has 0.3 percent. The Czech Right has no support at all. The parties that did not put down a deposit and whose voting papers have thus not been printed have the following support: the Green Party, 1.6 percent; the Right Bloc, 0.4 percent; the Party of Czechoslovak Communists, 0.2 percent; and the Nationwide Caucus of Citizens, 0.1 percent.

Support for Parties

	Jan	Apr	Beginning of May
	Percent		
ODS	27	26	22
CSSD	17	16	18
KDU-CSL	7	9	7
KSCM	7	6	7
ODA	7	7	6
SPR-RSC	5	5	6
Left Bloc	5	5	3
DZJ	1	2	3
SD-LSNS	2	2	2
DEU	1	1	2
Do not know	20	20	17

NOTE: SD-LSNS = Free Democrats-Liberal National Social Party; DZJ = Pensioners for a Secure Life; DEU = Democratic Union

Czech Republic: Analysis of Final Polls Before Elections

AU2205120596 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 21 May 96 p 2

[Article by Jiri Kubik: "The ODS and the CSSD Could Win Over the Voters of the Other Parties"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—On the basis of its experience from the last parliamentary elections in 1992, the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] evidently is convinced that far more people than the polls are suggesting to date will eventually support it in the elections.

Although the most recent surveys by the Institute for Public Opinion Research [IVVM] and the Center for Empirical Research [STEM] have revealed a decline in support for the ODS, the party's representatives think that, in the end, they will win over to their side current supporters of the other parties or the undecided voters. While the last preelection poll in 1992 also suggested a decline in the ODS's popularity from more than 20 percent to 19 percent, 30 percent of the electorate eventually supported the party in the elections.

"We would consider a similar or slightly better result than last time to be acceptable. We envisage a return of 30 and more percent," claims ODS spokeswoman Jana Petrova.

The Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] forecasts that 25 percent of the electorate will vote for it. So, compared with the ODS's forecast, they themselves reckon that they will be second after the elections. "We have made it our aim to win 25 percent," said CSSD spokesman Jiri Kanturek. The social democrats won 6.5 percent of the vote in the 1992 elections; at the same time, the preelection polls had indicated that they would get about 9 percent.

IVVM director Eliska Rendlova is convinced that such a dramatic increase in ODS voters cannot transpire at the last moment in this year's elections as in 1992. "I believe that the ODS may gain votes from the voters of the other parties, but the same thing could also occur in the case of the social democrats. It could win votes from the dissatisfied camp, from people who are oriented, for instance, toward the small opposition parties, which, it is already clear today, will not get into parliament," claims Rendlova.

At the same time, according to the most recent poll conducted by IVVM, some of the smaller opposition parties have added to their supporters. Rendlova thinks that this could be the reason for the decline in the ODS's support in May. For example, 2.3 percent chose the

Democratic Union [DEU] (only 1.4 percent in April); 2.8 percent chose the Pensioners for a Secure Life [DJZ] (1.9 percent last time); and 1.2 percent named the Independents, which no one mentioned at all in the previous polls.

That is, for the first time, the IVVM offered the respondents a list with the names of all of the parties that are going into the elections. So, people could make their choice just as they will do in the real elections. In the previous polls, they only had to say, without the possibility of a choice, which party they would vote for.

"It is possible that, in the most recent poll, a number of the respondents became aware of some party that, previously, they did not know existed and gave it as their favorite," thinks the IVVM director.

The IVVM ascertained electoral preferences in the first week of May, while STEM carried out its survey the following week. These two agencies will not conduct any more opinion polls before the elections, which take place on 31 May and 1 June.

Slovakia: Poll Shows Drop in Support for NATO Membership

AU2105174696 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA
in Slovak 21 May 96 p 2

[Report by TASR: "If a Referendum on NATO Entry Were Held..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The FOCUS agency conducted a public opinion poll on the issue of Slovakia's entry into NATO from 23 to 30 April, in which 1,332 adult respondents took part.

To the question: "If a referendum were to be held the coming weekend, how would you respond to the question 'Do you agree with Slovakia's entry into NATO?'" 37.8 percent of citizens replied affirmatively in April (in December 1995, 42.5 percent of respondents replied affirmatively and in June 1995, 38.6 percent) and 25.3 percent answered negatively (in December, NATO entry was opposed by 21.9 percent of citizens, and in June 1995 by 19.2 percent). In April 1996, 18.5 percent of the adult population of Slovakia would not have taken part in the referendum (compared with 17.7 percent in December 1995 and 21.3 percent in June 1995), while 10.5 percent were unable to decide (compared with 17.9 percent in December 1989 and 20.9 percent in June 1995). The share of citizens who support Slovakia's entry into NATO has declined somewhat since December 1995, while the share of opponents of this step has increased.

In April 1996, 63 percent of respondents would participate in a referendum on Slovakia's entry into NATO, 60 percent of whom would support this step. For the sake of comparison, in December 1995, 64 percent of respondents would have participated in such a referendum, 66 percent of whom would have voted for NATO entry.

The share of respondents supporting the Slovak Republic's entry into NATO is lower among supporters of the government coalition than among opposition supporters. The largest proportion of supporters of NATO entry is to be found among respondents supporting the Democratic Party—61.9 percent, the Hungarian Coalition—61.7 percent, the Democratic Union—56.9 percent, and the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH]—48.9 percent. Among sympathizers of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], 47.1 percent would support the Slovak Republic's entry into NATO. As for supporters of the government coalition, 37.5 percent of respondents supporting the Slovak National Party [SNS], 36.8 percent of respondents supporting the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS], and 34.3 percent of respondents supporting the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia

[HZDS] would advocate in April the Slovak Republic's entry into NATO. A total of 25.3 percent of those polled identified themselves as nonvoters or undecided.

[Bratislava SME in Slovak on 21 May on page 3 publishes a table on the results of the FOCUS poll on the extent of support for Slovakia's NATO membership in the event of a referendum, which provides a different figure for undecided respondents in the April 1996 poll. The SME table reads:

	Apr 96	Dec 95	Jun 95
	Percent		
I would reply "yes"	37.8	42.5	38.6
I would reply "no"	25.3	21.9	19.2
I would not participate	18.5	17.7	21.3
I do not know	18.5	17.9	20.9

Slovakia: Schenk's Vatican Visit Seen as 'Unusual'

AU2105125196 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA
in Slovak 20 May 96 p 1

[Report by Zita Sujova: "Eduard Kukan Termed Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk's Procedure in Keeping Slovak Republic Ambassadors in Slovakia as Nonstandard"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Juraj Schenk, Slovak Republic minister of foreign affairs, left for a one-day working visit to the Vatican on Friday [17 May]. Anton Neuirth, ambassador of the Slovak Republic to the Holy See, did not accompany him, however. He stayed behind in Slovakia where he has been since 19 April for so-called basic consultations. Eduard Kukan, former minister of foreign affairs and former ambassador of the Slovak Republic to the UN, termed this procedure "nonstandard and unusual, to put it mildly." According to his experience, governments summon ambassadors for consultations when complicated situations arise in bilateral relations with the country of the ambassador's accreditation. He stressed, however, that these consultations usually last only a few days and the diplomat then returns. He gave as an example the summoning of Jeno Boros, Hungarian ambassador to the Slovak Republic, to Budapest "for consultations" after passage of the law on the state language by the National Council of the Slovak Republic. "When Mr. Neuirth has been at home for a whole month, the minister should have at least taken him along. Leaving him behind is absolutely inexplicable." Regarding speculation that the

Slovak Government wants to replace A. Neuirth in the ambassadorial post with Augustin Marian Huska, deputy chairman of parliament and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, Kukan said that he knew about this only from the press. "What I know for sure, however, is that Mr. Neuirth's position in the Vatican is very strong and that his possible recall, especially under those circumstances, would raise big question marks among Vatican representatives," Eduard Kukan added.

Slovakia: Official Views Ethnic Minority Rights Conference

AU2205103296 Bratislava SME in Slovak 13 May 96 p 4

[Interview with Dusan Slobodnik, chairman of the Foreign Committee of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, by Jana Pankovcinova and Juraj Hrabko: "The Hungarian Minority Co-Owns This State"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The second roundtable on ethnic minorities organized by a U.S. foundation took place in Casta-Papiernicka. Dusan Slobodnik, chairman of the Foreign Committee of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, deputy for the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, participated.

[SME] What steps should Slovakia take to at least maintain its present position in the endeavors to integrate into international structures like the EU or NATO?

[Slobodnik] I believe that we must press on with the development of this society. Metaphorically speaking, in four or five points, we could join, let us say, the EU from one day to the next. Regarding our domestic democratic situation, some of the exceptions presented to us must of course be admitted and the faults removed. The important thing, however, is that Slovakia is a young country that is only just building its statehood. From this point of view, therefore, it cannot be compared with democracies that have existed in Europe for 30-40 years. It is necessary to have a little patience and seek solutions so that we make our way forward. I am convinced that Slovakia will make it. The situation is not all that hot—the decisionmaking process will not start before February, March 1998. Nothing will happen until then because the intergovernmental conference is going on in Turin, and these issues will only be discussed after Malta and Cyprus are admitted. The associated countries will get their turn after that.

[SME] Relations between the government coalition and the Hungarian minority in the Slovak Republic are not good. What should be done to improve them?

[Slobodnik] The standard of ethnic minority rights is very high in Slovakia. Of course, there are things

that should be and will be dealt with. Nevertheless, Slovakia will undoubtedly not go beyond the level of individual rights—it will not accept collective rights. Any additional steps of accommodation toward the ethnic minorities within the framework of individual rights are possible. We really want the citizens of ethnic Hungarian background to feel at home in Slovakia, for they co-own the state, they are equal citizens. We do everything in our power to this effect. Of course, the cooperation of the other side is needed.

Slovakia: Visiting Americans' Advice Criticized

AU2205111796 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 18 May 96 p 1

[Editorial commentary by Lubomir Hudo in the "Public Matter" column]

[FBIS Translated Text] Two important members of the board of the Foundation for a Civil Society (FSC), James Hodge, publisher of the Foreign Affairs bi-monthly, and Robert Hutchings, head of the International Studies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington, came here within the framework of a panel discussion on the topic of the U.S. Policy Toward Central Europe to deliver some bad news. According to them, the Western community in general shares the opinion that Slovakia does not belong in the first group of the North Atlantic Alliance membership hopefuls. It has been allegedly clearly stated within the framework of nonpublic diplomatic discussions. Both Americans were very sorry about it but it allegedly is Slovakia that brings about its own exclusion from the first rank of candidates of membership in the North Atlantic structure because of the nondemocratic conduct of the cabinet and the signs of deterioration of the domestic political situation.

NATO Secretary General Javier Solana stated in Bratislava recently that there are no chosen or doomed countries with respect to Alliance membership. To the question of whether Solana is aware of the diplomatic rumors behind the screens or whether he informed us hypocritically, the American duo did not give me an adequate answer. Nevertheless, Hodge and Hutchings emphasized that it still is not too late; they hope that the situation would improve in time, and it is up to us. As true democrats, they do not prescribe to us what government we should have, and Slovakia itself must decide where it is to belong. We are not to ask what NATO can do for us, but what we can do for NATO. So, we should take to heart the good advice from American uncles. Disobedient Slovakia brings wrinkles to the brows of the protectors of "democratic society." So, when could this country become one of the chosen

ones? Apparently only after we learn to dance to the tune of various lobby and interest groups....

Slovakia: Coalition Disputes Said To Be More 'Acute'

AU2205090096 Bratislava SME in Slovak 15 May 96
p 4

[Commentary by Marian Lesko: "The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia Is Under Double Pressure"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Recently it came to light that, besides presiding over the National Property Fund [FNM], Stefan Gavornik also manages the subsidiary of a large bank. About Mr. Rehak, chairman of the FNM Executive Committee, we learned that he had bought himself an official car for 3 million korunas. It goes without saying that these reciprocal information leaks were not coincidental. The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] [Rehak's party] and the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] [Gavornik's party] let it be known in this way that they are arguing about the further course of privatization. The prime minister officially announced last week that its drastic deceleration had been caused by "various subjective factors, not by objective ones." Vladimir Meciar categorically added that "these subjective factors must be reassessed and changed." After this the chief of the Antimonopoly Office, also Gavornik, another of Luptak's men, was thus to go. And not only Gavornik. The HZDS daily recently wrote about the general director of Slovenska Poistovna [Slovak Insurance Company] that "he got into this important post at the proposal of the ZRS as an absolute layman." The ZRS chairman retaliated against Meciar in his own way. After meeting a delegation of the Russian Duma, he mentioned what he had stressed during the talks—that "we would be glad if our country became neutral." The prime minister was then forced to explain to foreign journalists what is inexplicable: The coalition government has its clear policy targets, only "statements by the chairmen of coalition parties differ in this respect from the coalition government's policy."

Just like Luptak's "workers," also the Slovak National Party [SNS] people have both privatization and political interests. SNS deputies proposed that further subjects at schools with Hungarian as the language of instruction be taught in the state language. The government disagreed with this. And the Penal Code amendment is not on the agenda of the parliamentary session, even though Jan Slota [SNS chairman] insisted that it was a "very urgent" legislative norm. The question of what to do with Gavornik (and privatization) and with the Penal Code amendment (and the EU and NATO) will have to be pondered by the coalition from the beginning of the National Council of the Slovak Republic session

because the Democratic Party will again propose the dismissal of the FNM president and the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] will propose that the Penal Code amendment be debated again.

The conflicts within the government coalition have never been as acute as they are now. The HZDS has never been under such pressures from within and from the outside. When it retains Gavornik and approves the amendment, it will signal that, faced with external pressure, it yielded to pressure from within.

[Coalition disputes over privatization are also the subject of a 650-word commentary by Ivan Podstupka, entitled "Coalition Monolith With a Crack," in Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 20 May on page 4. According to Podstupka, "SNS and ZRS representatives in the FNM Presidium and Executive Committee and in the management bodies of banks to be privatized have started to pour sand into the HZDS's giant privatization machine." He cites as an example the "stalemate situation" in Slovenska Poistovna, whose general director Mikulas Trstensky, a ZRS nominee, was recently dismissed by the Supervisory Board from the post of chairman of the Board of Directors. As Podstupka says, it was expected that Trstensky would soon be dismissed from the post of director general as well. However, because of a "stalemate situation" between the HZDS-controlled Supervisory Board, which appoints the chairman of the Board of Directors, and the ZRS and SNS-controlled Board of Directors, which appoints the director general, Trstensky has managed to hold on to one of his positions. According to Podstupka, "Trstensky, within the framework of his jurisdiction, immediately recalled senior managers who, as members of the Supervisory Board, had voted for his dismissal from the post of chairman of the Board of Directors and gave notice to other company dissidents." In Podstupka's opinion, the "stalemate is not so much between the Supervisory Board and the Board of Directors as between the HZDS on the one hand and the SNS and ZRS on the other."]

Slovakia: Scandals Erupt on Domestic Political Scene

AU2205094296

[FBIS Report] Three separate but related scandals broke out on the Slovak domestic political scene on 13 and 14 May, and were duly reported by the press. The Slovak dailies of 16 and 17 May carry several interviews with President Kovac, and a number of reports and commentaries. First, on Monday, 13 May, Radio Twist (private radio station) and Radio Free Europe broadcast a recording of a telephone conversation between Interior Minister Ludovit Hudek and SIS (Slovak Information Service) Director Ivan Lexa, during which the interior

minister promised to dismiss the Bratislava Regional Court investigator, Peter Vacok, from the case of the abduction of Michal Kovac, Jr. abroad. Both the content and vulgar language of the conversation are very compromising to Hudek and Lexa.

A day later, on 14 May, Slovak Television carried a 20-minute anonymous documentary claiming the direct participation of the Slovak president (senior official in the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly at the time) in the Technopol affair (fraudulent textile purchase in Germany). And last but not least, a report compiled by the Independent Civic Commission on the abduction of Michal Kovac, Jr., was delivered by Christian Democratic Movement Deputy Ladislav Pittner, chairman of the Commission, at a news conference in Bratislava on the same day. According to Pittner, "Slovak state authorities, as well as some top officials, neglected their basic duties and violated regulations during the investigation of the kidnapping of Michal Kovac Jr., and thus they are suspected of abusing their authority as state officials." Pittner names, among others, Ivan Lexa, director of the Slovak Intelligence Service (SIS), who particularly "interfered in the investigation," and "the Prosecutor's Office did not fulfill its duties." Moreover, Slovak Interior Minister Ludovit Hudek, the General Prosecutor of the Slovak Republic Michal Valo, and SIS director Ivan Lexa, "should carefully evaluate their behavior and resign from their posts." Pittner said that President Michal Kovac, Parliament Chairman Ivan Gasparovic, Prime Minister Meciar, and the lawyer of Michal Kovac Jr., Jan Havlat, will be able to familiarize themselves with the report. The aforementioned recording of the phone call between Hudek and Lexa was appended to the report.

Bratislava SME in Slovak on 16 May on page 5 carries a 200-word report signed "ch," according to which "the decision to broadcast the anonymous documentary on the Technopol case in an STV1 prime-time program was made on the evening of the broadcast. It was approved by STV Programming Director Milan Polak." Chief Editor Oto Neuman told SME that "the documentary was broadcast because it was topical and interesting," while Emil Semanco, the STV newscast first deputy chief editor, told SME that "he had nothing to do with it and categorically denied the possibility that the documentary was prepared by the newscast office."

This was complemented almost a week later by Bratislava NOVY CAS in Slovak on 21 May, which on page 2 carries a 400-word report signed "ay" that the unusual inclusion of the documentary in the program and the fact that the viewer has never learned who produced it, led Democratic Union Deputies Knazko and Vavrik "to continue the parliamentary research

in STV that began last week." The two men visited yesterday STV Director General Darmo. According to regulations, the "STV violated the author's law." The film that was not copyrighted is, according to the regulations, a pirate documentary, Knazko is quoted as having said. Darmo, asked for any documents (contract, receipt, etc.), refused to provide any information. He said, however, that "within 30 days he will prepare a statement on the problem." Democratic Union Chairman Cernak attempted to verify the authenticity of the controversial call between Hudek and Lexa but the Interior Ministry refused to let him see the book of telephone calls, which Cernak "considers sufficient proof."

Bratislava SME in Slovak on 16 May on pages 1 and 5 carries a 900-word interview with President Kovac by Peter Toth. The place and date of the interview are not given. President Kovac here denies ever having promised Peter Krylov a pardon in the Technopol case. According to Kovac, he "passed Krylov's petition for pardon onto the appropriate department to deal with it." While Kovac admits that he was aware of "Krylov's willingness to tell the truth about how and why he spoke in his testimony about Michal Kovac, Jr. as an alleged accomplice in the fraud," he insists that "it did not at all affect the processing of Krylov's petition for a pardon." Asked whether he ordered processing of the petition for a pardon submitted to him by Syc-Mile, Kocner, and Rosenberger, charged in the Technopol case as the STV documentary claims, Kovac replies that he received the requests, and he asked for their files, as he would not make such a decision without a thorough knowledge of the affair. So far, he had not received the files. Kovac also denies the alleged involvement in Technopol fraud. He had neither the intention nor the power (at the time) to provide the guarantees that the documentary claims. Toth further observes that "according to the STV, Kovac is capable of committing in the thrall of the opposition any amoral act against the government and the citizens of the Slovak Republic, and Pittner allegedly has documents from the Technopol case, which "bind Kovac to obedience." Kovac replies that the published recording of the Hudek-Lexa phone call, the unsolved accident of Robert Remias, and other issues of a discrediting nature led the SIS, SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA daily, and STV newscast to this desperate attempt—meaning the documentary—at explaining the situation in the manner that would suit their purpose. Furthermore, Kovac expects that the Office of the Prosecutor General will assess the broadcast documentary, and possibly prosecute the culprits.

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 16 May on page 2 carries a 650-word report on a similar interview with President Kovac by Julius Gembicky about the anonymous STV documentary on the Technopol affair. The place and date of this interview are again not given. According to the report, "the objective of the 'documentary' was to discredit the president" and to "make the public believe the versions of the events presented by the SIS, SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA, and the STV." The involvement of the SIS is allegedly testified to by the recording of telephone calls, conversations recorded by a hidden camera, etc. Nevertheless, according to Kovac, certain people were involved in the Technopol affair, "who did not work for the SIS in 1994 but certainly worked for Vladimir Meciar," and he names Jaroslav Svechota as an example. The body of the interview is identical to the above SME interview. In the last paragraph of the report, however, President Kovac concludes the interview with the statement that he "trusts the truth of the report compiled by the Independent Civic Commission of Deputy Pittner."

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 16 May, also on page 2, carries a 150-word CTK report that Marian K., one of the suspects in the Technopol fraud, denies mediating between President Kovac and Peter Krylov, main witness of the prosecution.

Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 16 May on pages 1 and 2 carries a 700-word report signed "mad, maj," in which the authors state that "although the STV had decided to keep quiet about the Technopol case, after some dirty moves by the 'other side,' it carried some facts of the case after all." They continue by recounting the content of the TV documentary, emphasizing the involvement of President Kovac. Next, they refer to the "emergence of well-founded hypotheses that Pittner has at his disposal evidence in the Technopol case (not included in the files)." The proof "of this evidence is, for instance, Pittner's unusual promotion to general." Even the so-called abduction of Michal Kovac, Jr., was, according to them, only a maneuver "to distract attention from the Technopol case." Moreover, "the manipulators of the affair also attempted to utilize the situation of Peter Krylov," who was promised a presidential pardon for his transgressions if he cleared Kovac, Jr. In conclusion, SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA challenges the claims made by Kovac in the above SME interview, accuses the president of lies, and warns him that lies are short-lived.

Bratislava PRACA in Slovak on 16 May on pages 1 and 2 carries a 1,350-word interview with President Kovac by Frantisek Melis about the same television documentary. Kovac is quoted here as saying: "We heard a mixture of fabrications and half-truths that came

out of the workshop of the Slovak Information Service," and its purpose was, according to Kovac, "to distract the attention of the public from the important issues of domestic policy, which have otherwise dominated the domestic political scene." He again mentions the Hudek-Lexa phone call, the mysterious explosion of Remias's car, and the owner's death, and—of course—an attempt to implicate the president in the Technopol fraud. Asked about the possibility of prosecuting those responsible, Kovac again says that he expects the prosecutor to take action. If he does not, he would consult his lawyers concerning a conceivable prosecution.

Next, Melis asks about the calls in the parliament on 15 May for the resignation of Interior Minister Hudek, SIS Director Lexa, and Prosecutor General Valo. Kovac says that "following the arguments in the report of the Independent Civic Commission, any reasonable politician would make it possible for the government and the parliament to restore the impaired trust in these institutions. The public expects these officials to resign." Melis also asks Kovac about Prime Minister Meciar's statement that the president and the opposition would be responsible if Slovakia were not admitted in the EU and NATO. Kovac expresses his surprise over Meciar quoting from the record of Kovac's talks with NATO Secretary General Solana because he himself only received a copy of the record on 14 May. Nevertheless, according to Kovac, there was nothing said that would hinder the admission of Slovakia into these organizations. He "only quoted Jean Francois Vallin, secretary general of the Party of European Socialists, who said, among other things, that the greatest obstacle to the admission of Slovakia into the EU is Vladimir Meciar."

Bratislava PRACA in Slovak on 16 May on page 5 an 850-word commentary by Ivan Ceredejev on report by the Independent Civic Commission on abduction of Michal Kovac. According to Ceredejev, the report has been overshadowed by the recording of the telephone conversation between Hudek and Lexa in its appendix. "Although it is worthless before the court because of its illegal origin, it is one of the few new facts confirming the existence of a government-supported mechanism thwarting the investigation of the abduction. Otherwise the report deals mostly with an analysis of known facts. The minimal direct evidence undoubtedly is encouraging for the organizers and culprits of the abduction." While there is no direct proof of the involvement of the SIS top brass, Ceredejev writes, there is plenty of circumstantial evidence. "Of particular interest are the night meeting between the prime minister and the interior minister, who was recalled from Brussels, after which the prosecutor terminated the prosecution of the

SIS agents, and the session of the State Defense Council, where apparently the transfer of the case to authorities in central Slovakia was prepared, as the prime minister inadvertently announced at the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia rally." The appeal to the implicated officials to resign in the conclusion of the report is, according to Ceredejev, a logical but ineffective ending. The commentary ends with the observation that "Lexa's generally recognized fast hand in ping-pong or soliciting finances for an election campaign cannot make up for the total absence of political and organizational talent and—recently quite underestimated—morals." The result is, according to Ceredejev, that "after a year of the government of the 'fast hand,' most citizens consider SIS agents as people with whom no decent person has anything in common."

Bratislava SME in Slovak on 17 May on pages 1 and 2 carries a 950-word commentary signed "bog, rk" on the delayed denial by Interior Minister Hudek of the authenticity of the recording of his conversation with SIS Director Lexa. According to his own statement, Hudek did not deny the authenticity at first because he was shocked. "The published scandalous recording, in which Hudek calls policemen idiots, indicates his and Lexa's direct interference in the investigation of the abduction of the president's son, moreover with the knowledge of the 'boss.' While the opposition calls for the resignation of Hudek, Lexa, and Valo, Prime Minister Meciar has kept quiet for the four days since the scandal broke out." Hudek's denial came only after Lexa denied ever having had such a conversation, and explains it as an artificial composition. This seems to explain why the commentary is entitled "Interior Minister L. Hudek Apparently Believes That All Citizens in Slovakia Are 'Idiots.'"

Bratislava SME in Slovak on 17 May on page 4 carries also a 550-word commentary by Robert Kotian entitled "Interior Minister Hudek Lies." Kotian reviews the course of events—Hudek's original admission and subsequent denial of the authenticity of the recording—and ridicules his attempt to convince the public that he can deny the authenticity of the recording based on an analysis of the tape. The author also observes that there are rumors that the recording was to be used for blackmailing the minister. Similarly to the other SME commentary, the author concurs with Hudek's "corrected" statement that the policemen are not idiots but wonders what he thinks of Slovak citizens. The scandals have not been resolved, and more items on the situation will certainly follow.

Slovakia: DU Calls Leader of New Liberal Party 'Swindler'

AU2105182796 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
20 May 96 p 1

[Report by TASR: "Democratic Union: Hlavac Embezzled Party Money"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"For Mr. Hlavac, founder of the Civil Liberal Party of Slovakia [Obciansko-liberalna strana Slovenska, OLSS], there is only one 'political' direction—alcohol. He parted ways with the Democratic Union of Slovakia [DU] when he embezzled the party's money. The public should know this, so that it does not get trapped by another swindler," reads a statement issued by the DU Press Department on Sunday [19 May] in reaction to the founding of the new political entity. "We will hold our fingers crossed for everyone who will honestly strive to stabilize the political scene in Slovakia," the DU adds in conclusion.

Slovakia: President's Son Protests Suspension of Case

LD2105133396 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Michal Kovac Jr. sent a statement to TASR [Slovak Republic News Agency] today in response to the decision of bodies responsible for criminal proceedings to suspend the case of his abduction abroad and not to continue the investigations.

In his statement Kovac Jr. tells all citizens that yesterday they were able to see how the state behaved toward its citizens, and how it viewed the protection of their rights. Every citizen must work hard in order not to encounter in future the state's blatant arrogance in ignoring human rights. The state is made up of citizens, Kovac Jr. stresses in the statement on the decision of bodies responsible for criminal proceedings to suspend investigations into the case of his abduction abroad.

Slovakia: Parties View Shelving of Kidnapping Inquiry

AU2105142596 Bratislava SME in Slovak 21 May 96
p 3

["Survey" by "bog, rk": "Investigator Ciz's Decision Proves the Endeavor To Let the M. Kovac Jr. Kidnapping Case Fizzle Out"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Investigator Major Jozef Ciz yesterday filed away the Michal Kovac Jr. kidnapping case and has stopped dealing with it, for the time being. Justifying his move, he said that no facts have

been ascertained that warrant the initiation of criminal proceedings. We asked the representatives of political parties how they assess Jozef Ciz's decision.

Milan Knazko, Democratic Union: Mr. Ciz is fulfilling his assignment, which is to thwart the investigation. He does not take into consideration the parts of the investigation file that demonstrate beyond all doubt the active involvement of Slovak Information Service [SIS] staff members in the abduction of a Slovak Republic citizen abroad. He will now evidently be working on the self-abduction version, sketched for him several months ago by the prime minister himself, who thus actively entered the process of investigations. I think that the independent civic commission, which is working on completing the investigation of the case, will not end its work with its report [published on 14 May], but will issue its final report only after the true perpetrators are behind bars.

Gyula Bardos, Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement [MKDH]: The decision by Central Slovak investigator Ciz to file the case away is the realization of a previously heralded scenario. This self-serving decision proves the endeavor to let the kidnapping case, or, rather, the investigation of the case, fizzle out. This decision will again make the Slovak Republic more visible in the negative sense. Something like this could not happen in a state based on the rule of law.

Jozef Zselenak, Party of the Democratic Left [SDL]: Although I attentively follow newspaper articles, personally I do not have enough information to be able to deliver an objective and impartial opinion on this matter. The SDL bodies have not yet dealt with this new fact. The information is simply so new that it would be irresponsible to react to it immediately without knowledge and the appropriate analyses.

Ivan Simko, Christian Democratic Movement [KDH]: The investigator fulfilled his assignment, as expected. He could now be appointed to investigate the murder of Thomas Becket. It would probably become suicide.

Peter Osusky, Democratic Party: The whole world knew who set the Berlin Reichstag on fire—only Goering's investigators did not find that out, and their boss cut a poor figure. The whole of Slovakia knows who is involved in Michal Kovac Jr.'s kidnapping, and only Meciar's Central Slovak Sherlock Holmes is unable to find it out. Is he unable, or not allowed? The answer is simple. But Mr. Ciz should try to find another job, one in which he would be more successful. What about sheep farming? There, one works with sheep. But there are also thinking citizens in Slovakia. And the "filed away" case will have a different ending.

Rafael Rafaj, Slovak National Party [SNS]: Was the decision made in accordance with the law? And was it made by an entity authorized by law to make it? If this was the case, then the SNS, respecting the principles of the law-governed state, has nothing to add to it, and least of all a political statement.

[On the same day, on page 1, Bratislava SME in Slovak carries a 350-word interview with KDH Deputy Ladislav Pittner, chief of the independent civic commission investigating the kidnapping of the president's son, by Jana Pankovcinova, which also concerns Major Ciz's decision to suspend the inquiry into the case. Pittner says that he is not surprised by the decision because, ever since investigators from Central Slovakia took charge of the case, "the investigation headed in the direction of confirming the version of self-abduction or simulated kidnapping." Pittner voices the conviction that, as the period of limitation for crimes of this nature is 10 years, it will be possible for criminal prosecution bodies to return to the case. He also observes that the investigation of the case by Austrian authorities has not yet been concluded and "does not rule out" that the Austrian investigation could result in the bringing of charges against specific Slovak perpetrators.]

Slovakia: Remias's Parents Convinced of Son's 'Murder'

AU2105183096 Bratislava SME in Slovak 20 May 96
p 2

[Report by "pt": "Robert Remias's Parents Are Asking"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—In an interview with SME, the parents of Robert Remias expressed doubts about the circumstances of the tragic death of their son, which they call "murder." "How is it possible that, immediately after the tragedy, the Slovak Ministry of Interior knew who the victim was? How is it possible that a Slovak Information Service [SIS] vehicle—a red Mercedes—was present at the scene of the crime? Someone even stepped out of the car, apparently to check on his job, got into the car again and left. How is it possible that the police took action so quickly and even deployed their special units? After all, according to the Slovak Interior Ministry spokesman, it was an ordinary accident," E. Remias, the father of the deceased, said in the interview with SME. He also raised the question of why the Slovak Interior Ministry was drawing final conclusions on the basis of partial findings, and why the prime minister was commenting on the case. According to E. Remias, neither he nor his wife were invited to identify their son immediately after the tragedy. He asked: "With what right do they treat him the way they do? He is not state property, and he was not in the state

services. With what right do they withhold the crashed car? Why did one of the policeman on the scene of the crime say that this was a delicate affair?" E. Remias added: "We will spare you one of the answers. The opposition is supposedly pressuring them. With good reason. Everyone can draw his own conclusions on the basis of our questions."

[Bratislava NOVY CAS in Slovak on 20 May on page 2 carries the following CTK report: "The parents

of Robert Remias, who became the victim of a car explosion, are convinced that their son was murdered. According to their information, shortly before his death Robert Remias said: 'Should they put their hands on my life, the murderers will be Meciar, Lexa, and their vassals.'"]

Hungary: Defense Minister Keleti Refuses To Resign

LD2105180196 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti is not to resign, although opposition parties have called on the prime minister to dismiss him. Speaking to Kossuth Radio, Keleti said he had made his decision to stay in coordination with Prime Minister Gyula Horn.

The parliamentary group leaders of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), the Hungarian Democratic People's Party (MDNP), the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP), the Independent Smallholders' Party (FKGP), and the Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party (Fidesz-MPP) [opposition parties] demanded Keleti's dismissal after eight MiG-29 aircraft participated in a military exercise in Poland without parliamentary authorization. [passage omitted]

Hungary: Surveys Examine Army Attitude Toward NATO Membership

AU2105203396 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 20 May 96 pp 1, 3

[FBIS Translated Text] According to internal surveys in the Hungarian Army, the opinion of the regular soldiers, similar to that of society, is divided and unstable on the issue of NATO membership. Many see it as a delicate issue and are unwilling to talk about it. Others give their opinion very carefully, asking not to reveal their names, and one general even said: "The dilemma creates a schizophrenic state for honest soldiers." We asked psychologists and sociologists: What are the characteristics of the problem, and what is the background?

According to our information, a 1990 survey indicated that 63.5 percent of regular soldiers did not see NATO membership as a good security solution, but 68.7 percent were also against participating in a possible new Warsaw Pact, and more than 38 percent found neutrality desirable. The research program that examined the general mood in the army showed that in 1993, some 73 percent of those questioned believed that our NATO membership would increase the country's security. Two years ago, only 61.3 percent said the same. Some 73 and 66.5 percent, respectively, agreed with membership itself at that time. This year's data is still being processed, so we cannot yet see the trend.

"In my view, the evaluation of this issue is not well founded either in the civilian sphere or among soldiers; there is no firm knowledge," said Colonel Janos Szabo, a sociologist. In his view, those who said yes or did not

know could join the group saying no at any time, and vice versa.

According to the deputy commander of the Miklos Zrinyi Military Academy, at first the defense sector, living in a euphoria of national sovereignty, did not prepare for Euro-Atlantic membership and had to wake up from the Warsaw Pact. The big army became smaller when some pieces were taken away both from the top and the bottom ranks of the officers, and the market took many of those in the middle away. However, as the new tasks of the hoped-for NATO membership offer new careers to those who are young, speak languages, and are willing to invest values, the rejection of the burdens of change in the aging army can also be accompanied by the rejection of NATO membership.

Today, the majority of regulars have a rational view of their situation and do not believe the army will get ahead through assertion of the legendary historic mission and the myth of making sacrifices. Market factors are decisive. That is why many believe it is only possible to change the disintegrating structure by supporting NATO orientation and through modernization, says one university professor, who believes that for the defense sector, the NATO problem will turn into a real task if a referendum turns the government's intention into a firm decision. At the moment, the armed forces are preparing for NATO compatibility without knowing the program of admission. "The situation is a bit similar to the tail wagging the dog, because in this issue the army is the dependent, and politics the independent variable," the doctor of military sciences said.

As to how the officers feel about the declared end of the enemy image, Janos Szabo said it was difficult to define who the enemy was in the past, but hatred had a concrete object. On the one hand, soldiers today accept the abstract enemy image, and on the other, just like the majority of people, they are unable to think in terms of abstract codes.

Psychiatrist Laszlo Bognar, department leader and head doctor at the Central Army Hospital, approached the issue of how much Hungary's intention to join NATO may have shocked the regular soldiers from the angle of the end of a sense of security and a shattered sense of identity. In the paternalistic world, soldiers knew their tasks and requirements exactly, and their supervisors even fulfilled the role of father so that the personality could be harmonious among these clear coordinates, the whole being crowned by existential security. The confusion started when he was told that from now on he was a uniformed citizen. It continued with the disappearance of guarantees from around him, and the new demand to be creative appeared at all levels of the

dependency structure. The formerly privileged service comfort (konform) sank below the civilian average. The two-way processes of one-way communication found the commanders unprepared, and discipline was violated with increasing frequency, Bogнар emphasized.

In his view it is a telling fact that in the first year of hurrah-optimism, not a single suicide was attempted in the army, but later this figure rose sharply and stabilized at around 400 a year. The reason is seemingly simple: The conscripts do not understand the commander, and vice versa. Although the enemy image disappeared, the content of the training did not—training for directed aggression, based on who should be exterminated when and how.

This psychological conflict has significance, because soldiers cannot be pacifists, and therefore the aggressive abilities should be maintained. There is no answer yet to the how, Bogнар claims. In the meantime, politics suggests that no armed conflict can be expected, and all problems can be solved through negotiations. In this way the existence of the army becomes symbolic, and officers have found themselves aware of not being needed. For me, the regular soldiers' opinion on NATO membership can only be understood in this context. We are at the stage where we roughly know what the point would be in joining but are still living and acting on the basis of former knowledge. "Soldiers have a split personality, which is a serious source of strong emotions and creates serious internal conflicts."

Bogнар called attention to two series of data. One indicates problems of the civilian sphere: Among 18-to-25-year-old conscripts, 35 percent are unsuitable for the army, 60 percent of whom are rejected for mental-psychological reasons. The other shows the health history of regulars: Soldiers at the beginning of their careers, at the age of 23 to 24, are in perfect psychological and mental health. Getting close to the retirement age at 55, the mortality indicator is much worse than that among civilian men; they die four to five years earlier. The army destroys the selected, healthy young people more than society does with civilians, Bogнар claims.

It was impossible to get many of the officers to talk; they found the psychological problems of NATO membership too much of a delicate issue. Some volunteered to touch on the subject. "For me, the question is how to defend our security rather than whether it is the Warsaw Pact or NATO," a 42-year-old officer said, who is preparing to leave because his workplace has become redundant. A 39-year-old officer said that we would only be able to defend our border for three to four days at the most, and therefore it is not a question of whether

we need the protective umbrella of the Euro-Atlantic alliance. A general, younger than 50, said: No one should believe that a responsible soldier can give his answer on this issue with a shrug of the shoulder. And he gets into a real schizophrenic state by the time he sweats out a responsible answer.

Hungary: SZDSZ Chairman Peto Views Legislative Issues

*AU2105150096 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian
20 May 96 pp 1, 4*

[Interview with SZDSZ Chairman Ivan Peto by Anna Dano; place and date not given: "Agreement Not Absolutely Necessary—Peto Claims About the Investigation Office"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The central investigation office is not an issue on which the two governing parties definitely have to make a decision. A lack of agreement would naturally mean that there will not be a new office, Ivan Peto, chairman of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], told NEPSZAVA. He believes that if there is not support from five parties the new constitution, then the current one will probably remain in effect. The government is not prepared for implementation of the media law.

[Dano] Your party said a categorical no to the plan for a central investigation office. With which basic principle of the SZDSZ does this idea clash? What is making you so tough?

[Peto] The wrong means must not be used, even in the interest of a good end. The central investigation office would confuse the current facilities available for repressing the black economy.

[Dano] Can a compromise be sought?

[Peto] We are facing any deadline to make a decision. It is not as if an investigation office or something similar would have to be created to avoid negative consequences. If the coalition partners do not reach an agreement, then no decision will be made on this issue. In that respect, this is an everyday event. The only difference from might be that the prime minister announced the decision in advance and the debate on whether it was possible or permissible to do so only started afterwards.

[Dano] Over the weekend, the prime minister criticized almost all the Free Democrat ministries. What are your views on the work of Interior Minister Gabor Kuncze?

[Peto] I do not think that I need to assess ministries in occasional interviews. I do not believe it is appropriate for any government member or leading government

party politician to assess the work of a government member or ministry during an ad hoc press conference. This is not customary. Such statements and assessments should only be given according to strict guidelines, because an impression might be created that, let us say, when the SZDSZ does not want a central investigation office, someone says that the SZDSZ-member minister did a bad job on the law on higher education.

[Dano] What are your views on the work of the police? Why haven't there been any results or successfully closed corruption cases?

[Peto] It is not opportune to assess the work of the police in connection with whether we want a central investigation office. In the work of the police, just as in the case of all offices, some elements can be criticized and others praised. It would be inappropriate to draw the balance of these at this occasion. I simply note that the police have finished many more cases than the number of judgments passed. The procedure and the whole issue has to be assessed in its totality in order to draw any conclusions.

[Dano] Although the SZDSZ has been pushing for passage of the law on incompatibility, it might have to wait longer. At his 17 May forum, the prime minister said that as long as the deputies do not perform their duties as a main job, they must not be restricted from filling other positions.

[Peto] First of all, in practice the deputies do their work as a main job, their fee being equal to full-time pay. Second, the current rules allow them to have certain types of jobs. However, it makes a difference whether they have a state or a private job. There is a close link between being a government party deputy and having governmental power. It is unacceptable for a government party deputy or any deputy to represent the state, as an owner, at the companies. Rather than being a money-making opportunity, this affects precisely the thing from which the prime minister wants to protect the economy and public administration. The economy and politics have to be sharply separated. It is unacceptable to use political positions for acquiring economic positions. If we do not have a strict law on incompatibility, then the opposite will happen. The law on incompatibility is not about whether a deputy should or should not earn, it is about the dangers of merging economic and political positions.

[Dano] If the law on incompatibility existed the way you are suggesting, former Industry Minister Laszlo Pal could not be chairman of the MOL RT [Hungarian Oil and Natural Gas Corporation]. MOL is soon to have a general meeting. The SZDSZ formerly protested Pal's appointment. Rumor now has it that Pal will leave. Has

the SZDSZ's opinion been asked on this issue, or did you try to exert any pressure?

[Peto] We do not consider the board of directors at a company, including state-owned companies, to come under the authority of parties. Regardless, my opinion is that it is not good to have frequent personnel changes at large state companies that are facing privatization. This indicates confusion and creates mistrust.

[Dano] The big social debate about the new constitution, the coalition's big task, keeps revealing that this draft is not any better than the existing Constitution. On 17 May, Horn called the concept categorically bad. Is it possible that the government party will vote for the new constitution in spite of this?

[Peto] The current Constitution is not bad. As a matter of fact, some of those contributing to the social debate are laymen, and a small number of them are experts who represent the stance they wrote down many years ago. The expert approach is different from that of parliament. Constitutional lawyers correctly represent a constitution of which they have dreamt and do not deal with what other scientists or parliament itself would accept from their views, what passages parliament can accept as necessary support for the law. Naturally, the constitution that is to be made with the agreement of five parties contains many more compromises than a concept written down by scientists. Technically, the government parties can pass the constitution with a two-thirds majority, but they made a generous offer to the opposition that they would not use their majority until a certain deadline. They will not amend the Constitution on a two-party basis. Instead, the new constitution has to be made with the agreement of five parties. If constitutional legislation fails because of the resistance of the opposition parties, then the government parties will have to reconsider what to do. If no agreement is achieved on the formerly accepted five-party concept, then the government parties will have to assess whether to submit a package of amendments. In other words, they will not make a new constitution but will amend the existing one at the necessary points.

[Dano] The opposition is accusing the government of sabotaging the media law. When you prepared and voted for the law, did you see how bankrupt television and radio were?

[Peto] Radio and television were known to have problems with financial implications. It is hard to see the exact size of these, but reports on bankruptcy have been coming ever since I started to deal with politics. It cannot be disputed that there are problems with the implementation of the law. The government has not properly prepared for its implementation. The last time

the leaders of the Socialist and the Free Democrat parliamentary group met, we agreed that the government has some tasks in this area. This is not a compliment, either, but it is different from what the opposition always sees in the background; namely, a conspiracy.

[Dano] What are your ideas about the future of the two institutions? Is there any chance that the concession will be taken out by the specified deadline?

[Peto] I cannot say. We have a National Radio and Television Body [ORTT] which is independent of the parties and the government, and it must solicit applications. Members of the ORTT will obviously do all they can to ensure that the law is implemented as soon as possible. The government's responsibility is to create the proper conditions for this—namely the broadcasting facilities—and to carry out the asset evaluation of the channels to be privatized using the

method prescribed by the law. I would like this to happen by the set time. However, if it is delayed by one or two months, it does not appear to be a big problem, considering how hopeless the settlement of the media issue seemed before.

[Dano] The budget reform has met with an apparently great social resistance. (For example, the pension issue, the protest of university and health care lobbies, conflicts in state administration.) To what extent does this hinder the reform?

[Peto] I think all politicians know that such a reform cannot be implemented without social resistance. Therefore, the fact that there is a social resistance should not in itself hinder the issue. The resistance has to be taken into consideration, opinions have to be heard, and the possibilities and opinions obviously have to be matched.

B-H: Klickovic on Possible Referendum, Dayton Implementation

LD2105185496 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 21 May (SRNA)—Gojko Klickovic, prime minister of the Serb Republic, today repeated the statement he made after the last session of the People's Assembly that a referendum could soon be held in the Serb Republic.

In a statement to journalists after the first session of the government of which he is the head, Klickovic said that holding the referendum depends on the results of today's talks with Carl Bildt, the high representative of the international community, and talks over the next few days.

According to him, the referendum, if it were to be held, "would probably be on whether people support or do not support the current policies of the leaders and government of the Serb Republic and everything we are currently doing."

The prime minister of the Serb Republic told journalists about the results of today's government meeting. Among other things, it concluded that the Serb Republic negotiators would in the future "not move faster" than the Croat-Muslim side in implementing the Dayton agreement.

"We have moved faster and resolved certain matters more quickly. We have taken this very seriously and achieved, and carried out on time, everything which was asked of us," Klickovic said, adding that this was "not bad at all."

The prime minister of the Serb Republic believes that "the problem lies with the other side (the Croat-Muslim federation), which will have to respect and carry out in parallel all the provisions of the Dayton agreement, just as the Serb Republic has done."

"The gap that has appeared between the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat federation in implementing the Dayton agreement is not good," he warned.

B-H: Unendorsed Treaties Signed by Kasagic To Be Disregarded

LD2105184996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 21 May (SRNA)—The first session of the Serb Republic Government following the appointment of Gojko Klickovic as prime minister was held in Pale today.

In a discussion on working procedures, the government accepted the prime minister's proposal that government

sessions should be held at 1000 [0800 GMT] every Thursday, preceded by sessions of government committees every Wednesday.

In a discussion on establishing a Serb Republic Government protocol for contacts with representatives of the international community and bodies of the Croat-Muslim federation it was concluded that both sides have to submit a list of questions they wish to discuss; this would be followed by an agreement on the time for the meeting; this practice was earlier imposed on Serb Republic representatives.

In their future contacts with the international community and the Croat-Muslim federation, Serb Republic representatives will not discuss issues not connected with the Dayton agreement.

In future talks, Serb negotiators will disregard documents signed by former Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic that have not been endorsed by the Serb Republic Government.

Ministers will regularly brief other government members about the results of negotiations with representatives of the international community and the Croat-Muslim federation.

Examining a report on the construction of the Derventa-Srbac 110-kilovolt power transmission line, the government decided to ask the Serb Republic Power Company to provide additional information.

The deputy prime minister in charge of social activities, Velibor Ostojic, has been authorized to sign an agreement on the territorial delineation between the Serb Republic and the Croat-Muslim federation.

The government also appointed a delegation for an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe-sponsored meeting on regional stabilization which starts in Vienna tomorrow and will last until 6 June: Radomir Lukic, deputy minister of foreign affairs; Major General Zdravko Tolimir, assistant commander of the Serb Republic Army; and Lieutenant Colonel Milenko Indjic.

B-H: Biographical Data on Serb Republic PM Klickovic

AU2105173896 Banja Luka GLAS SRPSKI in Serbo-Croatian 20 May 96 p 1

[SRNA report: "New Prime Minister Has a Master's Degree in Legal-Economic Sciences"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 19 May (SRNA)—The newly appointed prime minister of the government of the Serb Republic, Gojko Klickovic, was born on 25

March 1955 in Krupa na Uni [Serb name for Bosanska Krupa].

He attended elementary and high schools in his native place, and graduated from the Faculty of Sociology in Sarajevo.

He finished postgraduate studies in the field of legal-economic sciences in Osijek and Belgrade.

So far he has performed the following functions: chairman of the Municipal Committee of the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] of Krupa na Uni, deputy chairman and chairman of the SDS Executive Committee of Krupa na Uni, commander of the crisis staff in Krupa na Uni, chairman of the Wartime Presidency of the City Assembly in Krupa na Uni, chairman of the Krupa na Uni municipality, deputy minister for health care, labor, and welfare, and chairman of the committees for the reception of Serb refugees from the republic of Serb Krajina, from the western part of the Serb Republic, and from Serb Sarajevo.

B-H: Bildt, Walker Meet Serb Leaders; Karadzic Problem Remains

AU2105204796 Paris AFP in English
2030 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina, May 21 (AFP)—The top civilian official implementing the Bosnian peace process and the number two in the NATO-led force in Bosnia held nearly four hours of talks with top Serb leaders here Tuesday.

Carl Bildt and General Sir Michael Walker stayed tight-lipped after the closed-door meeting refusing to give reporters details of the discussions with senior Serb leader Momcilo Krajisnik.

Bildt has in recent days been leading a push to pressure the Serbs into ditching Radovan Karadzic, an indicted war criminal, as "president" of the Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Walkers's presence, requested at the last minute by Bildt, was intended to be "helpful" to Bildt's effort, an aide to Walker told AFP privately.

The NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR) has 60,000 troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina but has so far resolutely refused to arrest indicted war criminals.

IFOR is recognised as one of the few forces in the Balkan region that could force Karadzic and other indicted Serb leaders, including military leader General Ratko Mladic, to leave power.

Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic said Tuesday that Bildt was not capable alone of forcing Karadzic from office. IFOR could, he said.

Emerging to face questions after their meeting with Krajisnik, and fellow Serb hardliner Aleksa Buha, Bildt said he had had "a couple of hours of discussions on different issues concerning both the political and the military implementation of the peace agreement."

"There are as you are aware a number of problems, a number of issues, and we will from our side watch developments extremely carefully in the time ahead."

Bildt, a former Swedish prime minister, denied that he was "backing down" in his drive to get a formal commitment from the Serbs to force Karadzic out of office.

"I'm not backing off on any issues related to the peace agreement, in no way whatsoever," he said.

Walker meanwhile declined to discuss his real contribution to the meeting.

"I came with Mr Bildt really to update myself on the situation and to discuss those issues that were common both to my military commission and the meeting here this afternoon," was all he would say. [passage omitted]

B-H: Bildt To Ask Milosevic 'To Help Arrest' Karadzic, Mladic

AU2105194096 Paris AFP in English
1921 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, May 21 [AFP] Bildt meanwhile said in an interview with the independent Belgrade radio station B 92 he would ask Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to help arrest Karadzic, as well as Serb military leader General Ratko Mladic, who has also been indicted for war crimes.

Milosevic signed the Bosnian peace accords on behalf of the rebel Serbs, BETA news agency quoted Bildt as telling the radio station. He therefore bore a huge responsibility in implementing all provisions of the agreement, Bildt argued.

B-H: Serb Socialist Leader Views Kasagic Removal, Economy

AU2105181996 Belgrade RTB Television Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1935 GMT 20 May 96

[Interview with Dragutin Ilic, chairman of the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic, SPRS, by Pregrad Sarac in the RTB studios in Belgrade, date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Summary] The 35-minute interview with SPRS chairman Ilic begins with Sarac asking Ilic to assess the current situation in the Serb Republic. Ilic says that "the implementation of the peace agreement is the most prominent feature of the current situation in the Serb

Republic. There are certain problems there, as the public knows, but we hope that the agreement will be fully implemented, to which our party is committed, and is actively promoting on the ground. Of course, there are many problems in the economy, in the social sphere, but there are also certain forces that are still trying to reignite the war, to hamper the implementation of the peace plan. However, we are convinced that peace is here to stay, thanks primarily to the determination of the international community, but also to the great desire of the citizens in both entities for peace to last. What is key for the implementation of the peace agreement, in our view, are the elections."

Following a lengthy explanation by Ilic about how "the idea of socialism is close to the Serb nation," Sarac asks him to comment on the "recent" dismissal of Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic. Ilic says that "this is yet another of the wrong moves by Radovan Karadzic and the people around him. Although he, too, is aware—must be aware—that all the international and domestic public knows that he was elected president of the republic by his 62 party colleagues, deputies in the former assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which later separated and became the Serb assembly when the Serb Republic was formed. He is behaving in accordance with the constitution that bestows authority upon the president only if he runs in presidential elections, that is, without consulting the people's assembly that appointed the government. I think that the main motive for the prime minister's dismissal was because he was based in Banja Luka and not in Pale, and because the prime minister tried to have his government act in accordance with the constitution." He says that "just as our image in the world was beginning to improve and we were beginning to expect to get some assistance from the world, thanks to the cooperativeness of his government, the move was made—not unexpectedly, but no one expected it to be made this way—that someone would dismiss the government, that is, the prime minister, by a decree and in an unconstitutional way. The consequences of this could be fatal to the interests of our people, and the fact that the international community, as the guarantor of the peace agreement, has expressed great concern, speaks volumes about what murky waters the person who made this decision has headed into."

Sarac then asks Ilic about the Socialists' plans for the economic recovery of the Serb Republic, to which Ilic responds that they "will make sure that all the regions are developed equally." They then discuss preparations for the first congress of the SPRS, scheduled to take place on 1 June in Banja Luka. The congress, he says, will appoint "the main committee of the party, the statutory commission, and the party chairman."

B-H: Commentary Assesses Karadzic's 'Halfway' Withdrawal

AU2105160996 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI
in Serbo-Croatian 20 May 96 p 5

[Commentary by Boro Maric: "Departure Through a Back Door"]

[FBIS Translated Text] By transferring part of his authority—according to the official statement—to Biljana Plavsic, Serb Republic President Radovan Karadzic has most probably decided to leave the political scene through a back door.

If this were not true, he—at least formally—would not have delegated to the Serb Republic vice president, that is, Plavic, only his authority in the domain of foreign policy.

Still, even with such a move, Karadzic, although indirectly, has recognized several equally important facts. The impression is that two of them are crucial.

First: By remaining in the office of the president of the Serb Republic—because of the international community's refusal to talk with him—Karadzic has seriously called into question the implementation of the peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, consequently, the survival of the Serb Republic as well.

Second: The peace agreement is not subject to bargaining. It involves a series of internationally stipulated commitments (which entail rights as well) that, to put it in the simplest way, must be fulfilled in a manner determined in advance.

The Dayton agreement, among things, suggests Karadzic's withdrawal from political life. Precisely, it bars him, as well as all others accused of war crimes, from participation in the coming elections.

In other words, his political term will have expired in little less than four months from now, that is, in September.

The key question remains open though: Is Karadzic actually trying, by promoting Plavsic as his successor, to preserve his political position, and at the same time, to keep his hardline political platform in relations with the world?

This dilemma emanates from the following: The state leadership of the Serb Republic was represented at the negotiations in Dayton and the signing of the peace agreement in Paris by Nikola Koljevic, being a politician fostering considerably "softer" attitudes than those of Karadzic's and Plavsic's.

Koljevic's removal from the Serb Republic's foreign political stage can only mean that the international community will face the fact that the new negotiator, namely, Plavsic, represents old views, which the world does not accept.

Such an outcome of Karadzic's (halfway) withdrawal would be extremely unfavorable for the Serb Republic—everything that the Serb people has achieved in almost four years of struggle, and what has been recognized by the Dayton accord, would be gambled away.

B-H: Serb Missing Persons Official Requests Bildt's Help

LD2105214596 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Dragan Bulajic, chairman of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic Commission for POW's and Missing Persons, has sent a letter to the high representative of the international community for former Bosnia-Herzegovina, Carl Bildt, saying:

The implementation of point one of the Dayton agreement—the release of POW's—has been completely forgotten due to a chaotic situation created in former Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are, therefore, people who are still held in prison although the Hague [war crimes] Tribunal has not brought charges against them; there are also registered and unregistered POW's held in prisons all over former Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

Your office has not assumed an official stance on the persons who have been imprisoned since the signing of the Dayton agreement. A particular problem is the resolution of the issue of missing persons.

We therefore ask you to enable Serb Republic representatives to visit the [Bosnian] Krajina area, which is under the control of the Muslim and Croat armies, in order to collect the bodies of our soldiers killed in that area. We also demand the exhumation of our soldiers and civilians who were buried in mass graves in the areas of Glamoc, Grahovo, Jajce, Drvar, [Bosanski] Petrovac, Kljuc, and Grabec, Dragan Bulajic's letter to Carl Bildt says.

B-H: ICTY To Hold Public Hearings on Karadzic, Mladic

AU2105133996 Paris AFP in English 1319 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Hague, May 21 (AFP)—The international war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia will hear witnesses for the prosecution in

the case against Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and army commander Ratko Mladic at the end of next month, diplomatic sources said here Tuesday.

The International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) will hold public hearings for around 10 days starting in late June to hear witness testimony against Karadzic and Mladic.

The two Serb leaders, who have been indicted by the UN war crimes court twice, on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity, are still at large in Bosnia.

The court cannot hold trials in absentia, but can examine witness testimony in a preliminary public hearing of the case against indictees.

Karadzic and Mladic stand accused of directing indiscriminate attacks on civilian populations, and of complicity in the alleged wholesale massacre of Muslims in eastern Bosnia in the summer of 1995.

B-H: UNHCR Reports on Refugee Situation in 10 Municipalities

LD2005165396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1517 GMT 20 May 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, May 20 (TANJUG)—The office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] has completed reports on possibilities for the return of refugees and displaced persons to ten municipalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The ten municipalities are Brcko, Breza, Celinac, Konjic, Laktasi, Livno, Olovo, Sanski Most, Visoko and Zavidovici.

According to the 1991 census, Brcko had a population of 87,000, of whom 44 percent were Muslims and the remainder Serbs and Croats.

The UNHCR report covers only the part of the Brcko municipality which is now in the Muslim-Croat federation and where close to 60,000 Muslims and 4,000 Croats live.

The Croat community has formed its own municipality, which has a local police and whose authorities are accountable to the Bosnian Croat leadership.

The UNHCR provides aid in food for more than 40,000 people in the part of the Brcko area which is in the Muslim-Croat federation, while a Norwegian humanitarian organization is building there a settlement for 1,000 displaced persons.

The municipality of Breza now has 20,000-odd inhabitants, mostly Muslims and about 500 Croats and 236 Serbs.

Before the war, Muslims made up 50 percent of Konjic's population of 43,000, Croats 26 percent and Serbs 15.2 percent.

Konjic has roughly just as many inhabitants now, but only a hundred or so Croats and 14 Serbs.

The Olovo municipalities had 16,900 inhabitants before the war, of whom 75 percent were Muslims, 19 percent Serbs and 4 percent Croats.

Olovo now has a population of 15,150, of whom 550 Croats and only 45 Serbs of the about 3,000 before the war.

Local authorities in Olovo, where six international humanitarian organizations are engaged, are calling on refugees who are returning from abroad to make donations of between 2,000-9,000 German marks.

There are only 800 Serbs and 500 Croats in the Visoko municipality.

In the Zavidovici area, which used to have a population of 57,000, of whom 20 percent Serbs, 60 percent Muslims and 13 percent Croats, there are now 930 Croats and 380 Serbs.

Contrary to the situation in the Muslim-Croat federation, where numerous non-governmental humanitarian organizations are engaged, the Bosnian Serb Republika Srpska receives aid mostly from the UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC].

In the Celinac municipality, for instance, where housing facilities have been devastated, the local Red Cross, the UNHCR and the ICRC are helping the local population of 19,500, mostly displaced Serbs.

Laktasi is an even more drastic example of the inequitable distribution of humanitarian aid.

The municipality had 29,910 inhabitants, predominantly Serbs, before the war and now has nearly 45,000.

Nearly 70 percent of Laktasi's population fall in the category of the needy.

The UNHCR provides food for 11,800, while aid also comes from the ICRC, Oxfam and Doctors Without Frontiers.

Serbs used to comprise 42 percent of Sanski Most's population but none have been living there since a Croat-Muslim offensive in the autumn of last year.

Gen. Mehmed Alagic, former commander of the Muslim army's seventh corps, is the mayor of Sanski Most.

Livno, with 36,000 Croats, about 4,500 Muslims and 300 Serbs, mostly elder, is now part of the Mostar canton.

Both Muslims and Serbs who have returned to the town are discriminated against when seeking jobs.

Manual jobs are mostly reserved for them, while precedence is given to demobilized Croats.

B-H: Izetbegovic Discusses Elections With OSCE Officials

AU2105182896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the state presidency, today received Flavio Cotti, chairman of the OSCE mission, and Ambassador Robert Frowick and their aides, and discussed the possibility of the holding elections. The meeting was also attended by Ejup Ganic, member of the Presidency and vice president of the Federation; Hasan Muratovic, head of the Republican government; and Hilmo Pasic, minister of justice.

They reiterated the view of the Bosnia-Herzegovina side that conditions for elections do not exist at this moment. We said that we were very interested in holding elections within the period envisaged by Dayton and that conditions should be ensured by September, the president said after the talks.

Karadzic's departure from the political scene is the condition of all conditions, President Izetbegovic said. This would be followed by an accelerated process of certain democratization. The freedom of movement and the freedom of media would be established relatively quickly, and a certain number of people would return to the territory of the Serb entity. I think that this job should be done by IFOR [Implementation Force]. Alternatively, pressure should be exerted on Milosevic, who has taken this obligation onto himself with the Dayton agreement.

Mr. Bildt, as it appeared two days ago, did not manage to unseat Karadzic, who would try to reinforce his position by organizing some kind of referendum. This should certainly be prevented. Without this, there will be no conditions for the fair and (?correct) elections, and the peace process will be [words indistinct] in many aspects, President Izetbegovic stressed.

B-H: Pejanovic Stresses 'Basic Conditions' To Hold Elections

AU2105192396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Mirko Pejanovic, member of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and president of the Serb Civic Council of Bosnia-Herzegovina, today received a high-level U.S. delegation led by Sam Brown, the U.S. ambassador to OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] in Vienna. They discussed the upcoming democratic elections in our country, respect for human rights in this region, and implementation of the Vienna talks on disarmament.

According to Pejanovic, the upcoming elections are the first test for the democratization of Bosnia-Herzegovina and a chance to replace the military structures with civilian and democratic ones.

Pejanovic stressed that it was necessary to ensure three basic conditions for holding elections: Arrest of war criminals Karadzic and Mladic, freedom of movement throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, and freedom of political activities including the freedom of media.

Speaking about human rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Pejanovic said that the situation is unfavorable because of the [words indistinct] the right of refugees to return, their right to property, work, and the right to vote at the upcoming elections. It was concluded jointly that in this sense [words indistinct].

B-H: Government Repeats Demand for Mostar Refugees To Vote

AU2205123496 Paris AFP in English 1213 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, May 22 (AFP)—The European Union official in charge of the southern Bosnian town of Mostar held talks with Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic Wednesday [22 May] to discuss Bosnia's first post-war elections.

The elections, in the divided town of Mostar, are due to take place May 31. They are intended as a forerunner of nationwide elections due by September 14.

Six political parties that are in pro-Bosnian Government have demanded the Mostar elections be postponed because under current rules refugees from the city are not allowed to vote.

EU administrator Ricardo Perez Casado, who runs the town under an EU mandate agreed after the end of a bitter 11-month war between Moslems and Croats in

the town, has so far refused to agree to a postponement of the elections.

"We had a very constructive meeting regarding the election process in Mostar," Perez Casado said, after meeting Izetbegovic here.

He said he would travel to Zagreb Thursday to hold talks "on the same subject" with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman.

A European source in Mostar earlier told AFP the outcome of the meetings would not be announced until Friday, when Perez Casado is due to hold a press conference.

Kemal Muftic, an adviser to Izetbegovic, told AFP after the meeting the Bosnian Government's attitude was still "very clear."

"We want refugees from Mostar, now living abroad, to be able to vote. They have to vote. End of story," he said.

The Bosnian Croat parties, notably the Bosnian branch of Tudjman's Croatian Democratic Community, have said they want the elections to take place as scheduled.

Mostar is still divided between a Moslem-held eastern half and a Croat-held western half. The EU union has so far failed in more than two years of trying to effectively reunite the city.

B-H: Commentary Urges Mostar Elections Postponement

AU2205150296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 22 May 96

[Commentary by Nada al-Issa from Zagreb]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Mostar elections must be postponed. Germany believes that they cannot be held until both sides, that is, both peoples, agree. If only one side were to vote, the elections would not be legitimate, and there would be the danger of a definite partitioning of the city into two parts. Germany opposes this, which is why Minister Kinkel warned the Republic of Croatia several times that he holds it responsible for Mostar's fate, its integration rather than partitioning.

The West is, therefore, aware that all Bosnian parties who want an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina are boycotting the elections. Only the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] wants the elections. Europe should be able to conclude from this why only the HDZ wants the elections right away. At the same time, the HDZ is using the Croatian media to accuse, I quote, the Muslims for games involving the Mostar elections. However, the games are on the other side, and they involve borders

that would divide Mostar. That is why the HDZ is insisting on elections right away, before the expelled Bosniak Mostar citizens return. The elections will be won by the majority people, and the Bosniaks are currently in the minority.

According to the information of the Party of Democratic Action in Croatia, of the 180,000 Bosniak Mostar residents before the war, only a fourth remain in the town. The majority were expelled during the war with the Croats. Meanwhile, some 30,000 Croats have moved to Mostar from eastern and western Herzegovina. It is now clear with what intention. That is why the EU Administration would make a fatal mistake if it were not to postpone the elections, or not allow expelled Bosniaks to vote [words indistinct]. This would be a dangerous precedent, which could be repeated in other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina according to the same plan currently being implemented in Mostar—namely, that a people who have become a majority on the basis of ethnic cleansing hold elections before the expelled members of the other ethnic group return. This constitutes a further tailoring of Bosnia according to somebody's maps and wishes. However, it seems that Europe has realized this, so the postponement of Mostar elections is a good sign.

B-H: Presidency Appoints Cazim Sadikovic as Brcko Arbiter

AU2105175396 *Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 21 May 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] A meeting was held today in the building of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina at which the participants discussed the situation in Brcko, the town whose future status should be the subject of international arbitration according to the Dayton agreement.

The meeting was presided over by Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic, and was attended by Presidency member Ejup Ganic, heads of the republican and federal governments Hasan Muratovic and Izudin Kapetanovic respectively, Mato Tadic, minister of justice in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, Izet Hadzic, governor of the Tuzla-Podrinje canton, Munir (?Jusupovic), head of the Brcko municipality, and Cazim Sadikovic.

On behalf of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kresimir Zubak and Ejup Ganic, president and vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation respectively, appointed Cazim Sadikovic as arbiter for Brcko and [words indistinct] in this responsible job.

B-H: Joint Military Commission Discusses Peace Agreement

AU2105195796 *Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 21 May 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The joint military commission held a regular meeting in Sarajevo today. The meeting was also attended by a delegation of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, led by its commander, Army General Rasim Delic. The commanders exchanged views on the pace of implementing the peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Annex 1A. The commander of the Army of the Bosnia-Herzegovina also raised a number of (?other issues).

It was demanded that the seven men from Srebrenica, who were handed over to the organs of the Serb entity by the international forces, be released as soon as possible. They also raised the issue of the freedom of movement as a basic human right guaranteed by the Constitution and the agreement on (?peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina).

They also discussed the issue of the representative of the army of the (?Serb entity) in the joint army of [word indistinct]. Our delegation has expressed the view that the commander of the army of the Serb entity should take part in the work of the joint military commission in the period ahead, but that in the spirit of the provisions of Annex 1A of the peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which stipulates that war criminals cannot hold [words indistinct].

B-H: Gen Delic: Federal Army Commander Should Be Bosniak

AU2105175996 *Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 21 May 96 p 5*

[ONASA report: "The Commander of the Federal Army Should Be Bosniak"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 20 May (ONASA)—General Rasim Delic, chief of the General Staff of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina [BH Army], has stated that, as the federal defense minister is Croat, it would be logical that the commander of the federal army be Bosniak. "The army is federal, which means that the president and the vice president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina will have a decisive say in most of the army's activities. As for the protection of state integrity and the sovereignty and territorial borders of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, until the next elections, two members of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, one being Bosniak and the other Croat, will have a decisive say. Our suggestion is that, on behalf of the Bosniak people,

this role be performed by Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina." According to Delic, units in the federal army will be without national identity. "They will be called, for instance, the 1st Motorized Unit of the Army of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and such things. The terminology of commanding will be uniform, which also applies to the training program, to services, and in particular to the air force, logistics, and so on," Delic said.

B-H: Zubak: UNHCR To Blame for Stolac Impasse
LD2105190396 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] There are reports that the Bosniaks do not want the implementation of the pilot project involving the return of 100 displaced persons from Stolac. They want them all to go back at the same time, Kresimir Zubak, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, told today's edition of VECERNJE NOVINE.

The problem in Stolac is of a financial nature: The UNHCR has not carried out its obligations in terms of finding the resources to renovate apartments, Zubak said, and added that this was the reason why Bosniaks still could not return to Stolac.

B-H: Government Views Results of Federation Forum Meeting

AU2105195696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Government of the Federation today held a session presided over by Prime Minister Izudin Kapetanovic. The federal ministers discussed the documents adopted at the Forum of the Federation in Washington. The ministers concluded that the government and the federal ministers have accomplished a significant number of tasks with this document and with the documents bringing the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina into life that were adopted earlier. They also concluded that some other tasks will be accomplished by the next Constituent Assembly session of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. [passage omitted]

B-H: Air Force Commander Describes Development of Air Force

AU2205100896 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 17 May 96 p 6

[Article by Selvedin Avdic: "Sovereignty Over Both Air and Land"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 22 May 1992 Dubrave airport near Tuzla was officially handed over to the legal authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is when the first air force unit of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army began to be organized. From then on, that date has been commemorated as Air Force and Antiaircraft Defense Day [of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army]. Until this day, our pilots have carried out 7,000 flights, and transported 30,000 passengers, 3,000 seriously wounded people, and 3,000 metric tons of various materials.

"Everything has been accomplished with minimal losses. The world aviation experts would not believe that we have managed to make so many flights with very few losses," says Brigadier Salko Begic, commander of the air force and antiaircraft defense. Up to now all the air force's activities have been treated as top secret. This is the first time that, as part of the commemoration of Air Force and Antiaircraft Defense Day, the pilots have spoken about their work.

The Development of the Air Force

Brig. Begic presents the development of our air force in three phases. In the first phase, property was taken over from the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], and intense work was done on mobilizing the aviation cadre, members of amateur flying clubs and aviation experts from special-purpose industry. Then the training of that cadre was expedited and equipment acquired. The third phase included active participation in military operations. Pilots stress that their aviation support involved transportation of the wounded and of logistics, and that there was no fire support.

In the words of Brig. Begic, the air force is an exceptionally important branch of every country's armed forces. If one does not have sovereignty over air space one cannot have sovereignty over the land.

"It is our goal to create an air force that, with a qualified cadre and technical equipment, will be a significant element in preventing any sort of aggression against our country. Our objective is to build a defensive air force. If necessary, however, it will be capable of offensive operations," Brig. Begic says.

Modern Aircraft

We need multipurpose aircraft that will successfully carry out all the tasks of modern fighter planes, bombers, and reconnaissance aircraft. The dominant force will consist of military helicopters, which are exceptionally suitable for fighting on this terrain. The whole system will be enhanced with unmanned aircraft, which can be effectively used for reconnaissance. Transportation needs can be met quite successfully with the present equipment. In the air force they are aware that it is exceptionally expensive to acquire this equipment, when one aircraft costs around \$22 million. However, in Begic's words, they are exceptionally optimistic and believe that they will get the necessary funds soon.

According to the Dayton agreement, the air force of Yugoslavia, because of the balance of power, must reduce the number of its aircraft to 70 percent. Our permitted limit amounts to only 30 percent. Commander Begic believes that this is not a depressing fact.

"We will make up for the number of aircraft with good training and more flights. Israel is the best example that the it is not the amount of equipment that is decisive. They have ten times fewer aircraft than their neighbors. Their superbly trained pilots simply doubled the number of their flights, and managed to gain victory in the sky," commander Begic claims.

In commander Begic's opinion, the aviation experts we inherited from the former aviation industries "Soko" and "Orao" are our biggest assets. Thanks to those experts, we have maintained the aircraft at an exceptionally high level throughout the war—92 percent.

"The army of the Serb entity mostly relies on the aviation cadre from Yugoslavia. According to our data, because of inadequate maintenance, their present equipment is in an extremely poor shape," says Brig. Salko Begic, commander of the air force and anti-aircraft defense.

[Box, p 6]

The Worse the Conditions, the Better the Results

The siege of Bihac lasted 120 days. Our helicopters were the Bihac enclave's only link with the rest of the territory.

"I have not done anything harder in my life. In making decisions we had only one principle in mind—nothing has to be in accordance with theoretical knowledge. The worse the conditions, the better the results. The worse the weather conditions were, the more likely it was that our helicopter would get through. "Even then they completed every flight with five to seven shots

of various calibers. Despite all the laws of probability, only one of our aircraft was downed," commander Begic says.

[Box, p 6]

Numerous Awards

For tasks that have been successfully performed up to now, our pilots were awarded nine golden lilies and nine silver shields, as well as a great number of compliments from the General Staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army.

B-H: Scandinavian IFOR Troops Not To Withdraw 20 Dec

AU2105211096 Paris AFP in English
2052 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kabelvaag, Norway, May 21 (AFP)—Nordic countries called on the United States Tuesday to keep its troops in Bosnia next year and agreed not to pull out their forces from the former Yugoslav republic at the end of this year.

Defense ministers from Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, meeting in this north Norwegian town, said they would not abandon Bosnia-Herzegovina, five months after a peace accord was signed that ended a nearly four-year war.

"The international community has invested a lot in Bosnia, and there is no way we will withdraw" after December 20 when the mandate of the NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia expires, said Norwegian Defense Minister Joergen Kosmo.

His Swedish counterpart, Thage Petersen, warned however that military operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina could not be pursued without the United States and must remain under NATO command.

The four ministers also said Russian troops should remain part of the peacekeeping effort in the former Yugoslavia.

The Nordic contingent in IFOR would however be reduced next year. Petersen said Sweden would bring its contingent down to 300 from its current 800.

B-H: Federal Partners, Bosnians in Turkey Deceiving U.S.

AU2205081396 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
20 May 96 p 4

[Commentary by J.V.: "Federal" Emotions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Since 18 March 1994, when the Washington agreement (as the foundation of the Feder-

ation) was signed in an impressive ceremony, the federal partners' representatives—often the all-star cast—have been touring the world as if to prove that the earth is round: Bonn, Vienna, Zagreb, Sarajevo, Dayton ("honored" by Milosevic's presence), Paris, Rome, again Zagreb (two weeks ago), and again Washington (last week). After their last meeting, the Forum on the Federation in Washington, the overall impression was—although Granic, the head of the Croatian diplomacy, showed his proverbial satisfaction, as did Ganic and Zubak, the federal pair,—that the (potentially) united Croats and Muslims had accomplished nothing. The U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher expects the "natural allies" to put their hearts and souls into the Federation as their only prospect, while both parties do so only while the Americans are watching—just to show that they are ready to comply with the wish of the United States.

The "cunning Latin ways," previously attributed to the western partner, were this time evinced by the Muslims. While the official vice president of the Federation and unofficial vice president of the dying Bosnian Presidency was cordially shaking hands with the Croats and Americans in Washington, primarily celebrating the adoption of the Federal defense law, about 200 soldiers of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army took off from Sarajevo airport and flew to Turkey. Although the "Train and Equip" program was devised for the joint federal army exclusively, they will spend three months in Turkey on a drill—as information from Sarajevo said—with weapons that the Government in Sarajevo will soon receive. That is how the Bosnian soldiers celebrated the Washington Forum in a working way, as cynics would say. It also shows what one commander on the alleged joint command thinks about Christopher's wish that they put their hearts and souls into the Federation. The federal partners are obviously ready to show emotion about their joint existence—insisted on by their patrons—only on TV footage and in newspaper photographs, as the numerically dominant partner demonstrated this time. Of course, unless deception is another "product" of heart and soul.

B-H: 'Mutual Distrust' in Relations With Croatia Seen

AU2005121196 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 13 May 96 p 1

[Commentary by Gojko Beric: "Life and Agreements"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Anyone wanting to determine the exact number of agreements signed between Sarajevo and Zagreb over the last four years would have a lot of work to do. Some of them, such as the one on the federal-confederal association of the two neighbors,

have been described as historic, while others have only been of a tactical nature. Most have fallen into oblivion because the most important questions have still not been resolved. In Zagreb on Saturday [11 May], another two agreements were signed in the presence of President Tudjman and President Izetbegovic. The first enables Bosnia-Herzegovina to use the port of Ploce, while the other gives Croatia the right to pass through the Neum Municipality. Countries need to make everything formal in mutual relations, even things that life itself takes care of. From that standpoint, there is nothing to complain about in these agreements. Nevertheless, there is certain irony in them. Namely, it is well known that the port of Ploce was built mainly with funds from the Bosnia-Herzegovina economy. At least half the population of the port used to earn their living from the railroad to Bosnia. This most recent agreement allows Bosnia to use the docks again that it in fact built itself. But only for a period of one year and then we will see. It was, however, said that the agreement would be in force for a period of 99 years. As for Neum, there are both similarities and differences. This small tourist resort, once shaken by the "summer house scandal" [reference to scandal of businessmen renting out summer houses that were built in Neum by companies for the use of their employees], belongs to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Everything built there before the war was built with Bosnian money. However, for those citizens of the Federation without a checkerboard passport [reference to Croatian national symbol], Neum has until recently been foreign territory. At that time, Croatia asked nobody for permission to pass through the Neum municipality. Croatia passed through Neum when and how it wanted to. With this agreement, this habit is at least legalized, which was obviously a concession from Sarajevo in return for the use of the port of Ploce. Every agreement that makes life in these war-torn territories more human is useful in principle. But, amassing agreements can also make life more complicated. The normalization of life by small measures, a teaspoonful at a time, is a sign that relations between Sarajevo and Zagreb are still burdened by mutual distrust. It is not useful for either Bosnia or Croatia, if on one side the solution of the most complex questions is postponed forever, while on the other side political capital is spent like petty cash to pay for the amassing of agreements of more or less second-rate significance.

The television stations in both Zagreb and Sarajevo paid significant attention to the signing of the Zagreb agreements. Everybody was satisfied with the atmosphere at the presidential palace. And then, on the very same day, Bosnia-Herzegovina Television's satellite program broadcast some footage on Ejup Ganic's visit to Stolac and Pocitelj, where, in the latter, the Croats have erected

a huge stone cross on an old fortress. The vice president of the Federation, seeing what was for Bosniaks an insulting picture, was sad and disappointed, which was, after all, obvious.

B-H: Report on Former Mujahedin Camp

96BA0252A Sarajevo SLOBODNA BOSNA
in Serbo-Croatian 22 Mar 96 pp 8-9

[Article by Senad Slatina: "Jihad Is Our Destiny...Even in Peacetime"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The key argument mentioned most frequently in the charges that even the Bosnian Government does not want full implementation of the Dayton agreement is the Islamic volunteers, about 150 of them, who are said to be still in the ranks of the Bosnian armed forces. The volunteers from the friendly countries (the terminology used by Bosnian diplomats), or fanatized Islamic fundamentalists and extremists (as formulated by the Western media), regardless of what they are called, are a topic around which increasingly important games are weaving. Their departure is being made a condition of sizable U.S. financial and military aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina, one of the key people in the top leadership of the Bosnian state has been removed because of them, on several occasions they have been used as blackmail against Bosnia-Herzegovina's negotiators when essential political decisions were being made.... Even though there are numerous other aspects and processes much more dangerous to implementation of the peace agreement, the mysterious mujahedin remain the main topic in most of the international media. A three-member team of SLOBODNA BOSNA went out to look for the mujahedin in order to verify in the field what about them is truth and what is the product of fiction.

The first impression that presses upon one in investigating this topic is that any story about the mujahedin is still taboo for both official and unofficial sources. At most of the places where we went for information about the location of the former mujahedin, we raised many more new questions than answers. When we ourselves set out for villages in central Bosnia, locals mainly responded by shrugging their shoulders. In part, this is because of distrust of our newspaper's good intentions, but this kind of protection of the mujahedin is much more an expression of respect and gratitude of the local population to the only foreigners who were in Bosnia and for Bosnia at the time "when it was toughest." There were many at that time who were condemning the criminals, adopting resolutions, and expressing concern, but only a very few leapt into the bloody Bosnian maw in order to save at least one Bosnian life or house by their own individual and tangible fighting. Fantastic stories about the fearlessness and fighting style of the muja-

hedin instilled fear and have been remembered not only among the enemies, but also among the Bosnian population.

The closer we got to our ultimate goal, the more terrible the stories got about their appearance, way of life, and (especially) treatment of strangers, and, to tell the truth, as we looked for their camp, we secretly hoped we would not find it. After a few hours of wandering through the forests and mountains of central Bosnia, disappointed because of the wrong instructions we had been getting, we decided to make our last location a mountain village on the border between Travnik and Zenica Općinas which we were told had once been the main center for training mujahedin in central Bosnia. Some of the foreign media and journalists who had been unable to approach this area refer to this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina as the "green triangle," alluding to its menacing mysteriousness and inaccessibility. After a 20-minute climb up a steep asphalt road several kilometers from the nearest settlements, we came upon the first local inhabitants. They were dressed like the other inhabitants of this region, but their long beards and unique raising of the index finger as a sign of greeting (the greeting of true believers, meaning "Allah is one") gave us the idea that we were on the right road. A few hundred meters further on, the village we were looking for suddenly appeared before us. In front of every house, there were a few men who wore the Palestinian headdress. They all had long beards.

When we stopped the car, most of them immediately started in our direction. None of them was armed, but this did not diminish in the least the dramatic sense of the encounter nor our quite noticeable panic. It was obvious that they were enthusiastic about our visit. Altogether pale, as if he were uttering his last words, our driver whispered in a trembling voice:

"Eh, who the f... needed this."

We got out of the car. After the introductions, a tense conversation began about the purpose of our visit, who we wanted to talk to, and what questions we intended to put. Less than half of the 10 or so people around us were foreigners. One young man spoke both Bosnian and Arabic, and when he had figured out what was involved, he disappeared from the group and obviously went off for consultations. Over the next several minutes, we tried to get some kind of conversation going with those who had gathered on topics people ordinarily talk about when they meet for the first time. At one point, our photographer laughed, took a deep breath, and said as he looked around for support of his casual witticism:

"Eh, thank God this war has come to a stop!"

"Better if it hadn't!" responded the one who was largest, had the longest beard, and the gloomiest countenance. This was followed by a short pause in which our informants exchanged several quick glances. The smile left the photographer's face.

"Yes...uh...hm...actually...that is exactly what I wanted to say," our photo-reporter added, very constant in his political views. He did not utter a single word after that during the visit to that village.

As we waited for what would happen about our visit, we noticed in the village quite a few discarded military vehicles. Trucks were parked along the road, and it was obvious that they had not been used for quite a long time. We also noticed quite a few children around the houses. We did not see a single woman. The three-story building in front of which we were standing had a sign with the meal schedule on the first floor. That ground-floor dining room is where we were taken after the lad who had gone off for consultations returned. Another man who entered with him was wearing the headdress and did not say a word. He only locked the door of the dining room behind us as soon as we entered. He said nothing to justify that move, but we hoped (consoled ourselves) that he had done this so that the children would not bother us.

While we were still in the yard, we learned that some of the former members of the El-Mudzhahid Detachment were accommodated in the village. About 50 families are living in the village. All the foreign volunteers (about 30 of them) married Bosnian women and started families. They all had proper documents of Bosnian citizenship.

"As you see, our unit no longer exists," we were told in the dining room by a lad who did not want to say his name, considering it unimportant, and introduced himself only as a brother Muslim. "No military activities whatsoever are carried on here anymore. The IFOR [Implementation Force] representatives were here a month ago and talked to the local population and the brother Arabs. They were interested in what is going on here. They thought that there were underground arms caches here, that some kind of training was going on, and so on. We turned over our weapons much earlier to the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in keeping with the accord. The IFOR representatives told us at that time that they would not bother us if we did not provoke them. That, of course, is not our objective. Nevertheless, even now the IFOR very often sends its helicopters, which circle our village for 10 minutes or so. That is their way of trying to intimidate and scatter the Muslims."

This 23-year-old lad said that the inhabitants of the village are now trying to live the life of true believers, life as it was lived by Muhammad a.s. [blessed be his name]. They do the namaz regularly, and there is a brief sermon about Islam after every prayer.

"Children and adults from neighboring villages come for those sermons. The ders (lecture) is usually delivered by one of the better-educated brother Arabs. The topic for study may be Islam, goodness, ahiret (the other world), the day of judgment, strengthening a person in his faith, i.e., all of those reasons why Allah gave our army such success and so attracted young people to the jihad and mujahedin."

Our informant said that the people in the village were living off food stores from before and help from neighbors in nearby towns. The local population, he said, had very good relations with the Muslims (mumin).

"We are not bogeymen or scarecrows at all, as they would like to portray us. Unfortunately, even some Muslims, the worst among us, hypocrites (munafik), are trying to make Islam look bad and are representing it in people's eyes as a religion of blood, murder, and looting. Everyone who has been in Bosnia knows, however, who did the killing and who was defending himself. The people here are only those who say 'la ilahe ilallah'—'there is no other god except Allah.' That is my faith. We want to grow a beard, to wear the headdress (those are emblems of our Emissary). We are entitled to that."

As to the future of this minicommune, our informant said that they will continue to live the life of believers, because their goal is ahiret, not this world. They will also continue to appeal to people to come to their lectures and to get to know Islam. Asked what is going to happen with Bosnia-Herzegovina, our informant replied:

"Only Allah knows what will happen with Bosnia. If the Muslims in Bosnia are satisfied with this situation, and we will be with our people, Allah will certainly provide some solution. We must be aware, however, that the infidels will not give up their ultimate objective: to plant the cross in Mecca and celebrate the mass in Medina. They will not be satisfied until we accept their faith. It is to be hoped that Muslims will see that Islam is their only support and strength and will not sell out and reject their faith."

The lad, who told us he had gone no further than high school, said all this calmly, without any changes at all in the tempo of his exposition. Only the remark that people who are fugitives from the law, who are sought by governments of countries they come from, and that

if this is true Bosnia ought not to give them asylum, took him aback a bit, but not too much.

"The infidels want judgment to be rendered under no law but theirs, the law which they invented and which they want to impose on everyone. The only law which the Muslim must recognize is the law of Allah dzelesanuhu (blessed be his noble being). The true and sincere believer denies all other laws. It is true, these people cannot go back to their countries, because they cannot live the life of believers there. In those countries, the infidels have brought into power renegades who call themselves Muslims, but there is nothing Islamic about them except perhaps their names. They represent themselves in the name of Islam, but actually they march under the banner of Christianity and the crusades. They persecute the mujahedin."

We were appalled by this 23-year-old in front of us, asking ourselves where to draw the line between his religious obsession and everything sensible and practical which he evidently possessed. How can anyone like this absolutely preclude any possibility of abuse of religious sentiments? His friend with the headdress gave notice that the talk should be brought to an end. We asked whether we could take pictures of anything.

"No," the man with the headdress answered curtly. Our photographer who had lost his voice made no objection whatsoever. Seeing us off, the young man to whom we had talked said at the end:

"Everyone is writing against Islam. Everyone is striking blows at the mujahedin. Most of the people are looking only at you, at the media, and they accept what you say. So, be objective and pass on the truth. Aid Islam...or at least do not work against Islam!"

On the way back, not far from the place where the mountain road crosses a major highway, we saw the IFOR setting up its new base. The personnel carriers had come while we were in the village. The IFOR officer told us that they were here to oversee the zone of separation after D+90. The nearest line of separation, however, is 12 km from this place, and the new IFOR

base was only 500 meters as the crow flies from the village where we had been. To the direct question of whether their presence was related to assumptions that mujahedin are in the vicinity, the IFOR officer said: "That is a political matter. Our superiors told us that the men who had been mujahedin are now Bosnian citizens, and we will treat them as such."

In the close vicinity of Zenica, we were unable to discover other settlements where former mujahedin were housed. We were told that they exist around Zavidovici, but we did not go there.

The former members of the El-Mudzahid Detachment whom we had seen in the village are today Bosnian citizens, and there is no defect in formal law here, nor should there be. No one outside Bosnia-Herzegovina (and against the will of those people) can decide whether they stay here or not. No, by no means because of others, then, but necessarily because of ourselves and in order to affirm the proclaimed principles on the domestic political market, the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina must take the necessary steps to socialize these people in keeping with the Bosnian way of life. If they have military knowledge, they will be welcome in the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina; if they have religious education, the Islamic Community can provide them employment. Now that they have already obtained citizenship, they can find jobs in others areas of the life of society. But they cannot remain outside the system, like some independent Islamic hippy colony, in which they will be teaching children among the Bosnian crags not to respect any laws except Allah's law, and even then as it is represented by problematical gurus. But if it turns out that there are criminogenic people among them who joined the liberation movement in Bosnia while in flight under the laws of their own states, Bosnia-Herzegovina must also make very specific moves. Anything that clouds over this issue will leave room for doubts and malicious interpretations about the kind of Bosnia-Herzegovina the top Bosnian political leadership would like to see in the future.

Croatia: UN Envoy on Pilot Program for Refugee Repatriation*LD2105225896 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1850 GMT 21 May 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ilok, May 21 (TANJUG)—The head of civilian issues department of the U.N. Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) Gerard Fischer said Tuesday that pilot programs for refugee repatriation being drawn up at present must apply equally to Croats, Serbs and Hungarians.

Explaining the repatriation program in Ilok, town in the Serb region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem, he said that Serbs should return to the villages of Turalj And Kusonje (western Slavonia), Croats to Lipovac and Nijemce (Serb region), and Hungarians to Laslovo and Korodj (Serb region). He added that the program was approved by Croatian Government too.

The Serb region of eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srem is the only part of the former Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) that Croatian [word indistinct] did not occupy last year. It occupied the western part of RSK last may and the southern and northern parts of RSK last August. About 300,000 Serbs fled Croatian aggressions leaving their ancestral homes, and some of them have settled in the Serb region.

According to Serb [word indistinct] authorities, accepting Croatian citizenship would enable retired Serbs from the Serb region to get back their old-age pensions that they had earned in pre-war Croatia, Fischer said.

A list of all old-age pensioners must be drawn up prior to resolving the issue of their citizenship, Fischer said.

Croatia: UNTAES Commander Satisfied With Demilitarization*AU2105173796 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 21 May 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Yuri Chizhik, spokesman for the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES), in the name of UNTAES Administrator General Klein announced via local Vukovar radio that the process of the demilitarization has begun today. Bogdan Rkman has the details:

[Begin recording] Following the completed deployment of UN troops in the region, and in conformity with the UN Security Council Resolution 1037, Mr. Klein informed the UN secretary general that the process of demilitarization had commenced at noon today. This is yet another important step toward peace and security for the people in this region and the normalization of life, the UNTAES spokesman announced.

Simultaneously with the beginning of demilitarization, a special newsletter was issued which UN members will distribute throughout the region.

Commenting on the beginning of the demilitarization in Beli Manastir today, Administrator Jacques Klein drew attention to the great importance of the so-called psychological demilitarization. It is impossible to demilitarize the military if the people are not freed of fear and pressure, Klein said. A great importance in the psychological stabilization, according to Klein, plays the Croatian amnesty law. My people are working on this law today. Once we establish what is not good in the document, we will go with the proposal of changes to Zagreb. I have already contacted Zagreb this morning, Klein said.

Klein repeated that demilitarization cannot be complete without a general amnesty law which should also entail the Serbs who arrived in the district after 1991.

Slavonija-Baranja Corps Commander, General Major Dusan Loncar on the occasion of the beginning of the demilitarization said that the corps was not surprised by the beginning of this process, because the disarmament was envisaged by the peace agreement. We will monitor the process and voluntarily participate in it, Loncar said, emphasizing that UNTAES is a guarantor of dignity and survival to the people and the army. [end recording]

Croatia: E. Slavonia Serbs Criticize Croatian Amnesty Law*LD2105200696 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian
1330 GMT 21 May 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 21 May (SRNA)—We shall only recognize charges brought by The Hague [war crimes] tribunal, not by the Croatian state, Yuri Chizhik, spokesman for the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, has said. He assessed criticism of the Croatian amnesty law voiced by the [Serb] leadership of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem as justified.

Goran Hadzic, president of this Serb region, who has been charged by the Croatian Government with alleged insurrection, has said that the law is "impermissibly selective," adding that "therefore it is not of great importance for finding a solution and offering good prospects for the population of the region."

"For us it is as if the law had never been passed because a large number of citizens who fled western parts of Krajina and who have not been included in this also live in this region," Hadzic said.

Croatia: Social Liberal Party Leader Gotovac Interviewed

AU2205105896 Split NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA
in Serbo-Croatian 17 May 96 pp 6-7

[Interview with Vlado Gotovac, Sabor representative and leader of the Croatian Social Liberal Party, by Vuk Djuricic; place and date not given: "The Opposition Cannot Yet Defeat the HDZ Because the Croats Are Afraid That Only Tudjman Guarantees the Country's Survival!"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

The Domination of HTV

[Djuricic] Tell us what kind of Croatia you would like today?

[Gotovac] The Croatia that I wanted has slowly been disappearing over the past three and a half or four years, and what is evolving is a Croatia that no one wanted. The Croat nation wanted its own country but not any kind of country. And even if the domination of the idea had been so strong that it had been considered that everything else could be postponed, it in no way meant that the rest should be thrown away and forgotten, but postponed, suspended, waiting.... However, the result is the opposite, and what is happening is unfortunately exactly what I foresaw—that we will get used to the situation of suspended freedom and in the end we will not even want it!

[Djuricic] You recently stated that "we are looking more and more like a society in which absolutely all information is blocked.... only a state bulletin is issued...." Is the situation really that bad?

[Gotovac] This was said in a picturesque way, but it is already happening to us to an extent. The HTV [Croat Television] main daily report, for instance, is in fact a "bulletin" from the ruling party, with a small addition of other events, and even this as seen through their prism. Therefore, it could be said that that, which is not totally party-like, is being regarded from a party point of view.... As this is a medium that informs over 80 percent of the Croats as the single means of information, the extent of the television's influence is clear, as well as the consequences of such program editing. [passage omitted]

The Simulation of Freedom

[Djuricic] After what happened in Zagreb, some people are asking themselves whether there is, any sense at all in having new elections unless many other things are changed before that?

[Gotovac] That is an absolutely logical question which is being asked after the Zagreb crisis. Why would a person who made the decision not to recognize the results in one-quarter of the Croat national body, and Zagreb is approximately this, recognize the results in the remaining three-quarters of Croatia!? Why would he change his decision at new elections, which he would also lose? This means that we could vote 100 times, and if he maintains his position, then we would have the same example as we had in Zagreb 100 times. According to this, the question whether elections make any sense is a valid question. But if there is no sense in having new elections, then politics also do not make any sense!

Then we reach the situation that I had mentioned—a police state, in which elections are what they have always been in police states, that is, a simulation of freedom.

[Croat] President Franjo Tudjman is now talking about a "firm democracy," and this is exactly the so-called mass democracy, that is, the democracy that is cited by all authoritative regimes!

[Djuricic] What does "firm democracy" mean?

[Gotovac] This is only a nice game with the firm hand method. The contents are the same, everything is only a little bit "changed." Like the people say: "Only that the Vlachs do not remember!" A so-called mass democracy existed, and it praised itself for stability, firmness, as well as its characteristics. In the study of politics this is known as the Schmidt concept of democracy, which was most ideally realized in Hitler's regime.

[Djuricic] The opposition was "honored" with such epithets from the side of the president of the republic.

[Gotovac] Yes, he "honored" us with some kind of Hitlerism, although statistically there is a similarity with his case in Zagreb. Hitler came to power with a relative majority, and the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] demanded that they come to power in Zagreb with a relative majority. [passage omitted].

[Djuricic] The presidential elections are in 1997. But already one can say that there are many that would like you to be one of the candidates for president of the republic.

[Gotovac] This is a matter of agreement, and one can now talk about it in only one way. If it happens that the opposition decides on me as its candidate to run against Tudjman, I would of course accept this. This is because it is an issue of political responsibility. If the opposition does not agree to this, then I will do nothing to oppose its decision, because I am deeply convinced that if we

are not united, then we do not have any possibility of winning! It is especially important that the opposition have a common candidate also for the reason that such a candidate would not also be a leader of a party. This is important because from that moment onward we would not have a party president of the republic, but a president of all citizens of Croatia.

Croatia: Tactics of Anti-Tudjman Opposition Criticized

*LD2105224096 Zagreb HTV Television
in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 21 May 96*

[Commentary by Obrad Kosovac]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Begin Pope John Paul II recording] I pray the Lord to (?grant) peace and harmony in your homeland. [end recording]

[Kosovac] Pope John Paul II, speaking in Croatian on 19 May while in Slovenia, wished peace and harmony to the Croats. Placing these thoughts into Croatia's current political context, it is worth recalling that Dr Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, has been advocating the reconciliation of Croats for years, precisely so that in a free state we might have both peace and harmony, as a precondition for the prosperity which, objectively, the Croatian people deserve in the future.

This is why his well conceived synthesis of all the positive currents in Croatian politics proved to be so superior in the homeland war. After all, Tudjman, as the person reconciling the different trends in Croatia, was not able to allow a multitude of mercenaries of brainwashed folk—whether conscious of this or not, whether desperate or unfortunate—to turn against their own state in a crazy and foolish way.

In his recent interview to the Croatian media and his speech in Okucani, the Croatian president repeated his standpoints on reconciliation pointing, as before, to the threat posed by Croatia's geopolitical situation.

This was immediately followed by an orchestrated campaign by the opposition and the papers that support it. [video shows stills of opposition media, including FERAL TRIBUNE] Those who digest alien ideas, precisely at a time when Croatia is most stable and strong, both internally and in its relations with the world, are plotting some new solutions, but of course without Tudjman and in elections or without them.

It is a little absurd to read the cataclysmic interviews by some opposition leaders and monitor the rigged polls in the tabloid press, stitched together in certain editorial offices, which have nothing to do with the facts.

Dr. Tudjman is the primary target of those newspapers that most loudly proclaim to foreign countries that there is no media freedom in our country at all. For example, according to them, Tudjman is against Europe, although he has always thought of Croatia's future as a European and democratic future. His commitment to the Scandinavianization of this area has today been completely forgotten. Also, at all costs but in a very naive way, there is a desire to compare Tudjman with Tito so that in the eyes of the world he is seen as a dictator and one-party ideologue.

But it would be more logical to compare Tudjman with Bismarck or Churchill or even with de Gaulle. These statesmen unified their nations, won wars, or created a strong and independent state in a situation of internal decay.

The brief postponement of Croatia's admission into the Council of Europe is also being used to score political points against Tudjman and in a blind struggle for power. Most vociferous are those who have given the least and who have never been successful or even given others hope. Today they want everything without taking a single step of their own to improve Croatia's situation. While invoking democracy, they use the most undemocratic methods, lies, name-calling, touched up photographs; in other words, they use political strong-arm tactics that have already been forgotten in the civilized world.

It should be made clear to them that Croatia has always been part of Europe and that it fulfills more of the conditions for Council of Europe than half its current members. The games being played by certain forces are much more sinister and every decent Croat senses this somehow. There is a desire to kill off Croatia by placing it in some kind of Balkan framework and use it in a new settling of scores between different spheres of interest, and, ultimately, systematically weaken it from within, so that those who want to rule in an obedient way might come to power.

Dr. Franjo Tudjman, naturally, says no to all this—today, as yesterday, when Croatia is showing this same Europe that it is in the right and that it can do what it never was able to do before.

In this the Croatian president has the powerful support of most of the people who work, follow events, take part in them themselves, and certainly also vote in elections. Reconciliation among Croats and the strength of the democratic system are just as important in peace today as they were in the recent war. After all, nations who forget their bad experiences, as the ancient philosophers said, are condemned to a repeat performance of their tragedies.

FYROM: Foreign Minister on NATO, International Relations

AU2105172196 *Skopje DNEVNIK in Macedonian*
18 May 96 pp 6-7

[Interview with Foreign Minister Ljubomir Frckoski by Branko Geroski; place and date not given: "The Resolution With the Liberals Confirmed Stable Democracy in Macedonia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Geroski] Mr. Frckoski, it seems to be normal for the government, whose foreign minister you are, to claim that Macedonia is scoring successes on the international plan and in completing its international position, while the opposition parties claim the opposite—that the situation is even worsening, as the Liberals claim. How do you assess the position of the country on the international plan?

[Frckoski] Matters are not so relative as to be able to oppose words—the word of the government, as opposed to the word of the opposition. There are some arguments here by which the public can come to its own judgment. Some assessments and qualifications on this position are also given by the international public, and finally, you as a member of the mass media can also make your assessments. So I believe that the general lines of the foreign policy have been confirmed as just and basic directions. This refers in the first place to the wish for equal cooperation with all neighbors. In the past four years we have solved the main questions and disputes with our neighbors, and have gained an international reputation not only for how and with what technology we did so, but also for the principles upon which we did it. We have completed the first period of so-called rough, open questions in relations with our neighbors and are now starting a phase of the more sophisticated question of mutual cooperation. They are mainly related to some key points in the development of the region and to our place in Europe. Our direct and individual application for membership in the European Union normally does not put aside the relations with our neighbors in the region.

Consensus for NATO

[Geroski] Will Europe's pressure on Macedonia for the regional "clause" be the last "rough" question for Macedonian diplomacy?

[Frckoski] I do not believe that there is such a condition, at least not in the "rough" interpretation of the term condition. There is a semi-condition that fosters the realization of such regional systems of cooperation. However, it is difficult to create advanced regional associations with countries with which you differ on the basic political questions: the relationship toward human

and minority rights, the construction of democratic institutions, the relationship toward collective systems of security, and so on. We are not disputing the so-called functional regionalism that is related to telecommunications, roads, traffic, trade and economic links.... However, the construction of regional cooperation, which implies the creation of coordinating bodies of a number of ministries, and so on, basically requires similar political orientations of the countries. We are trying to place this idea on the table, and I think that we have been successful in this (particularly in the discussions with French President Chirac). I believe that we may here "come out" with a general clause that will be first related to what I called functional regionalism, which is not a matter of dispute, but a formula that will keep the individual evaluation of the country and of its standards for admission in Europe.

[Geroski] The question of Russian resistance to NATO's expansion in the region is becoming more frequent. Does Macedonia have a concise view regarding the Russian theses, or is it perhaps trying to be ambivalent, let me not say "nonaligned"?

[Frckoski] No, Macedonia has a firm view that depends on its political orientation in the internal and external plan. Unlike some countries, I think in Macedonia the question of joining NATO is not just a consensus among the political parties. I believe this consensus exists also in the social base. Macedonia does not have the traditional links of some of its neighbors so as to create differences in the social base or the political development, which may cause problems, dilemmas, or steps back to the right or to the left.... The integration with NATO is a procedure that has to be completed, and we should not expect any spectacular turnover. We want to point out the following: NATO's southern wing must have equal priority with NATO's expansion strategy and the Alliance's penetration in Northern Europe, where, as you mentioned, Russian resistance is greatest. I think that in this part of Europe there is much less resistance, and the climate for the real and definitive stabilization of this region, through the inclusion of some countries in NATO, is much more mature. I now speak as an analyst of the geographic strategy in the region: The minimum condition for the definite pacification of the region is the inclusion of Albania and Macedonia in NATO, because from a geographic and strategic point of view, two conditions are necessary for control over the region: access to the open sea, which means to Albania and Greece, and control over the main crossroad in the region, which is Macedonia.

Kosovo Threat

[Geroski] Recently you sent a letter to UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali in which you asked for the expansion of the UNPREDEP [UN Preventive Deployment] mandate in Macedonia. The main reason was the crisis in Kosovo. What will happen if the UN Security Council denies its military presence in Macedonia?

[Frckoski] The first reason in that letter was the post-Dayton period and the stabilization of this project for peace in Bosnia. The second reason was the crisis in Kosovo or, more precisely, the absence of a dialogue for the resolution of the problem. Our position in relation to this is clear and identical to the international position: Kosovo, in the constitutional sense, is an internal question of the FRY, but from the aspect that human rights are not respected, it is also an international problem. We find that it is very important to start the process of dialogue, which will act as a pressure valve for energy and tensions. The tensions are now a fact, as it is also a fact that there is a concentration of army and arms in Kosovo, and we must look into the eyes of this fact when we consider the presence of UNPREDEP in Macedonia. The third fact is the tension that is present in the Balkans because of the Greek-Turkish dispute. The fourth fact is the process of our army's construction, which has not yet come to the final phase so as to guarantee full security on the border. I believe that these arguments will prevail, and I am optimistic about an extension of UNPREDEP's mandate in Macedonia. Our wish is to prolong its mandate for at least another year, and parallel to this, the presence of NATO and U.S. troops inside or outside UNPREDEP, in an arrangement that will suit us, is also of importance for us.

[Geroski] The political leaders of the Albanians in Macedonia are implicitly accusing the Macedonian leadership of supporting Belgrade in the dispute between Belgrade and Kosovo and, judging by the latest statement of Dzaferi and Taci for REUTER, they are even announcing direct action in case of an aggravated crisis in Kosovo. What is your assessment of those statements?

[Frckoski] These statements are emotional and somehow represent an "obligation" the Albanian parties in the region have concerning the question, which in a way dictates the timing of the political mood. The Albanian nation in the region will probably be the last to experience the fate of all the other Balkan nations; that is, to be divided into several states. This is a normal situation not only for the Balkans but for Europe, Africa, Latin America, practically everywhere. There are only a few cases in which the state borders coincide with the ethnic borders. Now they have to swallow this situa-

tion from a political and cultural aspect, because there is not another option. The other option is the option that failed in Bosnia, that is, the Serbian option for a Greater Serbia. Aside from this general situation there is the question of human rights. It is something that will be discussed endlessly. I think that we in Macedonia have passed the roughest phase of discussions on basic human and minority rights, and we are now in a phase of balancing more sophisticated rights in this field. It is important that the Constitution offers a large space for greater practice of minority rights, but of human rights in general as well.

[Geroski] Macedonia has constantly been under the pressure of international monitoring to do this....

[Frckoski] Macedonia has been open to these questions since the very outset. The international monitoring has even helped it, because it actually uncovered the situation that was politically manipulated by some neighbors and by some minority groups inside Macedonia, after which it rationalized the requests. It transformed them from nationalist and romantic into European standards. As we did not have any intention of hiding anything here, this process suits us, and this is the way in which we will proceed. Normally, we say that we must not be encompassed by the mandates that refer to the former Yugoslavia. These are different situations. The subregion former Yugoslavia must be definitely abandoned and a new adequate monitoring system must be applied. The mandates must be adapted to our status as a member of the Council of Europe and OSCE, as well as in appropriate UN missions.

Comparative Advantages

[Geroski] Mr. Frckoski, how is Macedonia different from the others in the region?

[Frckoski] We intend to follow the story, or joke, that goes like this: A tiger met two researchers in the jungle. One of them started lacing his tennis shoes, and the other asked him whether he believed that he could run faster than the tiger. The former replied no, but I hope to run faster than you. For Macedonia it is important to be faster than Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania, and Albania.... Our comparative model is not Japan, Germany, or Austria. We must define several orientation points. First, Macedonia leads all the other countries in the region in relation to safety and security, regardless of the political propaganda that some parties here are "driving" for the sake of their narrow party interests. This is a comparative advantage that is of great importance to us. The second factor is our arrangements with the IMF and with the World Bank that standardize the economic conditions. The third factor is the banking

system reform and the economic reforms in the other fields. In these sectors Macedonia is ahead, and it should maintain this timing. These are the comparative advantages of Macedonia. It is wrong to start numbering the comparative advantages by mentioning tobacco, tourism, healthy food....

[Geroski] Please allow me to ask you a mean question. Are we becoming comparatively better than the others because there are statements in which freedom of press is attacked; because of open processes of political abuse of a terribly unpleasant event, such as the assassination attempt; or because of a serious initiative of the opposition for extraordinary parliamentary elections, which was rejected by the ruling structures...?

[Frckoski] You know, we are a democratic state, and the opposition's initiatives to come to power are part of the political struggle. This struggle always takes place in front of the voters and the public, in order to demonstrate the best alternative solution for a specific moment in the development of the state. What is so terrible here? It is normal for there to be some important questions that have to be resolved, such as the legal framework for the position of the main agents in democratic life, first of all the mass media. Rules cannot be forcibly imposed on such an agent; only the basic legal conditions can be imposed. However, the content of these processes cannot be produced in the same way. There is a struggle here as well, and nobody is going to give you anything in this struggle. As far as the political use of the assassination attempt is concerned, I will not comment on the statement by my colleague Cokrevski [minister of the interior], but I will express my personal opinion. I know Professor Cokrevski, and I am convinced that this man, judging from his mentality and the whole of his life's activities, is a democrat. My opinion is that the emotion with which he reacted was caused by the political use of the assassination attempt, which is an open wound for all of us. This is a nightmare for all of us. I see all this in this context, and I do not wish to comment on his statement, but I am sure that it was taken in the wrong direction. The allegations that the Interior Ministry is producing a smoke screen are too strong. It really is insolent and offensive. All right, this is something that is happening in public. All this has to be endured.

Use of the Subject "Assassination Attempt"

[Geroski] The Liberals accused the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia], but they also accused you personally, of abusing the assassination attempt. On the other hand, there are some assessments that the other side is also using the "assassination

attempt" for political purposes. Why is all this taking place?

[Frckoski] You see, this event is a trauma for the whole nation, not only for the authorities. It is normal and necessary for the public to show an interest in the investigation. The fact that the Liberal Party has used the event to make political allegations in its newspaper LIBERAL that Macedonia has been taken over by murders and terrorism is quite another question. This is a political scandal. This cannot be hushed up if we want to adhere to political culture in the country. What does that mean, I beg your pardon? Power in Macedonia has been seized through murder and terrorism—that is what was literally written. It means there was a coup d'etat. It was not even a bloodless coup d'etat but a massacre—murders and terrorism. What kind of a country is ruled by such an authority? What is the foreign image of Macedonia? What is the motive for depicting Macedonia in such a way? Only because, conditionally speaking, a party has been removed from power. Is this despair compatible with the minimum political culture in a political struggle? Will this hatred bring anything good to anybody? What does it show? Aside from the scandal that it is creating, it speaks about its author as well. It says that the author is a small party without influence that can afford the risk of talking about classical liberal principles one day and turning to political extremism the next. The statements of the nonparliamentarian opposition are a joke compared to this statement by the Liberals. This is the strongest statement that has been given on any authority since 1991. Only a small and not influential party can afford such a statement, because a bigger and more responsible political subject knows that such a statement will kill it politically. Only a party with nothing to lose in its electoral body can allow itself to slide into extremism and then come back.

[Geroski] Has this tension connected with the "assassination attempt" dated from the first days following the attempt?

[Frckoski] No, there is something else in question. The tension and hatred coming from the criticism of the Liberal Party is a result of its inconsistency, of its method, which we could describe as walking around with a vacuum cleaner to suck up the crumbs that fall from the table of serious political ideas about serious political subjects, or acting like a political economist who is taking into account the kind of carpet that has been bought, the color of the wallpaper in the ministries, and so on. This speaks of the culture of consciousness and—let me say this conditionally—of the program of this party, which is only aimed at taking part in power. If that goal is no longer there,

the principles and the political program are gone. All of a sudden there is an explosion, there is self-hatred and despair. This 'infection' can be now transferred to the opposition in Macedonia. It will destroy the basic function of the political opposition—the construction of a political alternative. This is a major question. It is not just gathering crumbs from the table.

[Geroski] Mr. Frckoski, for a number of years you shared power with the party you are now describing. On the other hand, the question goes for the Liberals as well: They shared power with you, and they are now describing you as totalitarians. How was this combination possible?

[Frckoski] I have my own opinion about this, and it does not necessarily have to be the opinion of the parties that are participating in the coalition. Different political circumstances, in which some alternatives collided that existed in Macedonia in 1991 but also in 1994, created the need for alliances and electoral groupings among the political parties. The damage to the internal coalition was then considered to be smaller than the global possibility for the domination of another alternative, first of all the nationalistic alternative, which would literally mean a collapse for Macedonia at the start. That is the justification. The circumstances are being changed, and some things can now become clear. That is exactly what happened.

[Geroski] Is this tension reflected in Macedonia's position on the international plan? Is the reputation of the state ruined because of it?

[Frckoski] The facts show it to be quite the opposite. Because of the way we reconstructed the government, the diplomatic corps and the foreign observers here evaluate us as the only country in the region where political processes are carried out in a peaceful and controlled way, that is, in a standard way. The technology with which this was done speaks in favor of the stability and strength of Macedonian democracy without any reservations, and with its full meaning. That was written in the reports we received, and you received them as well. That was an important test, which Macedonia passed with excellent marks.

FYROM: Citizens Experience Difficulties Obtaining Visas

AU2105155796 Skopje MIC in English 21 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] citizens can go to China or Japan much more easily than they can travel through Europe. The visa quarantine which has been sealed for a year already by the so-called Schengen visa, has closed the ramp for free entry in the countries

with open borders. The queues in front of the embassies of the European countries with the largest number of Macedonian immigrants or people on temporary work, are growing longer and longer. And, not only for the purpose of getting the necessary entrance document. So, for instance, numbers are issued in front of the Italian Embassy every morning, and the citizens have to wait for several hours just to submit their documents. The situation in front of the German Embassy is similar, while in front of the Slovenian Embassy, the lines are mainly for working visas with which some citizens are trying to get work in Austria.

However, which ever way the situation is viewed, the procedure for compulsory visa is making the Macedonian citizens unwanted both in the big and the small states of the old Continent, except in those which used to belong to the eastern block. Actually, not one foreign consular employee or at least a foreign representative in Skopje categorically states that the Macedonian citizens are not issued entrance visas. Everyone can try to get one, but the problem is actually having it approved. Or, the necessary travelling seal in the Macedonian blue passports can only be obtained after gathering one thousand documents, as well as a bank statement.

The number of countries that require visas is much larger than those where such procedures are not necessary. Our citizens can travel freely to Bulgaria, Turkey, FR Yugoslavia, which can also be noticed by the information on the most exploited holidays or last year's summer tourist travels. Beside these countries, Macedonians can also travel without visas to Croatia, Slovenia, Romania, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Russia, for which it is only necessary to have an invitation letter. In Greece, the entrance is mainly free for the Macedonians, but it is still desirable that citizens born in the Aegean part of Macedonia don't travel to this country without any dire need.

Although since its independence and international recognition 13 embassies, a couple of consulates, and liaisons offices have been opened in Skopje, this has not helped our citizens to travel more easily to those countries. There are consular departments in some embassies which directly issue travelling visas. In others, on the other hand, such as the English Embassy, there is no consular department and it deals strictly with economic and cultural relations. The honorary consulates of Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Japan, and Denmark only act as go-betweens in the "travelling" of the documents necessary to obtain entrance visas. In all of these official institutions, beside the limited conditions for issuing the visas, the waiting periods are also unreasonably dragged out.

Nonetheless, all these institutions require literally identical documents, such as a letter of guarantee which the relative or friend from a foreign country must send. Among the documents, it is also necessary to submit a working certificate, a wedding certificate, a return air ticket. In order to visit Great Britain, for instance, it is necessary to show some kind of document of the money that will be brought into the country. Precisely from this kind of systematic examination of the necessary papers, it can be seen that only pensioners can obtain tourist visas, and not students or, in general, people who have jobs in the country. Therefore, in the last couple of years, when travelling abroad, they are using official visas more often, which are easier to obtain and the procedure is much more simple and certain. Otherwise, the price of the visa varies from country to country, it ranges from \$30 for China, up to around 50 German marks for the other countries.

And, while the visa for China is issued immediately, as well as that for Japan, through the honorary consulate which mediates with the embassy in Belgrade, one can get into Sweden about three months after submitting the documents. It takes less, almost two months after submitting an application, to travel to Denmark, while, in order to travel to the Benelux countries, for which the visas are issued in the German Embassy in Skopje, one has to wait two weeks.

However interesting this listing may sound, only those citizens who have felt the need to travel to some foreign

country have experienced this exasperating procedure of obtaining visas. Especially if the procedure requires the in-person presence in some of the embassies in Sofia and Belgrade.

The most difficult, probably, is to obtain visas for Australia and New Zealand, as our country is covered by the embassies in Belgrade and Berlin.

FYROM: Visa Procedure With Greece Simplified
AU2105155096 Skopje MIC in English 21 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] This weekend, there was a record number of guests and vehicles at the border crossings Bogorodica-Evzoni and Dojran-Dojrani, on the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]-Greek border. This forced the Greek border officials to make some changes in the manner of issuing visas.

Macedonian citizens are no longer required to fill in forms upon entering Greece, and the request for visas is filled in by the border officials themselves. In order to obtain a Greek visa, it is necessary to submit a passport, a photograph and 100 drachmas, while all other formalities are taken care of by the Greek border officials. This is a sign of the announced program of procedures for simplifying the border formalities for eliminating the queues and tourists before the start of the main tourist season.

Poland: Allied Forces Commander on Prospects of NATO Entry

LD2205115796 Warsaw PAP in Polish
0948 GMT 22 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Gdansk, 22 May—Poland would be a valuable recruit to NATO, Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Johns, commander in chief, Allied Forces, Northwestern Europe, told journalists in Gdynia today.

In Johns's opinion, the differences in armaments of Polish naval forces do not constitute a fundamental barrier to Poland's acceptance into NATO military structures, but the final decision on the matter will depend not on the commanders but on the politicians. [passage omitted]

The visit, aimed at showing the NATO commander the state and capabilities of the Polish Navy, will end on Thursday morning at the military airfield in Babie Doly, from where Air Chief Marshal Johns will go to Warsaw for talks at the Ministry of National Defense, the Polish Army General Staff, and the Air Force Command.

Poland: 'Large-Scale Actions' To Promote NATO Membership

WS2205132796 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
in Polish 22 May 96 p 2

[Article by "Z.L.": "MON Is Preparing an Information Assault on NATO. Our Men at the Headquarters"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *If Poland becomes a NATO member, it will assume all commitments stemming from the North Atlantic system of common security. It cannot be ruled out that allied troops will be stationed on our territory, and, if a need for military reinforcements arises, deployment of nuclear weapons in the Polish Republic should be envisioned as well. These and other questions have been included in the so-called classified Poland-NATO Document for Debate, material that is a foundation for further stages of arrangements with our Western partners.*

MON [Ministry of National Defense] will also prepare a white paper for our future allies, which will include all issues of significance for state defense. Because the deputies from the Sejm National Defense Commission have had memories of numerous white papers (by the way, none of them have so far been created), this time they suggested drafting a simply "white-red" document.

Deputy Defense Minister Andrzej Karkoszka yesterday avoided elaborating on the issue of possible deployment of allied forces and weapons on Polish land, believing that a debate on this topic will become inevitable only when our ties to NATO take real shape, when we are admitted to the alliance, and when our status is

defined. Because this will not take place within the next few months, we can currently confine ourselves to saying that, according to the current assessments of the country's external security, spectacular "strengthening" of Polish defense is not needed. Nothing is currently threatening us, and, unless rapid changes occur within the next few years, discussions about foreign forces within our borders will be groundless in the future as well.

As Minister Karkoszka reported, during the first round of individual talks between Poland and NATO, which was held two weeks ago, we assured our hosts from Brussels of our invariable strategic policy, strong social support for Poland's accession to NATO, the defensive nature of our doctrine, adherence to standards of civilian and democratic control over the Armed Forces, and meeting all other criteria included in the study on NATO's expansion, such as, for example, respecting the rights of minorities. The fact that Poland, as one of the few countries from our region that are aspiring to become NATO members has good relations with all of its neighbors—moreover, they have been consolidated by bilateral treaties—was an important argument. The 1991 treaty with Russia confirms that Poland will not participate in any aggression and that Russia will not be attacked from our territory and vice versa.

The white paper on Poland's defense is to include basic information concerning the results of reform of the former system, the current principles of running and financing the Armed Forces, and political and legal conditions in the area of state security. The paper is to supplement large-scale actions promoting Poland as a future member of the North Atlantic alliance, particularly those scheduled for the next few months. A recent official analysis by the U.S. Congress, in which the cost of enlarging NATO was estimated at several hundred billion dollars, has caused great damage, and not just to our image, because incorrect methods were used while drafting the document, and, in the opinion of MON, many elementary substantial mistakes were committed. For example, significant differences between prices were not taken into account.

Minister Karkoszka claims that directions in which contracts for deliveries and production of weapons are concluded should not excessively weigh on the process of our rapprochement with NATO. However, the reverberations of the ongoing commotion surrounding the selection of weapons for the Huzar attack helicopter—the Americans and the British have demanded equal chances, while the Industry Ministry tends to accept an Israeli partner—do not contribute to the process of integration. Although NATO countries do not have identical weapons, large-scale unification of equipment is

conducive to interoperability—that is, possible combat interaction in the future—Karkoszka claims.

"It is also important not to give in to lobbies but to sign the most important contracts for Polish industry on our terms," Deputy Jerzy Szmajdzinski, defense commission chairman, reminded.

Poland: Deputy Defense Minister on NATO Negotiations

WS2205110096 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA
in Polish 16 May 96 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Deputy Defense Minister Andrzej Karkoszka by Andrzej Medykowski; place and date not given: "The Brussels Dialogue"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Medykowski] Our dialogue with NATO has begun in Brussels. The most recent negotiations, however, seem to be a monologue by the Polish delegation, which is being "cross-examined." Is this really what it was like?

[Karkoszka] We were the ones who "cross-examined" NATO representatives on issues of interest to us, particularly issues that had been raised but left unexplained in the study on NATO enlargement. It took 2.5 hours. Our explanations were far more curt and took 30 minutes, although we would have preferred for the second part of the debate to be longer. At this stage, however, political issues and methodology are far more important than the technical and organizational details. We are speaking mainly about the state: the economy, the administration, government structures. All this is taken into consideration when assessing any country's readiness to enter a dialogue and far-reaching cooperation with NATO.

[Medykowski] Was Mr. Gebhardt von Moltke satisfied with the outline of Poland's basic preparations to join the alliance?

[Karkoszka] NATO Deputy Secretary General Gebhardt von Moltke oversees the negotiations with individual states. Fourteen have already entered the dialogue, but there may be more: one neutral state and Ukraine have recently expressed their willingness to join in. The dialogue has been broadened to include not only those countries aspiring to membership, but also those which want better relations with NATO.

Our talks with Mr. von Moltke were very pleasant, for both sides I hope. Most of all, they were very sincere: we spoke of major problems faced by contemporary Europe in the context of current relations between NATO, Russia, Ukraine and partner states. We were thus able to learn about the alliance's intentions for the next few months, including preparations for important

decisions and launching a dialogue at the ministerial session to take place in Berlin in June.

It is worth stressing that the Polish delegation had an opportunity to present our view on a number of problems, much to Ambassador von Moltke's satisfaction.

[Medykowski] The "Discussion Paper" presented in April indicates that our country meets the basic criteria for future NATO members. What do competent representatives of NATO think?

[Karkoszka] Some of the criteria specified in that document are obvious to us: a democratic state system, a market economy, the capacity to take part in solving international crises and conflicts, participation in peace missions.

A year ago some requirements were still presented as problems demanding a solution. The probably most important ones for the alliance—democratic, civilian control over the Armed Forces and developing the defense system—are currently being solved in a very positive fashion.

Efforts aimed at implementing the law on the office of the defense minister will shortly bear fruit. We fill in NATO partners on our activities, we jointly assess the progress we are making. I hope that soon this problem will be considered solved and crossed off the agenda of talks with Poland. The General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces has been subordinated to the defense minister and integrated with the structures of the Ministry of National Defense. The budget, short- and long-term planning, managing defense resources, training civilian and military cadres for defense, the shape of the defense system and state defense planning are all being taken care of. All these efforts, however, will only be crowned by the Constitution.

The economic development of the country gives ground for hope that Poland will be capable of fulfilling its obligations as an ally. This one of the major NATO criteria.

We argued that in our view Poland fully meets the requirements it has been presented with. As a nation and a state we are politically and psychologically prepared to enter NATO.

[Medykowski] The method and timetable for a harmonious acceptance of new members into the alliance still remain to be defined. Did the talks in Brussels in any way elucidate what concrete steps have to be taken over the next year, two years, three years, etc.?

[Karkoszka] We are discussing the timeframes. A preliminary dialogue is currently underway. Perhaps next

year we will have to supply more details on the Polish defense system, after which the alliance will assess it and invite us as members. Once the invitation is extended, talks on the accession protocol might begin. They could take a year or two. Once the accession protocols are ready, a project for their execution will have to be elaborated, and so on.

We presented our stance on these issues during the talks. I said that we should put in as much effort as possible now, in the preliminary phase this year and the next, so that the next stages can be shortened.

This applies, among other things, to planning system solutions, investments, expenses. The more we accomplish now, the less the burden for us and our allies will be in the future. Our partners would have no reason to vote against our membership in their parliaments. Our discussion paper contains a national project of integrating and cooperating with NATO. The project defines the tasks for all institutions dealing with defense. This includes legislative, administrative and financial problems. Tasks have been assigned for each sector in compliance with the priorities we had presented NATO within our framework document and ancillary ones. They deal with communications, command systems, transportation, foreign languages, air defense, data processing systems, logistics, infrastructure. Tasks have also been specified for the Armed Forces in such fields as structures, the system of maintaining combat readiness, military education, training cadres.

Among the most burning tasks are a methodological implementation of Western standards and NATO regulations in the state and within the Armed Forces, a reform of the system of financing and subsidizing the Armed Forces, and developing a system of dealing with crises.

We are beginning to solve these issues this year, but the whole process will continue for the next five, 10 and 15 years to come.

[Medykowski] We usually talk about the requirements set by the alliance. Let us look at it from a different angle: what are our strengths and what can we do to become an attractive partner both for NATO as a whole, as well as for the particular member states?

[Karkoszka] In the last chapter of our discussion paper, we listed our basic strengths.

First, Poland is a stable state. Many changes have taken place over the last few years, but the state system has remained intact. Nobody can question the fact that we are a democracy, or, as our partners are well aware, that state policies are unalterable.

The second argument is the economic growth projections. We are still far behind the Western states, but we are developing quickly and surely. Even if our economic growth does decelerate, it will remain relatively sure and steady.

The third positive element is social support for integration with the West: more than 80 percent of Poles back the idea. Perhaps some do not realize the sacrifice and expenses involved, yet the profits to be gained from stability, security, and a sense of being among the most developed states are tremendous. I therefore do not fear social attitudes might change.

The fourth advantage: we are an "anchor of peace" in this part of Europe. We have very good relations with all neighboring states, which makes us exceptional in the region. The policy of relations with neighboring states is implemented openly, actively, and comprehensively. The West sees that. It is no coincidence that there is increasing reference to a "backbone of Europe" which begins in Paris and ends in Warsaw.

The next issue is participation in peacekeeping missions and the role Poland plays in promoting peace. Poland has an impressive 49 years of experience in 29 peacekeeping operations. Some point out that our presence in Bosnia, for example, is costing us a lot. It is true the costs are high, but the political profits are undisputable. Contacts, experience, elements of interoperability are obvious. It is in these areas that we are laying the foundations for close-knit contacts with NATO.

Finally, the last factor: Poland is an average-sized European country with a population of 40 million, yet, despite financial difficulties, it has a highly disciplined and professional Armed Forces within which morale is high. Our huge military is transparent, structured for defense, and orientated at maintaining stability. It contributes to the enhancement of security and stability in the region. In my view, we should therefore be welcome in the alliance.

[Medykowski] Thank you for the interview.

Poland: Krzaklewski: Belarus Minister Lied About Minsk Events

LD2105141396 Warsaw PAP in Polish
1330 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 21 May—Solidarity leader Marian Krzaklewski says Belarusian Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Antanovich lied when explaining the reasons for last week's incident involving the Polish trade union delegation in Belarus.

Krzaklewski told a news conference today that, in spite of what Antanovich said, he did not break Belarus law.

He was in Belarus completely legally and obtained a legal pass at the entrance to the plant in which he met the workers.

"The minister's statement contains false and untrue information concerning both my person and the course of events. Our trade union, as well as the Polish Embassy representatives who witnessed most of the events referred to by the minister, has all of the information," Krzaklewski said.

Poland: Solidarity Pickets Belarus Embassy in Warsaw

LD2105165096 Warsaw PAP in Polish
1358 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 21 May—About 30 Solidarity trade unionists picketed the Belarus Embassy in Poland today. Maciej Jankowski, head of Mazowsze [Region] Solidarity, handed an embassy employee, who came out to the picket, a letter demanding the release of the Belarus trade unionists arrested after the 26 April demonstration and a guarantee of full freedom of action in defense of employee interests for Belarusian trade unions.

Marian Krzaklewski, chairman of Solidarity's National Commission, told journalists that Solidarity would keep protesting until democratic freedoms were restored in Belarus. He also announced Solidarity demonstrations during a possible visit by Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka to Poland.

Poland: Ukrainian Minister on Prospects for Free Trade

WS2205115496 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA
in Polish 22 May 96 p 18

[Interview with Serhiy Osyka, Ukrainian foreign economic cooperation minister, by Jacek Pawlicki; place and date not given: "To Free Trade"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *If experts from both sides solidly get down to work, a memorandum on free trade between Poland and Ukraine may be signed as early as the end of this year.*

[Pawlicki] When should one expect the signing of a free trade agreement between Poland and Ukraine?

[Osyka] I would not like to speak about a specific date. Before concluding such an agreement, we will sign a memorandum on liberalizing trade. It will include concrete things. If experts from both sides solidly get down to work, such a memorandum may be signed as early as the end of this year—of course provided that neither the Ukrainian nor the Polish side takes any measures that would harm domestic producers and

exporters. Because this is very important, we will have to analyze all of the pros and cons of trade liberalization.

We must analyze the economic and legal consequences of signing such an agreement. We must take into account all international commitments of both countries—for example, Poland's commitments with regard to the EU and the Central European Free Trade Association [CEFTA]—as well as the interests of both economies. The point is that the agreement's provisions should not threaten the interests of Polish and Ukrainian producers.

[Pawlicki] Which Ukrainian branches could suffer from the liberalization of bilateral trade?

[Osyka] For instance, the agricultural and coal sectors.

[Pawlicki] However, trade between Poland and Ukraine is currently proceeding according to the following formula: Polish coal for Ukrainian ore.

[Osyka] This is true; it is a concrete example of trade cooperation. I think that this method will expand. We must currently think what we should do to make this method of exchange more active.

[Pawlicki] Is Ukraine also thinking about joining CEFTA?

[Osyka] It is, but this will not happen soon. We must first sign agreements with members of this agreement—for example, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia. The second stage of our accession to CEFTA could begin after Ukraine's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Another round of negotiations with the WTO will begin in June. We will also have to settle the issue of liberalizing trade between Ukraine and the EU.

[Pawlicki] Is the tightening of economic contacts with Poland an alternative to Russia's economic expansion for Ukraine?

[Osyka] We cannot speak about Russia's expansion. Our terms of trade with Russia have recently considerably improved. For example, Russia abolished customs duties on exports in April. Diversification of foreign trade is one of the points of a program for Ukrainian economic reforms. In 1995, Ukraine's foreign trade turnover increased by 26 percent. Although exports to CIS countries grew by a mere 9 percent, exports to other countries increased by 33 percent.

The trade deficit with Russia has been balanced by the increase in exports to other countries.

[Pawlicki] Have you held talks on establishing a Polish-Ukrainian bank in Ukraine? The Polish side says that it could participate in a program for supporting and guaranteeing bilateral trade.

[Osyka] Talks on creating two Polish-Ukrainian banks—one in Kharkov and the other in Lutsk—are currently coming to an end. Both sides are negotiating the financial mechanisms of this venture. Ukraine's central bank has already given its consent. At the beginning of June, a Polish delegation will visit Kharkov to discuss this issue.

[Pawlicki] Will the Polish side capitalize the existing banks, or will new banks be established?

[Osyka] These bank already exist, but, if they receive additional capital, they will become completely new banks.

[Pawlicki] What capital will they have?

[Osyka] Their share capital will not be large—approximately \$15 million. This will be enough to begin credit and insurance operations. As the banks provide service for subsequent contracts, they will become richer.

[Pawlicki] [Foreign Economic Cooperation] Minister Jacek Buchacz is talking a lot about cooperation within a triangle. Polish firms conduct concrete ventures in Ukraine for Austrian or Canadian money. Is this possible?

[Osyka] Of course, this is a very interesting pattern, at least because, after signing an appropriate agreement, Canada and Ukraine would become strategic partners. Furthermore, Poland and Ukraine are very vigorously cooperating with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). This bank increased its credit lines for Ukraine to \$200 million in 1996. After my return to Kiev, a number of consultations with representatives of Poland, Canada, Austria, and Ukraine will be held with regard to concrete ventures.

Poland: Minister Presents Nominee for Intelligence Service

LD2105202596 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1600 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The political advisory committee attached to the minister of internal affairs has concluded the first part of its deliberations, during which Minister [of Internal Affairs] Zbigniew Siemiatkowski presented his candidate, Andrzej Kapkowski, for the post of head of the State Protection Office [UOP].

[Correspondent] The nomination of Andrzej Kapkowski will be scrutinized on 27 May, when the deliberations of the advisory committee attached to the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW] are continued. The members of the political advisory committee submitted a protest to the minister of internal affairs about the Council

of Ministers failing to consult the committee when it examined a bill on the creation of a Ministry of Internal Affairs and administration, and on the procedures for removing UOP from the MSW.

Poland: Committee on Interior Ministry Reorganization Plans

LD2105211696 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1730 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The members of the political advisory committee attached to the minister of internal affairs have protested about the Council of Ministers failing to consult the committee when it was doing work on reforming the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW]. Ryszard Hincza, spokesman for the minister of internal affairs, said that Zbigniew Siemiatkowski [interior minister] had not adopted a stance on this protest.

[Correspondent] After a secret session of the committee, its members did not want to talk about the reasons for their protest.

[Begin Hincza recording] The members of the political advisory committee have protested that the committee was not consulted when work was being done on restructuring the so-called center—in other words, on plans to amalgamate the Ministry of Internal Affairs into one joint ministry of internal affairs and administration. They also protested about plans to remove UOP [State Protection Office] from MSW structures.

[Correspondent] The committee familiarized itself with a secret report on the conditions of the services subordinate to the MSW. Senator Krzysztof Kozłowski, former minister of internal affairs, was very critical of the report.

[Begin recording] [Kozłowski, senator for the Freedom Union and member of the political advisory committee] It is not possible on the basis of this report to draw any conclusions about the condition of these services.

[Michał Janiszewski, member of the Confederation for an Independent Poland and member of the political advisory committee] It contains no revelations. It is as though it just states the existing condition and nothing more—no revelations. [end recording]

[Correspondent] Minister Siemiatkowski presented to the committee the nomination of Colonel Andrzej Kapkowski to the post of head of UOP. Kapkowski is acting UOP head. Discussions on this subject have been postponed until 27 May.

Poland: Draft Privatization Law 'Violates the Law'
WS2205110896 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
in Polish 21 May 96 p 1

[Article by "A.K.K.": "Changes in the Government Draft Privatization Law"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Work on the governmental draft of the privatization law carried out by a subcommission of the Sejm Ownership Transformation Commission has been suspended because experts appointed by the Sejm stated that the draft violates the law, mainly the constitution. Krzysztof Laszkiewicz, chairman of the Advisory Council for Reprivatization, claims that, unless the government introduces certain amendments, further legislative action is impossible.*

Work was recently launched on these amendments. At a council session held Monday [20 May], Miroslaw Marek, director of the Reprivatization Department at the Ministry of Privatization, said that the ministry has already prepared amendments to the draft law. They are to be presented to Prime Minister Cimoszewicz on 24 May.

The government might be forced to accelerate work on the law because the Supreme Administrative Court has been granted broader powers and is repealing an increasing number of past nationalization decisions. There is no money in the budget to pay damages to former proprietors.

Poland: Presidential Delegate Wants Draft Constitution Amended

WS2205111496 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish
22 May 96 p 3

[Article by Monika Sarnecka: "The Armed Forces Subordinated to the President or to the Government? A Recurring Problem"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 21 May, presidential representative Ryszard Kalisz submitted to the constitutional commission amendments to the draft constitution that concerned the Armed Forces. According to the opposition and experts, these amendments give the president more rights, as a result of which the Council of Ministers would have fewer powers.

In line with the proposal, the president would be responsible for the internal and external security of the state. His advisory organ in peacetime would be the National Security Council. In the event of the state being in any danger, as well as in the event of war, defense issues would be handled by the National Security Committee, headed by the president. He would also be the commander in chief of the Armed Forces; he

would exercise his supreme powers through the prime minister and the head of the National Defense Ministry.

"This proposal proves that the accusations leveled at Walesa have already been forgotten," says Jerzy Ciemniewski of the Freedom Union. He recalled that, as early as a few months ago, when Lech Walesa was president, the commission adopted regulations the president had now returned to. "This amendment is to suit the new head of state," Ciemniewski stressed.

Janusz Szymanski of the Union of Labor objected to the regulation that gives the president the right to appoint his successor if he is unable to perform his duties. "This is a trend toward accepting autocratic solutions," said Szymanski, recalling that the draft constitution already includes a provision that specifies that, in such a case, the president's duties devolve upon the Sejm speaker.

In general, the discussants argued that the proposed solutions are bad and that they were submitted too late. The issue will be voted on on 22 May.

Poland: PSL Chairman's Internal Party Policy Assessed

WS2105143296 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA
in Polish 18-19 May 96 p 3

[Article by Dominika Wielowieyska: "A Nonaggression Pact in the PSL; Disputes Only With the Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The Polish Peasant Party (PSL) and its leader Waldemar Pawlak are recovering from their crisis. The tactics are simple: criticism of the Cimoszewicz government and no disputes over posts within the party.*

The presidential elections are not Pawlak's most pleasant memory. He garnered a little over 4 percent of the vote. The rating of the PSL also dropped to approximately 5 percent (a poll carried out by the Center for Research on Public Opinion—OBOP—in November). Over and over the party was shaken by wars over posts. The chairman was almost dismissed from his post. He was accused of autocracy and of building his own "farm." He was rescued by the Oleksy case and the change of government. The peasants decided that they should not change their leader in a period of political turmoil.

Pawlak Is Strengthening His Position

Today Pawlak is reestablishing his position in order to win the party elections during the fall congress. "He stands a good chance of winning," admits party Spokesman Janusz Dobrosz, who previously said on numerous occasions that Pawlak unnecessarily "wants to keep the reins in his hands."

The chairman is visiting regions and courting activists. A few days ago he invited chairmen of the PSL voivodship boards to a meeting near Warsaw: magnificent meals, an artistic program, a tour of Warsaw for the chairmen's wives.

Luckily for him, the opposition within the party has not created any counter candidate for the party's chairman as yet. Deputy Prime Minister Roman Jagielinski, Pawlak's primary opponent, will not be such a candidate. His rating within the PSL is not too high. In a vote of confidence in the party's leadership, Jagielinski was saved by one vote only. Jozef Zych prefers being the Sejm speaker of all Poles to leading just one party. He is not actively engaged in promoting the PSL, of which the peasants do not really approve.

However, Pawlak realizes that lack of opposing candidates is not enough for him to be reelected the party's chairman. For this reason, he did his best to moderate the infighting over posts. There is unofficial talk within the PSL that he has ordered his people to temper their criticism of Jagielinski. The group of "small land owners," which supports Pawlak, used to accuse Jagielinski of promoting large farms. The anti-Pawlak opposition, in turn, has already stopped trying to recall the chairman from the post of the head of the party or the party's parliamentary club.

Jagielinski has confirmed in GLOS WYBRZEZA that there is a nonaggression pact within the party: "No more motions to recall Pawlak will be submitted. We have reached an agreement and this atmosphere will not change before the congress." As recently as three months ago, he suggested that a man of honor would have resigned after doing so poorly in the presidential elections (as Pawlak did).

The opposition agreed to a temporary agreement because their fear of a defeat in the parliamentary elections is greater than their fear of Pawlak. As Dobrosz put it: "Voters do not understand disputes."

A Ruthless Critic of the Government

Peace within the party is not enough for Pawlak to be able to really rise from the ashes. Thus, he is presenting himself as a stern critic of the government, although the PSL is part of it (the chairman saves his own ministers). The main target of his attack is Grzegorz Kolońko [deputy prime minister and finance minister]. Many people do not remember that he was also a minister in the Pawlak cabinet. Today the PSL chairman is criticizing the government's decisions regarding taxation. He demands introduction of an 18-percent tax for people with the lowest incomes and restoration of education tax breaks. He is dissatisfied

with the gasoline import quota; he prefers reduction of the excise tax paid by importers. When his offer to act as a mediator was turned down by [Privatization] Minister Kaczmarek, Pawlak announced that he would still "seek solutions." He managed to make a television appearance as a defender of the shipyard workers.

The peasants do not want to split with the coalition, but they are showing that they differ widely with the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]. "The coalition partners have been trying to discuss things with each other for three years now. A year before the elections they are trying to talk mainly with voters," one deputy says.

One gains the impression, which is in line with Pawlak's tactics, that the PSL and the SLD differ on just about everything. The PSL wants the concordat ratified; the SLD does not. The PSL opposed the laws on powiats and on the sale of land to foreigners; the SLD defended them. The PSL wants capital punishment; the SLD does not.

Opinion polls seem to show that the PSL tactics are yielding the expected results. Whereas it had only 5 percent support in November, the party enjoyed the support of 10 percent in March and 12 percent in April (poll results from the OBOP). Unless this trend is reversed and Pawlak's critics elect a new leader, the chairman has nothing to worry about.

Poland: Advantages of Israeli Missile Over U.S. Hellfire

WS2105142496 Warsaw SZTANDAR in Polish
20 May 96 p 5

[Report by Wojciech Luczak: "The 'Bombing' Truth About Missiles for Huzars"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *A prototype of the Polish combat helicopter will be ready for military testing in three years. The Huzar is to be equipped with a gunsight system; manufactured by the Israeli-based ELOP company and NT-D antitank missiles produced by the Rafael concern from Haifa.*

A third Israeli concern—ELBIT—will be responsible for integrating all the armament elements (including a 20-mm U.S. cannon) with the military version of the Sokol helicopter manufactured in Swidnik.

Despite huge pressure from the U.S. Rockwell corporation, which offered its Hellfire II missile after the bid had been already closed, the Committee for Defense Issues of the Council of Ministers [KSORM] chose to cooperate with the Israelis. The issue is basically closed. Only details of the contract remain to be negotiated.

Missiles From Mesko?

According to several high-ranking Polish military experts, charges that the Israeli missile is merely a prototype are insignificant. The first missiles are to be purchased in 1999, when the antitank Huzar is ready. The NT-D missile, which is to be completed by that time, could be produced at the Mesko plant. The Israelis are ready to fully share the production technology with Poland. The earliest purchases of the first 150 antitank missiles for the Huzar are projected for 1999. Over a period of 14 years (up to the year 2012), the Ministry of National Defense [MON] intends to purchase 2,000 missiles launched from helicopters and 3,000 missiles for the infantry. Total purchases, together with more than 250 ground launch pads, are estimated to be worth \$500 million.

There Was No Bribery

According to the Polish military experts, the KSORM decision is not the result of coincidence, pressure, or bribery, as U.S. sources suggest. Several independent groups of experts from the Military Technical Academy, the MON and the Ministry of Industry carried out an in-depth analysis of each of the antitank missiles offered to Poland. Hellfire II was no exception. Even if the missile had been considered in the course of the bid, it would have failed the tests.

Polish experts point out that data is being manipulated. The Polish media are showered with data showing the exquisite qualities of the Hellfire II missile. Yet Rockwell is one of the few producers which are not willing to sell manufacturing rights to Poland. This was clearly stated in a letter that a high-ranking U.S. diplomat recently sent to the Polish president. The Americans do not want the very heart of the missile—the homing warhead—to be assembled in Poland. Rockwell manufactures only 50 percent of the Hellfire II subunits. Separate negotiations would thus have to be entered into with each of the coproducers.

Dregs for Poland

Poland was offered a passe version of the Hellfire II missile that has been developed since the 1970's (AGM-114K). It is true that some lesser NATO states did purchase the Hellfire to equip AH-64 Apache combat helicopters (e.g. Greece). The more technologically advanced countries, however, such as Great Britain and the Netherlands, placed their bets on the modern AGM-114L Longbow missiles which have a unique target homing system. The two European pillars of NATO—Germany and France—having survived a hysterical pressure campaign launched by Rockwell lobbyists, resembling the one Poland has recently lived through,

have been developing their own system of Trigat antitank guided missiles (the British did not back out of the project even after they had selected the Apache helicopter with Longbow missiles).

Sand Versus Missile

After the Gulf War, at the motion of U.S. congressmen, the General Accounting Office—not heeding data from the Pentagon—analyzed the utility of Hellfire missiles against the Iraqis. In an official U.S. report cited by the "INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW" (Vol. 6/92), we read that sand dust and smoke adversely affected the effectiveness of the intricate laser homing system of the Hellfire missiles: they hit 76 percent of the targets. Our experts point out they were used against Iraqi tanks devoid of any system to deter the Hellfires.

Pact Curtain

The newest generations of Warsaw Pact tanks were equipped with a special system misleading the Hellfire missiles. The T-80 and T-90 families used in Russia and Ukraine are protected by an optoelectronic system of deterring Hellfires known as Sztora 1 [Curtain 1]. The widely acclaimed "Jane's International Defense Weekly" (No. 3/96) claims that Sztora 1 reduces the risk of hits by TOW, Dragon Hellfire and Maverick missiles by four to five times.

This is why laser homing systems, such as the one used in Hellfire missiles, have been abandoned. A new version of missiles—AGM-114L Longbow—was thus developed.

Fight for the Eastern Market

Yet even this is a temporary solution. The world is leaning toward long-range antitank missiles steered by a television camera. The picture of a target is automatically stored in the memory until that target is hit. This is how the newest U.S. Javelin antitank missile works. Only one of the steering systems of the Israeli NT-D missiles works this way. Another element allows transmitting images from the camera lens to the launching site by optical cable. The trajectory of the missile can thus be additionally corrected. The Hellfire II weighs some 50 kg, the NT-D weighs only 25 kg. The Israeli missile is capable of ripping through an approximately 1,200 mm-thick steel armor protected by a layer of explosive reactive armor. Polish experts claim that, by combining the inexpensive and lightweight Huzar with an ultramodern antitank missile, we can manufacture in Poland and export without any limitations, which will spark competitiveness, particularly on the Asian markets. The truth is that potentates are fighting to eliminate it.

Romania: Presence of NATO Troops for PFP Drills Approved

AU2105142796 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1300 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] During its afternoon session today, the Romanian Chamber of Deputies sanctioned Romanian President Ion Iliescu's request for authorization to hold in our country in 1996 certain drills and military training actions of the Romanian Army with the participation of NATO military units, as well as with troops of other Partnership for Peace [PFP] signatory countries.

The remark of Silviu Somicu, the leader of the PSM [Socialist Party of Labor] parliamentary faction, according to whom parliament cannot decide on the acceptance of foreign military troops, as the decision on such an issue lies clearly with the Romanian nation, which must express its wish by means of a referendum, triggered heated debates.

In numerous speeches, representatives of the other parliamentary factions insisted on emphasizing that Romania has already signed the framework accord with NATO regarding its participation in the PFP program. One of the articles of that accord stipulates that Romanian presidents have the right to ask parliament to approve the presence of foreign military units in our country for the purpose of participating in military cooperation actions.

Furthermore, upon repeated requests from the PSM deputies, the representative of the National Defense Ministry explained that the financial resources for Romania's participation in the PFP are earmarked in the 1996 State Budget Bill and amount to 14.7 billion lei. [passage omitted]

Romania: Funar Suggests PDSR-PUNR Meetings To End Dispute

AU2105132096 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Gheorghe Funar, president of the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR], has sent a message to Oliviu Gherman, president of the Party of Social Democracy of Romania [PDSR], explaining his party's position on the ruling party's proposal to initiate the procedure to bring the bilateral protocol between the two parties to an end. The first stage of this procedure is to take place today with a meeting of the PDSR-PUNR parity [comisii paritare] commissions.

Mr. Funar mentioned that the letter containing the proposal reached him only yesterday and it was to be examined by the PUNR Standing Bureau tomorrow at

1500. He noted that current election activities make it difficult to establish a proper schedule for the meetings of the joint parity commission that is to be set up. Mr. Funar suggests that, for the beginning, meetings of some joint parity commissions should be convened in Cluj-Napoca and Alba Iulia. In these counties some problems and actions of the PDSR and PUNR are causing disagreements. If the two sides do not manage to overcome local tension at this level, Funar suggests a meeting of the joint parity commission with delegations led by the two parties' vice presidents. The PUNR leader expresses the belief that at this time in particular, when local elections are approaching and political agreements might be reached between the two parties in the second ballots, solutions should be found to settle disagreements. Likewise, Gheorghe Funar says, it would be desirable for the PDSR leaders to refrain from making statements about ending cooperation with the PUNR and dismissing some ministers. Such actions do not serve stability and the continuation of the reform and democratization process.

In conclusion, Funar expresses the belief that through a rational and responsible analysis of the issues, the PDSR and PUNR will be able to continue their cooperation in accordance with the protocol concluded on 1 February 1994.

Romania: PDSR Rejects PUNR Proposal for County-Level Talks

AU2105160296 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1310 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In a press conference today, Mr. Oliviu Gherman, president of the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR], stated that the proposal for a joint PDSR-PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party] parity commission meeting today was not accepted by the PUNR leadership, which today suggested that some other joint parity commissions should hold talks at a local level in the counties of Cluj and Alba.

Furthermore, Oliviu Gherman said that the problems that made them call for a meeting of the joint parity commission are not local in nature but refer to the general stance displayed by the PUNR leadership, after which he added that they suggest that such a meeting should take place on 23 May.

Oliviu Gherman pointed out that in case the PUNR leadership does not show up on that day either, the PDSR leadership will consider itself free of any responsibility regarding the setting forth of the bilateral [governing coalition] protocol, and this could lead to the breaking up, both de facto and de jure, of their cooperation, reports our correspondent, Florin Lepadatu.

**Romania: Minister Says 'Secret Services' Involved
in Elections**

AU2205131396 Bucharest *EVENIMENTUL ZILEI*
in Romanian 20 May 96 p 12

[Article by Daniel Capatos: "Education Minister Liviu
Maier Asserts That There Are Many Secret Services in
Romania That Will Involve Themselves in the Election
Campaign"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday in the "Political
Games" program on Antena 1 [private] television, which
hosted Bela Marko, president of the UDMR [Demo-
cratic Union of Hungarians in Romania], Education
Minister Liviu Maier, and, as an observer, Ion Cristoiu,
director of the *EVENIMENTUL ZILEI* daily, Minister
Maier made the sensational assertion that in Romania
there are many secret services that will involve them-

selves in the election campaign. According to Maier,
they will produce discrediting files on certain politicians.
The education minister failed to mention to which part
of the political scene these already targeted leaders be-
long.

During the same program, Bela Marko said that the
UDMR would decide in June whether to nominate its
own presidential candidate or support one of the other
candidates for the presidency.

In connection with the fact that Virgil Magureanu [di-
rector of the Romanian Intelligence Service—SRI] is
quite often summoned before the parliamentary commit-
tee that supervises the SRI, Cristoiu said that if Magure-
anu was found guilty of the scandals within the SRI, he
should be fired; otherwise, he should be left to carry out
his legal duties.

Slovenia: No Signals From Solana on Possible NATO Membership

AU2105200896 *Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1700 GMT 21 May 96*

[Report from Brussels by Edo Zitnik on a news conference held by Slovene Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek and NATO Secretary General Javier Solana after their talks in Brussels on 21 May]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today's meeting was primarily informative and touched less on the essential issues because Solana, three weeks after his visit to Slovenia, did not have anything substantially new to say. According to Solana, the talks formed a part of the regular exchange of information, which confirmed Slovenia's readiness for the closest possible cooperation with NATO.

He emphasized that Slovenia was the first among the East European countries to start the so-called individual dialogue and that NATO was satisfied with the presentation material put forward by it. According to Prime Minister Drnovsek, today's meeting had been agreed upon during Solana's visit in Ljubljana. Drnovsek reportedly briefed him primarily on the results of his recent visit to the United States and Canada.

To a journalist's question as to whether the North Atlantic Assembly in Greece yesterday truly discussed some concrete countries that would be the first to join NATO, Solana replied negatively. Prime Minister Drnovsek later said that there was talk about three countries which, allegedly, Slovenia might also join. However, as Drnovsek said, nobody wanted to say this aloud.

After the talks with Solana, Drnovsek stressed that Slovenia's main foreign affairs objective—the earliest possible membership in the European Union and NATO—remained unchanged. The prime minister voiced a belief that Slovenia was one of the best prepared countries for membership in NATO and the European Union.

Asked whether the fact that he was meeting with Prime Minister Drnovsek for the second time in a month bore any sort of political message, Solana replied that this was a sign of friendship. He warned, however, that this should not be interpreted too widely. This means that Solana refrained from giving any signals that Slovenia could interpret as indicating special status among the candidates for NATO membership.

Slovenia: Duma Delegation Opposed to Nation in NATO

AU2105150396 *Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene 17 May 96 p 4*

[Report by B.A.: "Differences Only Over NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana, 17 May—Sergey Glotov, head of the delegation of the Russian Parliament lower chamber, which ended a four-day visit to Slovenia, said yesterday that in talks with the Slovene hosts the sides had agreed on all issues except NATO enlargement. "In Russia the government and the people alike are convinced that NATO expansion to the east and the south endangers Russian and European security. Russia is opposed to the proliferation of any sort of interbloc tension and will not enter into military alliances. The Warsaw Pact has been dissolved and we wish that NATO would follow the suit," Glotov said at the news conference.

In his belief, "which is identical to the prevailing opinion in Russia," organizations such as the Council of Europe and the Organization for European Security and Cooperation could play a bigger role in ensuring peace. "We depart from the position that no military or political alliance would contribute to the stability in Europe," Glotov said. Borut Pahor, president of the State Chamber commission for international relations, said that the Slovene side explained to the guests from Russia that Slovenia wished to be in the first circle of countries to join NATO and that the expansion did not represent a threat to the peace and security in Europe.

Glotov mentioned the differences regarding the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Pahor explained that these views differed since the beginning of the conflict. While Moscow sees the war as a civil war, Slovenia sees it as the case of an aggression of one state against another.

Regarding other issues, the head of the Russian delegation said that mutual interests existed. "Russia understands the Slovene desire to join the European institutions. With Mr. Pahor we also discussed ways of coordinating foreign policy actions in the international institutions. We also invited State Chamber Speaker Jozef Skoljc to visit Russia," Glotov said.

Pahor described the visit as a deepening of understanding and friendship. "Our guests from Russia were also interested in our relations with neighboring countries and the EU. We told them that we favored the regulation of our relations with neighboring countries on the basis of equality and mutual respect. As for the EU, we explained that the conflict with Rome in no way changed our loyalty to the European idea. The Russian delegation said that Moscow officials viewed Slovenia

as a West European state and supported it on its way to the EU," Pahor said.

To the question of what stance the Slovene delegation has taken on the military intervention in Chechnya, Pahor replied that "the committee for international relations some time ago passed a statement which condemned forceful resolution of conflicts and violation of human rights." The Russian deputies explained the differences over the Chechen crisis between President Boris Yeltsin and the Duma. A special Duma commission passed several dozen documents, in which it called for the end of the military operation and even passed a law to this effect which Yeltsin did not sign, however. Pahor remarked here that it was precisely this stance that helped Russia to be admitted into the Council of Europe.

The Duma delegation yesterday also met with Foreign Ministry State Secretary Ignac Golob and the delegation of the parliamentary defense committee, headed by Polonca Dobrajc.

Slovenia: EU Sees No Obstacles to Associate Agreement

AU2105154796 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network
in Slovene 1330 GMT 21 May 96

[Report by Edo Zitnik from Brussels—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The main political message of President Santer following the meeting with Slovene Prime Minister Drnovsek is that the European Commission as the executive body of the European Union believes there are no longer any obstacles to the signing of

the agreement on our associate membership. However, Santer, too, insists that the precondition for this is still the fulfillment of the Spanish compromise.

As we understand Santer, the commission is willing to assure the new Italian Government that the platform passed by the Slovene Parliament in April remained unchanged. Prime Minister Drnovsek reportedly assured Santer today that the Slovene Government had all the authority to sign the agreement on the basis of the Spanish compromise. The rapprochement with the European Union remains, according to Drnovsek, Slovenia's fundamental foreign policy orientation, also after the recent fall of the Slovene foreign minister.

Asked whether the commission in reality treats Slovenia as an associate members already, Santer's reply was veiled. According to him, the commission informally treats Slovenia as an associate member—on the assumption, however, that the obstacles to the signing will be removed. He repeated that the commission, just as do 14 of 15 EU members, believes that the conditions for the signing are ripe.

As we understand Prime Minister Drnovsek, Slovenia, following some very optimistic statements by new Italian Prime Minister Prodi, was waiting to hear Rome's official stance on the signing of the agreement. A possible Drnovsek-Prodi meeting is not on the cards yet. According to Drnovsek, at the present stage the contacts with Rome are taking place at the diplomatic level.

Prime Minister Drnovsek will be received by NATO Secretary General Solana this afternoon.

Federal**FRY: Defense Council Supports Dayton Accord Implementation***LD2105145296 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1348 GMT 21 May 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 21 May (TANJUG)—A session of the Supreme Defense Council presided over by Zoran Lilic, president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY], was held in Belgrade today.

According to a statement, the Supreme Defense Council examined a report submitted by the FRY delegation in negotiations on subregional arms control in Vienna. The council confirmed the FRY's firm commitment to pursue a consistent and principled policy of peace and work toward full implementation of all obligations arising from the Dayton Agreement.

The Supreme Defense Council also endorsed instructions and stances which the FRY delegation will urge in further negotiations on subregional arms control, by which our country has unambiguously displayed its commitment to find peaceful and permanent solutions for problems in the Balkans.

The council also examined other issues within its constitutional competence.

In addition to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic, members of the Supreme Defense Council, the session was attended by Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic, Federal Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic, Col-Gen Momcilo Perisic, chief of general staff of the Yugoslav Army, and Defense Council Secretary Maj-Gen Slavoljub Susic, the statement released by the military office of the FRY president says.

FRY: Serbian, Russian Nationalist Party Discuss Ties*LD2205113396 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0938 GMT 22 May 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 22 May (TANJUG)—Vojislav Seselj, chairman of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS], said today that the political alliance between the SRS and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR] "is functioning excellently."

Seselj addressed a special news conference together with Leontiy Arkhipov, secretary general of the LDPR, and said that over the past few days, delegations of the two parties conducted political talks on intensifying cooperation.

Local and Russian reporters asked Arkhipov to comment on the forthcoming presidential elections in Rus-

sia which will also be contested by LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. Arkhipov said that preelection polls putting Boris Yeltsin and Gennadiy Zyuganov in the lead give a false picture because they are based on the results of last year's elections for the State Duma.

He said that the elections will show the real situation and that from 17 June onward Russia will not be "Yeltsin's or Zyuganov's, it will be Zhirinovskiy's."

The reporters also heard the text of an SRS statement extending support to "patriotic forces in Russia" and for Zhirinovskiy's nomination.

The LDPR delegation which attended the Fourth Homeland Congress of the SRS on Saturday is returning to Moscow today.

FRY: Mladic Attends Burial of Serb Gen Djukic*LD2105191796 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1824 GMT 21 May 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 21 May (SRNA)—The [Bosnian] Serb Republic Army's Lt-Col-Gen Djordje Djukic [recently released from The Hague tribunal for health reasons] was buried this afternoon in Belgrade's Novo Groblje cemetery. In addition to the relatives of Gen Djukic and a large number of Belgrade citizens, the burial was also attended by Col-Gen Ratko Mladic, chief of staff of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic Army, as well as Gen Milan Gvero and Gen Novica Simic. [passage omitted]

FRY: Mladic, Perisic Attend Djukic Memorial Service*AU2205082896 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 22 May 96 p 6*

[Report by B. Matevski: "Served His People Till Death"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A commemoration service was held yesterday in the Central Club of the Yugoslav Army for deceased Serb Republic Army General Djordje Djukic. The service was attended by his family; Lieutenant General Ratko Mladic, chief commander of the Serb Republic Army, and his associates; Lieutenant General Momcilo Perisic, chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army; as well as a great number of friends, comrades, and officers in the Yugoslav Army and the Serb Republic Army. [passage omitted]

[Box, p 6]**Mladic Arrived With Perisic**

Lieutenant General Ratko Mladic, chief commander of the Serb Republic Army, arrived at the Central Club

of the Yugoslav Army together with General Momcilo Perisic, chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army. After the commemoration service the two of them left the building amid tight security measures, to applause and waves from the citizens gathered in front.

Serbia

Serbia: Belgrade, Zagreb Negotiate Oil Deal

AU2105162396 Paris AFP in English
1610 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, May 21 (AFP)—Serbian and Croatian negotiators met in Belgrade this week to discuss reopening an oil pipeline between the island of Krk in northern Croatia to Pancevo, near Belgrade, the daily NASA BORBA said Tuesday.

The link is seen as an important step in normalising relations between the two countries. However, both sides are still negotiating the cost of transporting the oil from the Adriatic, which Croatia initially set at 15 dollars per barrel. Quoting unofficial sources, the paper said the Croatian oil company INA agreed to lower the price, but no concrete accord had yet been reached.

The pipeline resumed operations on May 7, but Serbia has declined to use it because of the dispute. The structure was built in the 1970s with the help of foreign credits as well as contributions from all the refineries in the former Yugoslavia, except for one in Skopje. Croatia stopped delivering oil to the rump Yugoslavia—which comprises Serbia and Montenegro—shortly after the conflict with Serbia began in 1991.

Serbia: Milosevic Receives 'Acting' Serb Republic President

LD2105203496 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1837 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 21 May (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic today received Biljana Plavsic, acting Serb Republic president, and Nikola Koljevic, Serb Republic vice president, who briefed him on the most important political activities in the Serb Republic.

These activities are primarily aimed at fully implementing the Dayton Agreement and the economic recovery of the Serb Republic.

It was stressed that the forthcoming elections were of crucial importance for creating democratic institutions and that it was necessary in this connection to achieve full cooperation with the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission which is in charge of elections in line with the Dayton Agreement.

Particular stress was laid on the need to secure freedom of movement and to appoint electoral commissions in all municipalities in the Serb Republic in due time.

Acting Serb Republic President Biljana Plavsic also informed President Milosevic about the preparation of instructions for the equal presentation of political parties in the election campaign in the Serb Republic.

The talks were also attended by Federal Deputy Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic.

Serbia: Trade Union Threatens More Demonstrations in Nis

LD2105212396 Belgrade FONET in Serbo-Croatian 1837 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Nis, 21 May (FONET)—The trade union of the Electronics Industry [EI] from Nis issued a statement today, saying that all employees of the largest state electronics company belong to a "party of the hungry."

"We have been striking since 24 April because our very survival is under threat," the statement says and adds: "We want to work, to earn our living, and to have a dignified life."

According to Velimir Pavlovic, a member of the EI strike committee, the Serbian Government has promised to provide urgent financial aid by 24 May—2 million dinars for minimum wages unpaid in February and March.

"If this deadline is not respected, we will all pour into the streets," Pavlovic said. He added that the money would be distributed to the poorest workers and that at least 5 million more dinars were needed to fund the minimum wages. [passage omitted]

Serbia: Opposition Leader Believes Karadzic Should Go

LD2105154496 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1346 GMT 21 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 21 May (TANJUG)—Vuk Draskovic, chairman of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), said today that the "removal" of Radovan Karadzic from the political arena would be beneficial for the people in the Serb Republic (RS).

Speaking at a news conference, Draskovic stressed that Karadzic "has handed over only part of his responsibilities to Biljana Plavsic, the vice president of the RS."

Commenting on the postponement of Croatia's application for membership of the Council of Europe, he expressed hope that "Europe will close the door to Croatia

as long as the human rights of all people in Croatia are not respected in full."

According to him, Tudjman, who plans to bury victims and murderers alike in Jasenovac [former concentration camp] is offending not only the Serb nation but also the other victims of "savage nazism."

"Tudjman's intention is a disgrace to our civilization," Draskovic said and added that "by doing so Tudjman is bitterly offending all those who defeated nazism."

Asked whether the Democratic Coalition (SPO, Democratic Party and Civic Alliance of Serbia) maintains contacts with Vojislav Kostunica, chairman of the Democratic Party of Serbia, he answered, "No, why should it?"

Draskovic said that the "Democratic Coalition, which will revive Serbia, has already been formed."

He said that 99 percent of citizens whom he meets and who want changes "are demanding openly" that Vojislav Seselj [chairman of the Serbian Radical Party] is not included on the list of the united opposition.

Kosovo

Kosovo: Rugova on U.S. Role in Resolving Kosovo Issue

AU2205094996 *Pristina KOSOVO DAILY REPORT in English* 20 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The limitations of a society under occupation are too familiar, but we have proved that we can exist as a society and state, President of the Republic of Kosova Dr. Ibrahim Rugova said in an interview with the ORA [THE TIME] weekly newsmagazine on Friday, 17 May 1996.

Touching on the current situation in Kosova, in the aftermath of the tragic incidents that occurred late April, President Rugova said the people have been greatly concerned. "There has been a growing understanding of the people over the need to be cautious and not to fall prey to provocations," Dr. Rugova said, noting that extremist Serb groups may be used to provoke the situation. We have called for the people to refrain themselves, not out of fear, but to take precautions, for the future of Kosova is at stake, President Rugova remarked. He said he appreciated the concern of the international community, first and foremost the United States, who have stepped up presence here. The visit of (Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of State) Rudolf Perina early this month, together with the planned opening of the U.S. office in Prishtina are very important events, president of the Republic of Kosova said.

If you look back to the year 1990, you would see the entire people thrown into the streets, President Rugova said, adding that we have sustained our life and been striving for our goals: freedom and independence. The example of Eastern Germany is proof of what a people befallen by evil can experience, Dr. Rugova remarked. "A lot has changed in our consciousness; we have built a shield and moved ahead in our bid to drive back (Serbian) occupation," he said.

The 1992 parliamentary and presidential elections were a great achievement in the building of a democratic society, the Kosova president said, noting that the Parliament of Kosova has not met in plenary sessions, but rather operated in groups and commissions, "so as to prevent a gross provocation" by the Serbian regime. The Kosova Government functions, partly abroad, partly here, Dr. Rugova said, noting the paramount importance of the infrastructure of the Democratic League of Kosova (LDK) in Kosova itself and in the diaspora.

In reply to a question by ORA on the fate of the Parliament and the new elections in Kosova, President Rugova said: "In some way, the Parliament has been convening—not in a plenary session, but through parliamentary committees."

We will soon discuss the new elections with the political parties in the Parliament, with other parties, and the parliamentarian groups, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova said, remarking that parliamentary elections are set for this year, whereas presidential ones for next year. "The important thing is we have created a system to move forward," Dr. Rugova emphasized.

President of the Republic of Kosova pleaded for self-respect among the people in Kosova, not a "fanatical self-esteem, but a self-respect in the open world of competition and integrations." Being an ancient people, the oldest in Southeast Europe, accounts for the fact that historically we have not cherished a complex of inferiority, the president said, adding that self-respect feeds generosity, which has been characteristic of our people. "This is what makes Kosova survive."

The citizens, the people of Kosova, have gone determinedly down the route to a political settlement of the Kosova issue, building a society and cherishing a political culture and state-forming thrust, president of the Republic of Kosova told the ORA newsmagazine. "This policy of ours, the resistance we have waged, has been a very active one, for it is daily-based," Dr. Ibrahim Rugova said.

Commenting on the admiration for President Rugova's nonviolent policies, expressed recently by the U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and the European

Democratic Union, and the fact that Dr. Rugova received late last year the PL-Fondens Freedom and Peace Award and has been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize, President Rugova said: "I do not want to talk about myself. The honor the peaceful resistance of the people of Kosova has received is a great capital which will pay dividends in the settlement of the Kosova issue."

Asked to say why the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament have seemed to have advanced views about the Kosova issue, President Rugova said the two legislative bodies have taken an interest in and reacted to the Kosova issue as early as the mid-eighties. "It is natural enough, for parliaments are the voices of the people," President Rugova said, noting that governments, too, have made advancements. The legislative and the executive powers work together, Dr. Rugova said, adding that the "executive power makes concrete steps, which should be weighed carefully."

"We have pressed for U.S. mediation (in the Kosova-Serbia talks process, KIC) because the United States have for years now been following the situation here, and have given concrete assistance to Kosova," President Rugova said in reply to a question by ORA. He made reference to the humanitarian assistance and the permanent presence of U.S. diplomats and humanitarian organizations. "We have asked for U.S. mediation, because the United States have had a leading role in the resolution of numerous problems in the world. Their role in the Dayton accords, in Croatia, their presence in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and in the entire southeast Europe, is proof of this," President Rugova said, expressing his hope the U.S. will lead efforts towards the resolution of the Kosova issue based on the political will of the people of Kosova. The opening of the U.S. office in Prishtina opens prospects for new steps towards the resolution of the Kosova issue, Dr. Rugova concluded.

BULK RATE
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
PERMIT NO. 352
MERRIFIELD, VA.

This is a U.S. Government publication produced by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

FBIS collects, translates, disseminates, and analyzes foreign open-source information on behalf of the U.S. Government. Its publications may contain copyrighted material. ***Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.***

- Bracketed indicators before the first sentence of each item describe the way in which the material was processed by FBIS.
- Headlines and all bracketed explanatory notes are supplied by FBIS.
- Personal and place names are rendered in accordance with the decisions of the U.S. Board on Geographic Names as adapted by FBIS. Unverified names in radio and television material appear in parentheses and are spelled phonetically; words and phrases in parentheses preceded by a question mark are unclear in the original and deduced from context.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

U.S. Government Customers

For a list of FBIS products, to subscribe to an FBIS publication, or to indicate a change of address contact:

FBIS
P.O. Box 2604
Washington, DC 20013-2604
Telephone: (202) 338-6735
FAX: (703) 733-6042

Non-Government Customers

Subscriptions are available from the National Technical Information Service:

NTIS
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, VA 22161
Telephone: (703) 487-4630
FAX: (703) 321-8547

New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.